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Globally there have been important advances in health care; however developing 
nations have been challenged with problems of increasing prevalence of disease, 
changing and rising demands of services and problems of cost containment in 
managing their health systems generally (OECD, 1994, World Health Organisation, 
2005). In the face of these difficulties and with significant influence from the 
international policy arena developing nations began to identify the need for change 
across all aspects of their systems (Smith, 1997). The past thirty years have seen 
more than a third of the world’s developing nations undertake some form of health 
restructuring activity (OECD, 2004, Schou and Haug, 2005). The reforms have 
varied in content and scope from country to country, but most share common 
features such as changes in the institutional configuration of the health care systems, 
health financing and the role of the public and private sector in health care delivery 
(Berman and Bossert, 2000).  
 
Developing countries in the Pacific have faced the dilemma of a growing burden of 
diseases and the weakening of the post-colonial health system infrastructure. The 
introduction of health reforms globally throughout the 1980s created a wave of new 
ideological thinking of how post-colonial health systems could be strengthened and 
reconstructed (Litvack et al., 1998). This study examines Fiji as a specific case study 
of health system reform from 1999 to 2004 and focuses on reform implementation 
concerns. 
 
The review is complemented by 55 interviews with senior public servants, health 
minsters, academics and medical and health system bureaucrats and traditional chiefs 
involved in the reform experience. Context of the reforms is provided by in depth 
interviews and literature and government reports. Considine’s (Considine, 1994) 
public policy framework helped guide the approach of the study and the 
methodological design of the research was intrinsic case study (Yin, 2012a).  
 
Understanding the policy implementation experience for developing countries is 





developed nations. Key areas of focus in this thesis include a study of the behaviour 
of political institutions and actors in the reforms and the context in which the reforms 
took place and how these factors affected the implementation process. 
 
Analysis of the qualitative data highlights a poor understanding of both political and 
contextual knowledge of Fiji as well as a lack of understanding by reformists of the 
effect of Fijian culture on change management processes. Attitudinal factors 
associated with leadership, power and culture are determinants of the reform process. 
Awareness of reform processes and the importance of stakeholders’ support and 
engagement in the implementation of a reform activity are not well understood. This 
study identifies the importance of understanding a country’s political history and its 
societal values, when considering a shift in the political landscape of change. Reform 
approaches based on global experiences highlights their limited effectiveness and use 
in developing island nation settings are important finding of this study.  
 
The review of the implementation process of the reforms highlights that Fiji’s 
Ministry of Health does not have sufficient capacity to reform its system. There is 
little systemic capacity to develop, plan and implement reforms during a period of 
continuous political instability. Strengthening a country’s ability to analyse and 
design health system change, particularly in developing country settings where a 
culture of health policy making is weak and a strong culture and traditional mandate 
of the people remains, is challenging. The importance of health policy analysis (Walt 
and Gilson, 1994) and its use in the development country settings is paramount to the 

















This thesis identifies, describes, analyses and discusses the policy implementation 
experience of Fiji health reforms which took place between 1999 and 2004. It is the 
first in depth study to be carried out on the Fiji health policy experience (Aumua et 
al., 2009). The study examines the relationships and links between political 
institutions, policy actors, the political environment, and the values and culture that 
existed within the public policy making system in Fiji. The research identifies and 
examines the importance of these multiple issues and the inter-related experiences of 
each of these issues in the reform process. The culmination of analysis of these key 
issues is intended to help explain what happened in Fiji during the health reforms. 
 
This chapter introduces the study by providing the background and rationale for the 
study. It introduces the specific research objectives and explains in brief the 
conceptual framework that guided the project. The significance of the study is 
explained and an overview of the thesis and its limitations are described. 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
My research interest in this project started in 1998 while working in a policy role in 
the New Zealand Health Ministry. I took both a professional and personal interest in 
the health reform activity. As the Fiji reforms rolled out, I became a committed 
observer . In 2004, in the final year of the reform programme, the Fiji Ministry of 
Health (MOH) presented a paper at the Pasifika Medical Association (PMA) 
Conference in Fiji on the progress of the Fiji Health Management Reform Project 
(FHMRP), which drew attention to several key issues related to the implementation 
of the reforms. These related specifically to the challenges within the wider policy 
environment as well as concerns around the capacity of the MOH in Fiji to 
implement the reforms. 
 
The 2004 conference provided a platform that brought together policy makers in the 





managing the implementation of in-country reform programmes. From this point, my 
interest grew into more formal discussions with donors, academics and ministries of 
health in the region and eventually evolved into a PhD research project in 2007.  
 
Further impetus for the study came also after the release in 2007 of work undertaken 
by Gill Walt and colleagues at the London School of Hygiene, who released a series 
of papers derived from a workshop on health policy analysis. The results of the 
workshop concluded with a series of recommendations for the ‘future directions’ of 
health policy analysis in development country settings (Buse, 2008). 
 
The workshop recommendations called for a stronger focus on research on health 
policy analysis, including the following recommendations: (Buse, 2008) 
x A more explicit focus on the methods for doing policy analysis by increasing 
the methodological diversity within policy analysis by drawing more 
extensively on experience from other fields while paying greater attention to 
the benefits and limitations of different methodological approaches. 
x Enhancing reflexivity in relation to both the relationships between 
researchers and policy actors and the manner in which the findings from 
policy analysis are used to engage with policy actors. 
x Better use of the existing, but often descriptive, body of policy analysis 
through: 
x Synthesis of existing case study material using theoretically robust and well-
structured approaches to synthesis of findings;
x Collation of lessons learnt from country case studies that have a common 
topic focus or common framework;
x Collation of lessons learnt from all the health policy analysis studies carried 
out in a single country.
 
These recommendations formed the underpinning basis and ideas of some of the key 
objectives and questions that have driven this research project. 
 
Prior to committing to the research project, I undertook a more formal process of 





interest and support for a study of this kind, including several consultations with 
AusAID (the funder of the reforms) and Aus Health International (Australian 
managing contractors), who were involved in the reform design and 
implementation,1 as well as with the MOH of Fiji. These discussions helped me to 
identify a range of preliminary issues that the study could cover.  
 
AusAID officials encouraged me to consider an evaluation of the reforms, in 
particular their role in the reform project. This was a serious consideration; however, 
after discussions with other keys stakeholders, it was decided this was not a priority 
for Fiji. Australia’s role is nevertheless highlighted in various aspects of the study. 
Fijian ministry officials, on the other hand, signalled their concerns with regards to  
reforms processes and encouraged me to consider certain questions in the study. 
These questions and issues have naturally manifested themselves in the data analysis 
process. 
 
Consulting with stakeholders early in the project before the development of the 
study’s design assisted me in gathering some ideas around key issues and gaps in 
information that would be useful to Fiji. Assessing how the MOH in Fiji might view 
the project and its relevancy and usefulness early in the development of the study 
was a strategy that helped me over the entire project period and ensured political and 
cultural safety, not only for the project but for myself. This approach from the 
researcher’s perspective is an appropriate method in case study research (Darke et 
al., 1998) and confirms the study’s potential contribution to improving Fiji’s health 
policy environment by having all stakeholders consulted at the outset of the study 
(Aumua et al. 2009). 
 
1.2 Republic of Fiji 
Fiji is categorised as a developing nation (World Bank, 2012) and has the largest and 
most extensive health system in the Pacific region, excluding Papua New Guinea. It 
has, like many other small island nations in the region, struggled over the past three 
decades to deliver health services to its population, who are spread over a large 
                                               





geographical region and include outer and remote islands and rural village-based 
populations. Providing a responsive and appropriate health service in a country of 
significant geographical difficulties is one of Fiji’s many health system challenges. 
Other problems have included the management of limited resources, fragmented 
health services, reduced workforce numbers and a powerful centralised 
administrative system (World Health Organisation, 2011, Government of Fiji, 1996). 
Between 1999 and 2003, the Government of Fiji, as part of a series of wider public 
sector reform initiatives, implemented a programme of health reforms entitled 
FHMRP, with the purpose ‘to improve health system performance and delivery 
through the restructure and decentralised Fiji’s health management system’. 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
The overarching aim of this research project was to synthesise a coherent description 
of the policy implementation process of the Fiji health management reforms 
(FHMRP, 1999 to 2004).  
 
This is a study of policy; it is concerned with examining key areas within the policy 
making environment that influenced the policy implementation outcomes. The 
project’s primary focus is the architecture of Fiji’s health policy system and how 
health policy was developed and implemented in Fiji during this period.  To achieve 
this aim, the study explores numerous issues and factors that affected the 















The study is underpinned by Considine’s (1994) framework of policy processes 




Figure 1 Structure of policy systems diamond (Considine 1994; pg 9) 
 
The specific objectives of the research were: 
1. To investigate the role of the key stakeholders, their relationships and the 
extent of their influence in shaping the development and implementation of 
the FHMRP. 
2. To analyse the role of the various policy institutions and their influence on 
the reform implementation process. 
3. To investigate the role and nature of the political, economic and social 
environment and its influence in shaping the design and implementation of 
the reforms. 
4. To determine the importance and role of culture and values in the 
development of policy during the reform process. 
5. To identify the process of implementation of the reforms. 
 
The first objective relates to the experience of key policy actors and stakeholders in 
the Fiji policy system, which included individual actors, professional associations, 
industrial unions, academic institutions and groupings of actors. This objective 
answered the questions surrounding how actors used their power and influence to 
develop strategies which they used as individuals and as groups to ‘get what they 
wanted’ in the policy process. An analysis of the actors and their behaviour was an 
important and revealing contribution to the case study. 
Policy Actors 






The second objective examined the role of policy institutions and is focused on the 
agency and institutional level. This included examining processes and relationships 
between the organisations that held institutional and legislative power within the 
policy making process. This objective sought to understand how institutions laid the 
pathway down which the policy had to travel. An analysis of the legislative 
arrangements, policy and governance legacies and the history of institutions that 
directly influenced what happened within a policy process was fundamental to 
answering this objective. Key institutions included MOH, the Public Service 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance. Questions were posed to these agencies 
that revolved around their policy authority, their relationships with each other and 
their role in the reform process. 
 
The third objective examined the policy culture in Fiji during the reform period. This 
objective is a consideration of the policy values and knowledge of the various 
stakeholders and the tension they brought to bear on the policy process. Further, it 
sought to understand why policy actors and institutions struggled to control what 
they held as important and how this influenced behaviour and preferences. An 
analysis of the culture of Fiji’s public service and Fijian culture in relation to power 
within the public service was an important inclusion. These elements provided the 
study with important evidence in relation to the implementation of the reforms. 
 
The fourth objective examined the political economy of Fiji’s health system and the 
reforms. An analysis of the health systems resources, infrastructure and decision 
making processes was necessary to understanding the broader context of Fiji’s public 
policy processes. An examination of Fiji’s societal values and their influence on 
Fiji’s governance and traditional structures were part of this analysis. Data from 
reports and archival matter together with interviews with leading politicians, senators 
and public servants on these issues provided a perspective on the wider political and 
environmental issues during the reform period. 
 
The fifth objective was an examination of the process of the reforms. This included 
an analysis of project documentation, historical reports and archival data together 





reform process. Its importance lay in the reality of ‘what really happened’ versus 
what was ‘intended and planned’, and why. 
 
1.4 Significance and Contributions of the Study 
There is a notion that health systems, particularly those in low and middle income 
countries (LMIC), are in urgent need of reform to improve systems development and 
efficiency and population health outcomes (Cassells, 1990, Mills, 1990, Mills, 1997, 
Cassels, 1995b). The majority of reform policies used for restructuring health 
systems in developing countries have tended to be along the lines of decentralisation 
(Bossert et al., 1998, Mills, 1997). Decentralisation as a concept has been firmly 
entrenched in health reformist thinking and has been espoused by global 
organisations who have promoted health system reforms as part of their development 
agenda (World Bank, 2000, OECD, 1994). 
 
However, two to three decades of health sector reform experiences in many 
countries, including the Pacific region, appear to have done little to improve the 
stated problems of health system effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness 
(Berman and Bossert, 2000). A semi-formal evaluation of the Fiji decentralisation 
experience has taken place (Mohammad, 2011). An end-of-project report by the 
reform consultants was completed in 2004 and noted the key milestone achievements 
of the project (Aus Health International, 2004a). The reports were viewed with some 
scepticism by Fijian authorities as they were presented as a reflective review of the 
consultant organisations’ achievement of the project’s milestones.  
 
More recently, it has been reported that the Government of Fiji in 2006 and more 
recently recognised a number of key problems that have stemmed from the reform 
process that warrant a fuller review of the effectiveness of the health reform project 
(Australian Agency for International Development, 2006). This study, therefore, 
goes some way to assisting Fiji to better understand what happened during the 
reforms. In particular, it highlights the importance of policy knowledge and 






The project is important for Fiji. From a research perspective, the importance of 
having appropriate and trustworthy, researched information available to policy 
makers will assist in building greater confidence in those responsible for using the 
information (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Second, at a policy level, the study will 
have implications for improving the development of health policy in Fiji as a country 
that has struggled in recent years to formalise a whole health sector policy 
framework focused on health system strengthening (Oconnor, 2001). A major 
priority for the research was the study of the reform process, which included aspects 
such as the influence of the political, social and economic environment and the 
distribution of power and influence between stakeholders and the state. The results of 
this analysis are important for Fiji policy makers and policy institutions, who often 
fail to take account of the extent that environmental and contextual issues influence a 
change process (Schneider et al., 2006, Buse, 2008) 
 
At a government level, the research is important for politicians and government 
leaders who are ultimately responsible for policy development and achievement. 
Information regarding the complexity of reform process as a government-wide 
strategy and the issues associated with reform development and sustainability will be 
important for Fiji as it continues the implementation of health system changes and 
public sector reforms. 
 
At the institutional level of policy making, issues of institutional relationships and 
their role within reform programmes were examined. The study will highlight the 
challenges of institutions and their capacity to implement the reforms. At a 
community level, key issues in the research have been drawn out that will benefit the 
wider health sector such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), industrial 
unions, international aid and donor agencies and other government donors, in 
particular, the recognition of their power and ability to influence a government 
change process. 
 
Finally, at a regional level, the study will benefit other Pacific nations who have 
embarked on reforms in recent years who have similar public service structures and 





international organisations who have promoted health reforms and who have 
contributed to both policy development advice and funding of reform initiatives in 
the Pacific region will observe with interest the findings of this study. 
 
Methodologically, the case study contributes to the qualitative research gap in health 
reforms (Buse, 2008). There is need for better qualitative data, in particular, more in 
depth knowledge on reform experiences in developing nations. Case study 
methodology is a method that entails the intensive collection of data on all aspects of 
this case. It is a methodology that has traditionally not been utilised well enough in 
the study of health policy analysis (Buse, 2008). 
 
The study will further contribute to the body of knowledge regarding health policy 
analysis and implementation of health policy in developing countries. The challenges 
of implementing a reform programme in small island nations that are reliant on 
external resources to support their development are also highlighted. Transferability 
of the reform experience to other small island nations in the region such as Tonga, 
Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa is linked with many of these elements. 
 
From a Fijian Indigenous woman’s researcher perspective, this project is important. 
A 2003 report noted that more than 80 per cent of research undertaken and published 
about Fiji health issues is researched and written by non-Fijians (Finau, 2003). 
Research by Pacific researchers on the Pacific remains one of the Pacific’s most 
challenging and significant shortcomings (Thaman, 2002). Finau’s report further 
notes the lack of female Indigenous researchers working in the Fiji health system 
(Finau, 2003). 
 
1.5 Contextual Challenges for the Study 
Political Tension 
The period during which this research project was carried out was a politically 
unstable period in Fiji (Lal, 2006). Several political coups had ensued and there was 
emerging political and ethnic tension across the public sector. The environment was 
not particularly conducive for open and frank discussions with public servants. 





research process and manifested in their cautious responses to questions. 
Respondents were concerned that answers should not be misinterpreted or 
misconstrued. This level of cautiousness did not always allow for a free flow of 
information with some participants and was constraining from the researcher’s 




While undertaking the data collection aspect of the study, I was living in Perth, 
Western Australia. I was only able to travel intermittently and not for long periods of 
time. At the time when the bulk of the interviews were undertaken, the MOH was 
undergoing an internal management restructure,2 adding another level of stress to the 
participants and their work environment and to the already sensitive political 
tensions within the MOH. 
 
Cultural Responsiveness 
While my own set of beliefs and values guided the way I went about the research 
process, the importance of knowing my cultural place was key and guided the way I 
managed the study. As an Indigenous Fijian female researcher, it was important for 
me to ensure that I understood the multiple roles I played when working in Fiji. 
Ancestral obligations, perceptions, reactions, attitudes and responses were part of the 
research process. 
 
It was necessary for me to remain within a culture- and gender-sensitive framework 
when speaking and gathering information from individuals. It was important to 
maintain respectful recognition of participants’ ages, clan membership and social 
status. As a Fijian, this can often be a confining situation, particularly when 
attempting to gather information that could be seen as not in my realm of relevance 
from a cultural and gender perspective. I managed these limitations as best I could 
while assuming a posture of cultural recognition of my role as well as my cultural 
and gender limitations in this process. 
                                               






As an Indigenous Fijian health worker, I have a natural concern and affinity with all 
things Fijian and, in particular, with issues that affect the health status of the people 
of Fiji.  In choosing the FHMRP as my research project, I found an opportunity to 
contribute to the development of the country’s health system while living outside of 
Fiji. This project allowed me to utilise years of knowledge and experience gained in 
a field in which Fiji has limited capacity.  The concept of reciprocity is an important 
Fijian cultural principle. The act of returning what you have taken or returning what 
you have enjoyed or benefited from for the good of more than just yourself is of 
cultural and personal importance. It is customary and expected to give back. This 
principle has been at the heart of what has driven this research. This thesis is what I 
take back to my Fijian community after spending many years away.  
 
The learning from this study is my returning gift, it is my tabua (whale’s tooth)3 and 
it is intended that the benefits of this learning will not only benefit the Fiji health 
system but will go some way to assist in improving the health of the people of Fiji 
and my own tribal clan. These concepts embody my personal and cultural 
responsibilities to my community and have been the underlying motivation of this 
work. The improvement of the health of the people of Fiji has remained the most 
important motivating factor in choosing this case. 
 
1.6 Overview of the Thesis 
The structure and design of this study is based on what Yin (Yin, 2012a) calls a 
linear analytical structure. The thesis is an explanatory case study. Chapters 1 to 4 
provide the necessary information and background to the project. Chapters 5 to 6 are 
the analysis chapters. Chapter 7 discusses the findings and makes recommendations 
for further exploration. 
 
This present Chapter 1 provides the background and rationale for the study, and 
introduces the research objectives and issues. 
 
                                               
3 In Fijian culture, the symbolism of a whale’s tooth is the highest and most sacred gift that one can 





Chapter 2 reviews the literature relevant and necessary to the current study on 
health reform implementation and explores why there is lack of success of health 
reforms worldwide and why, in particular, health reforms have been unsuccessful in 
developing nations. The literature review makes a case for using broad contextual 
policy analysis to analyse the challenges of policy implementation in a developing 
country. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology and methods. Considine’s (1994) 
theoretical framework is discussed and the three qualitative data collection methods 
are described. The usefulness of case study methodology and qualitative methods as 
appropriate tools in the analysis of policy are examined. 
 
Chapter 4 provides background information on the Republic of Fiji, its people, its 
colonial history and the challenges and problems in Fiji’s health system that 
prompted the need for the FHMRP. The reforms objectives and approach are also 
outlined in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces Fiji’s political institutions and their role in the policy making 
environment in Fiji. It discusses the role of the three main political institutions 
involved in the reforms. It highlights the importance and centrality of policy 
institutions and their influence on the policy implementation process and the role of 
Fijian culture in the political institutional process. 
 
Chapter 6 provides an examination and analysis of some of the actors, and the 
issues that mobilised them during the reform implementation. It examines the role of 
medical power and its influence on the reform process. The role of external technical 
advisors was part of this analysis.  
 
The final discussion, conclusions and limitations related to the findings are found in 
Chapter 7. This chapter includes a discussion on health policy theory processes that 
helps explain what happened in Fiji. Also included are recommendations to meet the 












The purpose of this review is to place this current study in its context. The first part 
of the review reports on the subject of global health reforms and its history and 
importance, is followed by a discussion on health policy analysis and key ideas and 
challenges within the existing body of knowledge. The second part of the review 
discusses health policy analysis and its importance in health policy reform 
implementation. This thesis is concerned with understanding the importance of 
issues and ideas related to implementing health policy and the importance of factors 
such as politics, context and culture. 
 
The case for undertaking policy analysis has been made by a number of scholars and 
practitioners. However, there is very little guidance on how to undertake health 
policy analysis in low-income countries (Walt et al., 2008). (Walt and Gilson, 1994) 
argued that health policy analysis was central to health reforms. They assert that 
there is very little attention to how countries should carry out reforms, much less 
who is likely to favour or resist such policies. Reforms are therefore likely to fail 
because very little analysis is undertaken to assess who will support the 
implementation of policies without taking into consideration factors that affect 
implementation (Gilson et al., 2008, Walt and Gilson, 1994). 
 
In the search for relevant literature, there were a number of broad areas of enquiry 
(Table 1). Accordingly, a number of different search strings were used. These are 
highlighted in Table 2. In online searches of library-based catalogues and databases, 











Table 1  Literature Search and Strategy 
Literature Category Method 
 
Published literature such as books, 
peer-reviewed articles in journals 
and other scholarly papers and 
reports. 
 
Curtin University library catalogue. 
Curtin University ‘Gecko’ collection of 
databases, including those under ‘Health 
Sciences’, ‘Humanities’ (includes public 
policy) and ‘Public Health’ categories. 
Manual searches of the reference lists of 
relevant book chapters, articles and reports. 
Internet search, including ‘Google Scholar’ 
and ‘Google’. 
 
Scanning of the websites of major relevant 
organisations, such as the United Nations, 
Secretariat Pacific Community South Pacific 
Forum, World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and the governments of Fiji, Samoa and 
Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea  
‘Grey’ or not publicly available 
literature, e.g., technical reports 
from government agencies and 
reports or working papers from 
research groups, consultancies or 
committees.  
Direct contact and enquiry with relevant 
authors and organisations. 
Scanning of ongoing work announced in 
relevant organisations’ newsletters, websites 










Table 2 Literature Search Strings 
Area of Enquiry  Search Strings Utilised 
The history and practice of 
health policy and policy 
analysis in the field of public 
health. 
 (‘public health’ OR ‘ health reforms’ OR health 
‘policy analysis’ AND ‘reforms’) (‘history’ OR 
‘practice’ OR ‘health policy theory*’ OR 
‘strategy*’ OR ‘method*’)  
  (‘public health’ OR ‘public health policy’ OR 
‘health reforms’ AND ‘health’ OR ‘policy*’ OR 
‘*’policy analysis’ OR ‘implementation of 
policy*’ OR ‘reforms*’). 
 
The health system in Fiji 
 
   ‘Fiji*’ AND ‘health’. 
 
History and culture of the 
Republic of Fiji. 
 
‘Fiji’ AND (‘history’ OR ‘culture’ OR ‘society’ 
OR ‘social’ OR ‘tradition*’ OR ‘custom’). 
 
The health system in Fiji. 
 
‘Fiji’ AND (‘politics’ OR ‘health policy*’ OR 
‘decentralisation’ OR ‘health systems’ OR 
‘politics*’ OR ‘History*’). 
 




‘Fiji’ AND (‘govern*’ OR ‘parliament*’ OR 
‘constitution*’ OR ‘legislation*’). 
 
 
2.1 Global Health Reforms 
Health reforms are a political and development tool that have been imposed upon 
under-developed, developing as well as industrialized nations for more than 30 years 
(Walt, 1998, Litvack et al., 1998). Much of the literature available on the subject has 
been written by international organizations and funding agencies who have had an 
interest in the political implications of health reforms as well as by leading 





systems (Litvack et al., 1998, OECD, 1994, Berman and Bossert, 2000, Peckham et 
al., 2005, Figueras et al., 1997).   
 
There is no clear definition or universally accepted definition of what constitutes 
health sector reform (Figueras et al., 1997, Cassels, 1995b).  They further suggest 
that health sector reform is a “process concerned with defining priorities, refining 
policies and reforming the institutions through which those policies should be 
implemented.” This definition is useful as it captures the broad range of activities 
that go on within the context of health reforms. There is consensus in the literature 
that reforms are typically understood to be political concepts which involve a “top 
down” process of structural and organizational change (Figueras et al., 1997, 
Saltman et al., 1998). 
 
Much of the reform work in developing countries in the past two decades has 
centered around four main concepts and principles. These have included 1) the 
separation of financing and provision of health services  2) the introduction of cost 
effectiveness analysis to establish policy priorities, 3) resource allocation and the 
introduction of user fees, and health insurance, and 4) the growth of the role of 
private sectors in areas previously considered the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
(Smith, 1997). 
 
The bulk of health reform literature points to the lack of cohesive evidence and detail 
regarding the success of health reforms in developing countries (Rondinelli and 
Shabbir, 1983, Hutchinson and LaFond, 2004). According to Cassels (1995) two to 
three decades of health sector reform experiences in many countries appear to have 
done little to improve the stated problems of health system effectiveness, efficiency 
and responsiveness (Cassels, 1995b). Furthermore the literature does not point to one 
defining issue responsible for the lack of success, rather various studies point to a 
mixed bag of reasons for poor outcomes in health reforms (Cassels, 1995b, Bossert, 
2000, Gonzalez-Rossetti and Bossert, 2000).  
 
Issues range from the inadequate capacity of policy reforming institutions, health 





policy makers, stakeholders, donor agency influence, the complexity and design of 
reform models used in developing countries and in particular the lack of 
understanding of policy implementation processes (Litvack et al., 1998, Walt, 2006).  
However, the one consistent feature in the literature linked to the debate of policy 
reform failure is the recognition that much of the health reforms discourse is 
reflected by a preoccupation of rhetoric and ideology centered around health 
economics and market oriented interventions (Walt et al., 2008, Gilson et al., 2008, 
Lister, 2005, Buse, 2008).  
 
According to (Berman and Bossert, 2000, Buse, 2008) this is highlighted throughout 
the literature by the over emphasis of reformists focusing on system infrastructure 
and the economic and technical aspects of health systems. He suggested that the 
abundance of economic evaluations cited in the literature reflects the primacy of 
financial issues for policy makers and the political pressure to demonstrate 
improvements in fiscal performance by countries under reform. Berman (2000) 
agreed and argued that the lack of recognition and understanding of the social and 
cultural dimension of policy systems in the implementation of reform programmes 
pose serious problems for health reformists. Subsequently he suggested there is a 
need for more qualitative research in order to understand how reform initiatives have 
affected the organizations and stakeholders involved in the reform process and the 
influence of the wider environment on reform implementation (Berman and Bossert, 
2000). 
 
Berman (2000) argued that the most significant determinant to successful reform 
processes is the recognition of the reforms being “purposive” he asserts that reforms 
must be designed to achieve “policy objectives”. Numerous country studies reviewed 
allude to the problem of poor results due to the lack of shared understanding by 
reforming countries of what health reform agendas might be and the lack of clarity 
around the reform purpose. Bossert (2000) suggested that this lack of shared 
understanding by all policy stakeholders is reflected in the way reforming nations 
have struggled with defining problems and subsequently identifying solutions that 
were successful. Policy theorists on the other hand suggest that it is the lack of 





the economic, social and political elements within the environment that affect policy 
formation which are not considered by reformists when undertaking reform 
programmes (Considine, 1994, Colebatch, 2002). The creation of new organizations 
and the endless modifications of systems demonstrate the belief within health reform 
literature that the development of new formal arrangements of any system will 
mistakenly solve all health system problems (Gilson, 2003). Subsequently health 
reforms have not been viewed successfully as part of a global push to improve the 
strengthening of health systems (Lister, 2005). 
 
Reform efforts have historically focused on the development of the content of the 
reform package, neglecting the process of reform and the difficulties of 
implementing and managing change (Walt and Gilson, 1994). Policy analysis can 
contribute to meeting health objectives by revealing the many other key and complex 
issues that underpin the process of change (Walt and Gilson, 1994). 
 
2.2 Health Policy and Analysis 
Health policy analysis is a central strand of health policy systems research. It is 
sometimes understood as technical work that underpins the development of new 
policies or the central element of their evaluation (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008).  It 
can include epidemiological analysis, risk factor analysis, targets for health 
interventions and cost effectiveness, which can help identify the various possible 
interventions to address a particular health problem and which provides the best 
value for money. 
 
Literature on health policy analysis in LMIC has demonstrated that politics, process 
and power must be integrated into the study of health policies and the practice of 
health system development (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008).  Developing nations bear 
the bulk of the world’s disease burden and its negative effects such as weak health 
and financing systems and low numbers and capacity of health workers.  Although 
there have been dramatic improvements in  disease management over the years, there 
is still a notion that health systems, particularly those in LMIC, are in urgent need of 
reform to improve system development, efficiency and population health outcomes 





has been made by various scholars who have argued that appropriate policy analysis 
is central to health reform success (Walt et al., 2008, Walt, 1994, Parsons, 1995).  
 
Health policy analysis is cited as important in health reform success for two reasons 
(Walt et al., 2008). It helps explain why certain health issues receive political 
attention and others do not, such as identification of stakeholders who may support 
or resist policy reforms and why. It can also identify potential and unintended 
consequences of policy decisions, as well as the barriers that undermine policy 
implementation and so jeopardise national and global goals for health 
improvement (Gilson et al., 2008, Gilson and Raphaely, 2008, Buse et al., 2007). 
Historically, policy literature has tended to focus exclusively on general public 
policy that specifically relates to health; however, there has been a growing interest 
in applying general policy knowledge and principles to the concerns of the health 
sector. 
 
This research project is interested in health policy analysis and is concerned with 
policy process (not policy content), which is according to some arguably the biggest 
problem with the global phenomena of health sector reform for policy makers 
(Saltman et al., 1998, Reich, 2002, Collins et al., 1999). The context in which health 
policy is now formulated and implemented has changed dramatically over the years 
from a policy domain characterised primarily by consensus health policy 
development to an environment of conflict and uncertainty now characterised within 
developing countries (Walt et al., 2008). New paradigms of thinking need to be 
applied to the health sector to understand the factors that influence the effectiveness 
of policy change (Walt and Gilson, 1994). It has been further suggested that the lack 
of success in health reform experiences in developing nations such as the neo-liberal 
reform experience in Latin America (Homedes and Ugalde, 2005) and district 
planning reform in Africa (Oyaya and Rifkin, 2001) are directly linked to the 
problem of inadequate prospective health analysis by health policy researchers and 
reformists (Walt and Gilson, 1994). 
 
Policy is the process by which governments, institutions or organisations translate 





a single statement or a set of laws, regulations or, more vaguely, guiding principles 
brought to manage a particular health issue or resolve a fundamental health problem. 
The term health policy means the consideration of policy with an overarching 
concern for the health sector (Walt 1994, p. 214). Health policy can be understood as 
the: 
 
Courses of action (and inaction) that affect the sets of institutions, 
organisations, services and funding arrangements of the health system. It 
includes policy made in the public sector (by government) as well as policies 
in the private sector. But because health is influenced by many determinants 
outside the health system, health policy analysts are also interested in the 
actions and intended actions of organisations external to the health system 
has an impact on health (Buse et al. 2005; p 25). 
 
Health policy analysis is a multi-disciplinary approach to public policy that aims to 
explain the interaction, links and communication between institutions, interests and 
ideas in the policy process (Walt et al. 2008). It has been defined as the approaches, 
methods, methodologies and techniques for improving discrete policy decisions 
within a country’s health system (Dror, 1993) Policy analysis draws on concepts 
from various disciplines such as economics, political science, sociology, public 
administration and history (Walt & Gilson 1994). 
 
Policy analysis considers the role of actors who influence policy change at different 
levels, the influence of power relations, institutions and ideas over health system 
operations and policy as well as political economy issues. It can be conducted 
retrospectively, to understand, evaluate and improve past experience; it can also be 
used prospectively to support health policy change and health system strengthening 
(Walt and Gilson, 1994).  Reich’s case study on the introduction of an essential drugs 
policy in Bangladesh highlights the importance of the use of prospective analysis to 
formulate policy (Reich, 1995b).  Until the 1990s, very little knowledge existed in 
the academic literature on health policy analysis. More recently, however, it has 
become an area that is broadly acknowledged and recognised as an important aspect 





improve health outcomes (Walt and Gilson, 1994, Buse et al., 2007, Gilson and 
Raphaely, 2008) 
 
Today, health policy analysis is an established research and academic discipline in 
the industrialised world. In the developing world, however, its application has been 
limited and neglected (Walt and Gilson, 1994). From the mid-1990s, much more 
interest in the developing countries experience with health analysis has emerged and 
a recent literature review by Gilson (Gilson et al., 2008) highlights that although 
policy analysis in developing countries is still in its infancy, there is increasing 
knowledge and recognition of its increasing importance. Historically, the literature 
has tended to focus on policy specifically related to health, however, as Gilson and 
Raphaely (2008) and Ham (Ham, 1990) point out, there is now a growing interest in 
applying general policy knowledge and principles to the concerns of the health sector 
(World Health Organisation, 2013). 
 
2.3 Approaches to Health Policy Process 
There exist several frameworks, models and theories of the policy process. The most 
commonly known public policy framework is the ‘Stages Heuristic Framework’ 
(Laswell, 1956). This approach divides the public policy process into four stages: 
agenda setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation. Agenda setting is the 
issue sorting stage, during which a small number of the many problems societies face 
rise to the attention of decision makers. In the implementation stage, governments 
carry out these policies, and in stages heuristic for presuming a linearity to the public 
policy process.  This approach is more commonly known as the Top Down approach 






Figure 2 Linear /heuristic model of policy making (Grindle and Thomas 1990; pg 7) 
 
The Heuristic approach reflects the rationalist and scientific ideal, which according 
to some theorists, views society as a collection of autonomous rational decision 
makers who do not recognise the contribution of a wider circle of community players 
(Stone, 1998).  It assumes that the policy process can be designed and implemented 
in a straight line (Sabatier, 2007). Considine (1994) notes that to accept this view of 
policy making is too instrumental, that is to say, policy development in this way 
blocks any understanding of what happens in the field, and it does not allow for 
asking questions related to the bigger social and contextual issues within a policy 
environment (Considine, 2005). 
 
Theorists such as Sabatier (Sabatier, 2007) suggest that linear/heuristic model 
(Figure 2) is not a realistic framework for policy development as the stages that it 
postulates do not exist in reality and the neat demarcations between stages are 
blurred in practice. One of the key challenges of this approach is that it suggests that 
public policy is the result of a political process (Colebatch, 2002). It recognises that 
policy is essentially a product that is seen as an action or a decision, which employs 
governmental authority to commit resources in support of a preferred value (Howlett 
and Ramesh, 2003, Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993).  
 
This approach focuses on the content of policy as it analyses more specifically than 
other approaches how policy making should be done. It is viewed as a problem 





focused on considering the efficiency and effectiveness of policy (Lewis, 2005). 
Those interested in the analysis of policy and concerned with how the policy process 
is structured use this approach, as it helps to ask questions about how a policy 
process works and is concerned with political institutions and policy making 
capabilities of government machinery. 
 
As Walt et al. (2008) suggest, however, the linear/heuristic model does offer a useful 
and simple way of thinking about the entire public policy process, and helps 
researchers situate their research within a wider framework and offers a ‘simple way 
of thinking about the policy process’.  Walt in the same discussion asserts that this 
approach has been responsible for capturing much of the health policy debate in 
recent years. However she further notes that this methodology has also been 
responsible for distracting policy analysts to focus on the content of policy and 
reform and neglect the role of actors involved in policy change and implementation 
(Walt et al., 2008). 
 
Theorists such as Walt, Gilson, Rapahaely (Walt and Gilson, 1994)and others 
opposing the linear approach suggest that it fails to recognise the importance of the 
wider political community as participants in the policy process and their struggle 
with ideas. They suggest the approach is not ideal as it fails to explain why decisions 
are made and what drives policy from one stage to the next, and it subsequently fails 
to embrace the complexity and reality of policy making processes (Considine, 2005, 
Stone, 1998).  
 
The Behaviourist or Interactive (bottom up) Approach (advocates the importance 
of paying more attention to the process and the context in which policies are 
developed and implemented (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). The bottom up view of the 
implementation process is that that implementers often play an important function in 
implementation, not just as managers of policy handed down from above, but as 
active participants in a complex process that informs those higher up in the systems.  
 
This behaviourist or interactive perspective suggests that policy making and policy 





rather it focuses on a range of participants in the policy arena, the diversity of their 
understanding of the situation and the problem, the ways they interact with each 
other and the outcomes. This view suggests that policy is an on-going process of 
negotiation and influence (Considine, 2005). The central claim is that policy emerges 
from identifiable patterns of interdependence between actors, communities and 
institutions. In a sense, everything in the policy world is about process, the 
movement of people and programmes around common problems. Peoples’ views and 
their values do not remain fixed; they keep moving and changing. According to 
Considine (1994), we cannot afford to view policy as just a study of decisions.  The 
following table captures the different approaches used by the two disciplines of 
thought. 
 
Table 3 Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Policy Implementation (adapted and expanded from 
Sabatier 1986; Buse et al. 2007) 
 
 Top Down Approaches Bottom Up Approaches 




From top down and 
starting with government 
From bottom up, including 
both government and non-
government 
View of the policy 
process 
Largely rational process, 
proceeding from problem 
identification to policy 
formulation at higher 
levels to implementation at 
lower levels 
Interactive process involving 
policy makers and 
implementers from various 
parts and levels of government 
and outside in which policy 
may change during 
implementation 
Evaluative criteria Extent of attainment of  
objectives rather than 
recognition of unintended 
consequences 
Much less clear possibly 
recognizes that policy process 






Overall focus Designing the system to 
achieve what central/top 
policy makers intend - 
focus on structure 
Recognition of strategic 
interaction among multiple 
actors in a policy network. 
Focus on agency 
 
The difference between the rationalist and the behaviourist approaches to health 
policy analysis is that behaviourist outcomes are evolutionary; they are not fixed, 
rational or logical. They rely heavily on understanding the political, social and 
cultural aspects of policy making and it is these issues they suggest should lead to the 
best choice of strategies for implementation (Sabatier, 2007, Jenkins, 1978, 
Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). The behaviourists argue that it is much more important 
to pay attention to the process while the rationalist approach relies heavily on 
understanding the content of policy from a perspective of efficiency and 
effectiveness, and disregards the context and environment in which the policies are 
developed or will be implemented.  The behaviourist approach enables a way of 
understanding why policies are not implemented effectively and why health policies 
do not achieve what they set out to achieve (Jenkins, 1978, Walt and Gilson, 1994).  
 
There is a tendency to split policy making and implementation in the heuristic/linear 
model. That is the decision making is all about politics and implementation is all 
about administration (Grindle and Thomas, 1992).  The interactive model however 
sees the policy process as one integrated process.  Other policy frameworks most 
commonly identified in the literature include Kingdon’s (1984) agenda setting 
(Kingdon, 1984)(e.g., Klugman’s 2000 study of NGOs)(Klugman, 2000) and actor 
network theory (e.g., Walt and Gilson’s 1994 work on health sector reform and 
Schneider and colleagues’ 2006 (Schneider et al., 2006) work on health systems and 
disease programmes). The most commonly used overarching framework is Walt and 
Gilson (Walt and Gilson, 1994). 
 
Other models of the policy process include the Incremental Model. This model 
enables policy makers to look at a small number of alternatives for dealing with a 
problem and tend to choose options that differ only marginally from the existing 





a good policy is one that all participants agree on rather than what is best to solve the 
problem (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993). This model suggests that major changes 
occur through a series of small steps, each of which does not fundamentally “rock 
the boat”. The policy process is one of disjointed incremental steps or “muddling 
through” (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993). 
 
The Mixed Scanning Model covers a middle ground between the linear and 
behaviourist models (Walt, 1994).  It involves the policy maker in taking a broad 
view of the field of policy.  The rational/linear model implies an exhaustive 
consideration of all possible options, and the incremental approach suggests looking 
only at options which are known to exist.  In contrast a mixed scanning approach 
suggests taking a broad view of possible options and looking further into those which 
require a more in depth examination.   
 
This research project is concerned with understanding the process and context in 
which policies are formed. The study intends to go beyond the content of policies 
and give greater attention to the behaviour of health policy actors, their processes of 
decision making and the actions they take, or their lack of action and unintended 
actions, the influence of content on those actions, and the context that influences and 
is influenced by these behaviours (Walt and Gilson, 1994). Furthermore the focus of 




There is near universal consensus in the literature on how little is known about the 
process of implementing policy. Research on public policy implementation is scarce 
(Sabatier, 2007).  Multiple implementation theories have been dominated by a 
discourse as to whether decision making is top down or bottom up or a synthesis of 
the two (Sabatier, 2007). A key issue in the literature focuses on the gap or the deficit 
between policy objectives and actual implementation (Walt et al., 2008, Hill and 
Hupe, 2002).  Two schools of thought emerge in the literature. The first views 
implementation as an administrative function, the other views it as a political 





Wildavsky, 1984) see implementation as a “top down model: which focuses on 
putting policy into effect through communication and control.  The seminal work by 
Pressman and Wildavsk, Implementation: How Great Expectations are Dashed in 
Oakland  (Pressman J and Wildavsky, 1973)  considered to be founding fathers of 
implementation research. Their starting point is policy formulation, and 
implementation, the writers suggest that the goals of this policy approach might be 
achieved.  The emphasis been on compliance rather than performance.  
 
This approach is strongly supported by politicians and bureaucrats. The “bottom up 
model” as described and evolved by Lipsky (1980) who published Street Level 
Bureaucracy, Dilemas of the Individual in Public Service suggests that policy 
implementation is driven by those who control the actions and carry out the policy 
goals (Hill and Hupe, 2002 pg 53).  Lipsky is considered the founding father of the 
bottom up approach. He provided a perspective and a shift away from a focus on top 
down policy input and looked at what actually happens at the implementation level. 
Others see policy implementation as political process. A process of interaction and 
negotiation between those seeking to put policy into effect upon whom action 
depends (Considine, 2005, Walt, 2006). The political model views implementation as 
a bottom up process based on negotiation and compromise.  Performance rather than 
conformance is the focus of the political model. Saetren (2005) in his review of 
policy implementation of published literature concluded that while most studies 
focused on health and education, they predominantly focused on high income 
countries (Saetren, 2005).  
 
A key concern in the health reform literature has dealt with the issue of the timing 
and implementation of health reforms.  Walt et al (1994) note that global reform 
efforts have tended to focus on the development of the content, neglecting the 
process of reform and the difficulties of implementing and managing change. Reform 
failures often have little to do with the merits of the program but rather reflect the 
inadequate understanding of the many social and actor issues related to 
implementation.  A range of contextual factors including the socio political 
environment and societal values influences the implementation of reform in a 





government and the distribution of authority as well in which the process itself is 
conducted (Walt and Gilson, 1994b) Contentious issues related to implementation 
have been the pace of implementation and the merits of a big bang approach  (Klein, 
1997) versus the incremental approach (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993).  In 
addition actors and stakeholders play a significant role in the determinants of policy 
change.  Subsequently health reforms have not been viewed successfully as part of a 
global push to improve the strengthening of health systems (Lister, 2005). 
 
A key issue highlighted in the literature puts the barrier of effective implementation 
directly on the uniform failure of governments to plan for implementation of policies 
they develop. Planning for execution is seen as a critical component of 
implementation success (Sabatier, 2007, Hill and Hupe, 2002). Paradoxically, policy 
makers assume that implementation is self-executing and neglect to plan for it. 
Typically, their concept of implementation is to assign a budget and a time limit to 
the legislation and consider their jobs completed.  The rest in their view is up to the 
local program people and bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of policy 
(Considine, 2005, Dye, 2001, Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). 
 
2.5 External Influence and Development Ideology 
Although external assistance is not always a major source of funding in many 
developing countries, it is never the less influential in shaping policies and programs 
and therefore an important factor in the analysis of health sector reforms.  Much of 
the criticism of donors involved in this process has centered on the concern of certain 
agencies to promote specific strategies, (notably user charges, community financing 
and greater reliance on private care rather than taking a more country specific view 
and assisting recipient countries to analyse the implications of different options for 
reforms (Cassels, 1995a, Walt, 1994).  Ideological convictions, national experience 
and the need of some agencies to maintain an identifiable niche in the market for 
public and donor support are the key drivers for donor positions (Cassels, 1995b).  
Reform experiences in Latin America and in Europe highlight that many reforms 
experiences have been seen as imposed from the outside (Reich, 1995b, Thomas and 





negotiations on policy were often seen as coercive exercise designed to impose the 
donor philosophy (World Bank, 2000). 
 
2.6 Methods and Tools of Analysis of Reforms 
Undertaking health reform is a highly political process and will never be in 
everyone’s interest and cannot be promoted by rational argument alone (Gonzalez-
Rossetti and Bossert, 2000).  A range of tools and strategies are available to analyse 
health sector reform strategies, these include packages of services, such as burden of 
disease analysis and cost effective analysis (Murray, 1995, OECD, 1995), health 
financing and social health insurance, (Schneider et al., 2006). Further various 
national studies have been carried out in Mexico using tools such as political 
feasibility analysis (Frenk, 1995). Other approaches such as National Health 
Accounts as a tool for describing health care expenditure and flow of funds also exist 
(Klein, 1997). A computer based tool, for political mapping  developed such as the 
one by Reich and Cooper (Reich and Cooper, 1996) and Stakeholder analysis tools 
such as the one developed by (Trader -Leigh, 2002). Although an assortment of tools 
have evolved to support health sector reform there is no single strategy for health 
sector reform. Countries inherit systems that impose advantages and constraints that 
must be incorporated into reform efforts as such all reforms look inherently different. 
 
According to Murray (1995) analysis of health sector reforms will always remain 
challenging and difficult, as health sector objectives are difficulty to articulate and 
quantify. Defining a single overarching goal for reforms is not straightforward 
(Murray, 1995).  Most public health practitioners are happy with the objective that 
the goal of the health sector is to improve the health of the populations or maximize 
appropriate health measures (Lister, 2005). Most economists are more comfortable 
defining health sector objectives in terms of welfare maximisation rather than in 
terms of health status maximisation (Murray, 1995). Health reform implies however 
significant change. WHO report of 1993 reported that reform requires changing both 
policies and institutions (World Health Organisation, 1993). Acknowledging that 





2.7 Decentralisation as a Health Reform Strategy 
Of interest to this study is the concept of decentralisation. Decentralisation takes 
many forms and has several dimensions and can mean different things. The 
difficulties in discussing decentralisation are illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
Decentralisation may mean the transfer of authority over public enterprises from 
political officials to a relatively autonomous board. The transfer of administrative 
functions downwards in the hierarchy, or by the establishment of legislative units of 
smaller size, or the transfer of responsibility to sub-national legislative bodies. The 
assumption of control by more people, the hope for a better world to be achieved by 
more individual participation (Mills et al., 1990 pg 32). 
 
Saltman et al (2007) describe the logic of decentralization as based on an 
intrinsically powerful idea. It is, simply stated, that smaller organizations, properly 
structured and steered, are inherently more agile and accountable than are larger 
organizations. In a world where large organizations control wide swaths of both 
public and private sector activity, the possibility of establishing more locally 
operated, locally responsible institutions, holds out great attraction (Saltman et al., 
2007). 
 
There are four types of decentralisation commonly found in practice: de-
concentration, devolution, delegation and privatisation (Rondinelli and Shabbir, 
1983). These reflect both different degrees of decentralising of government authority 
and different approaches to decentralisation. 
 
1. De-concentration is applied to the handing over of some administrative 
authority to locally based offices of central government ministries.  
2. Devolution is the creation or strengthening of subnational levels of 
government that are substantially independent of the national level with 
respect of a set of functions.  
3. Delegation involves the transfer of managerial responsibility for defined 





4. Privatisation involves the transfer of government functions to voluntary 
organisations or to private profit making or non-profit making enterprises 
(Rondinelli and Shabbir, 1983). 
 
Implementation of decentralisation in developing countries has had mixed results. 
According to Litvak and others (1998), designing decentralisation policy is difficult 
because decentralisation can affect many aspects of public sector performance and 
generate a wide range of outcomes.  He notes that it is particularly difficult in 
developing countries because institutions information and capacity are all very weak.  
The cross cutting nature of decentralisation, the importance of local institutions 
influencing the impact of decentralisation and the limited empirical evidence on what 
works and what does not make the design and implementation of decentralisation a 
considerable challenge (Litvack et al., 1998).  
 
2.8 Developing Nations and Health Reforms   
Many developing countries have faced the need to transform their large and highly 
inefficient health systems, which have been operating along the same policy lines for 
50 years following their founding in the early post-war period (Gonzalez-Rossetti 
and Bossert, 2000).  Developing nations have also been challenged to consider 
reforms for various reasons and many developing countries face a variety of 
obstacles in addressing their many health problems. Most common among these 
obstacles are extremely limited and often inequitably distributed resources, shortages 
of institutional and or human capacity, inadequate accountable mechanisms, absence 
of risk pooling strategies and inefficient and frequently wasteful service delivery. 
Further, developing countries have had to deal with issues such as the need for better 
rural and or divisional outreach services, poor health infrastructure, shifting patterns 
of disease and in the poorer nations a prevailing lack of economic development.  
 
These issues were reiterated in the 2001 and 2010 WHO reports, which confirmed 
that the majority of public sector health systems in developing countries were poorly 
designed and did not respond to the needs of their populations. These same 
developing nations have been targeted by international development organisations 





and reform concepts (Litvack et al., 1998, Berman and Bossert, 2000).  There has 
been a tendency in public health to portray policy reform as a technocratic or 
economic process. Both economists and health policy analysts tend to provide 
detailed prescriptions on what has been done  without clear instructions on how to do 
it and without good explanation of why things go wrong (Reich, 1995a, Walt et al., 
2008). Health system reforms have until recently tended to focus primarily on 
structural change (Scott et al., 2003). Many of the global reforms have been formed 
from strong economic theoretical underpinnings that have been driven by 
mechanistic and technical ideas, rather than sector wide holistic ideas around 
government process and human dynamics (Gregory, 1999, Parsons, 1995).  
 
Criticism of health sector reform and the new public management concepts relate to 
the focus on standardised packages of technical and structural interventions based on 
simplistic assumptions about human behaviour and what (Gregory, 1999) has termed 
economic and reductionism and technocratic structuralism. As Blaauw et al point 
out, the debate is not new and the dominant discourse in health systems research and 
health sector reform still reflects a preoccupation with the infrastructure technology 
and economics of health systems rather than its human, organisational cultural and 
social dimensions (Blaauw et al., 2003).  
 
Reforms that have been carried out around the world have varied in content and 
scope from country to country, but most share common features such as changes in 
the institutional configuration of the health care system, health financing, and the 
role of the public and private sector in health care delivery (Berman & Bossert 2000; 
(Hsiao, 2007, Buse, 2008). The variation of systems and problems within countries 
described in the literature suggests that many of the reforms planned and carried out 
globally demonstrates that there is an ongoing search for better ways of improving 
health systems and health services. 
  
In 2000, a WHO report noted that 29 countries grouped in the OECD accounted for 
89% of total world expenditure on health, leaving the vast majority of the world’s 
population to share the remaining 10%. The same report highlighted that 84% of the 





world’s burden of disease (WHO, 2000, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 
2012, World Bank, 2012). These statistics demonstrate the widespread disparity 
between global population and health spending and the scale of inequality that has 
been generated by the current mix of systems and policies. In particular, these 
statistics point to the problem that global health care spending is almost completely 
inversely proportional to the global burden of disease. These statistics have led 
health academics and economists to propose that fundamental changes are required 
in health systems around the world if they are to be equipped to meet the challenges 
of the twenty-first century (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008, Berman and Bossert, 2000, 
Lister, 2005). 
 
Surprisingly, however, after years of investments in health reforms, there still 
remains inadequate evidence of the effectiveness of health reform policies and 
initiatives not only in those countries and agencies championing these policies but 
also by those countries at the receiving end (Figueras et al., 1997). As such, 
successive rounds of reforms have rolled out unevenly across developing countries 
with considerable evidence of limited progress and poor results, leaving the health 
systems strengthening agenda largely unfinished in many countries (Roberts et al., 
2008).  
 
The past 30 years have seen more than a third of the world’s developing nations  
such as countries in South America (Chile, Boliva) (Berman and Bossert, 2000, 
Bolger, 2005), Papua New Guinea (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1991) and Thailand 
(Green, 2000) undertake some form of health restructuring activity (OECD, 1994, 
Schou and Haug, 2005).  The discussion of health policy and health policy analysis 
and its importance and relevance to health reforms and health systems improvement 
has only recently emerged as an important issue related to global health systems 
improvements. In the past decade, there has been an expansion of literature that has 
reflected the growing interest in health reforms and health policy analysis (Berman 






2.9 Health Reforms in the Pacific Region 
Over the past 10 years, several countries in the Pacific region, Tonga, Samoa, 
Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Fiji (Rabukawaqa, 2006, World Bank, 2003) have 
undergone health system reforms. The central catalyst for many of the reform 
initiatives has been the result of investments by donors, through bi-lateral or multi-
lateral specific aid programmes, which have enabled countries to undertake 
restructuring programmes. Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea and Samoa were most notably subsidised by the Australian government 
(Rabukawaqa, 2006, Soakai, 2006, World Bank, 2003, Aus Health International, 
2004b, Australian Government, 2004, Ministry of Health Tonga, 2004, Bolger, 
2005). 
 
A 2008 review of global literature, which identified 391 health policy analysis 
articles concerning LMIC over a 13-year period, noted that none focused on the 
Pacific (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008).  Globally, evidence-based policy making is 
becoming more complex. Poor health information systems and the limited ability of 
many countries in the Pacific to collect, and monitor information for decision making 
is poor, as such evidence for policy making is limited (Aumua and Hodge, 2012). 
 
The WHO (World Health Organisation, 2005, Buse, 2008) highlights the strength of 
development partners, asserting: ‘not only do these partners have the power to fund, 
or not to fund, given projects, they also have the power to influence, if not control, 
policy making agendas’. Reich et al note: ‘policy making in global health has 
become a multi-stakeholder process … with competition and confusion both globally 
and nationally’ (Reich et al., 2008 pg 18). The fact that the Pacific is the most 
heavily aid-assisted part of the world per capita only adds to the challenge and 
importance of health policy analysis (Australian Agency for International 
Development, 2009).  Markus et al further note in their recent multi-country study on 
fragile states and health systems that, “when a country has significant portion of 
external aid it diminishes the power of local decision making” (Markus and Hill, 
2012 pg 12). This suggests that donor dependency is linked directly to the lack of 
ability for a country to manage its own decision making process and ultimate 





 The intimate involvement of international aid organisations such as the World Bank 
in health reform programmes as described in the literature and evidenced in-country 
reform reports has created tensions over health reform processes and has led to 
problems such as reform design, implementation and reform sustainability 
(Kolehmainen-Aitken, 1998, Cassels, 1995b, Berman and Bossert, 2000, Romeo, 
2003). Although very little evaluative work has been done on Pacific reforming 
nations and their success, there is evidence that health reforms in the region have not 
been successful (Rokovada, 2006, Soakai, 2006). 
 
2.9.1 Health Reforms in Fiji 
In 1999, Fiji commenced a series of health reforms, which were part of a wider 
reform programme aimed at restructuring the MOH (Government of Fiji, 1999b). 
Although Fiji’s health system infrastructure has re-oriented itself at various stages 
since the system’s inception in the early 1900s, the 1999 FHMRP was the first 
significant major attempt at restructuring the entire management of the health 
system.  In 2004 Fiji continued its reform program with phase two of the FHMRP, 
and in 2009 the Government of Australia and Fiji established the Fiji Health Sector 
Improvement program which continues until today. To date, no formal evaluative 
work has been undertaken on the 1999 Fiji health management reforms.   
 
2.10   Why is Health Policy Analysis Important? 
The literature highlights numerous areas that relate to the importance of health policy 
analysis. Its overall importance is that: 
 
It can help explain why certain health issues receive political attention, and 
others do not, such as by enabling identification of which stakeholders may 
support or resist policy reforms, and why. It can also identify the perverse 
and unintended consequences of policy decisions, as well as the obstacles that 
undermine policy implementation and so jeopardize national and global goals 
for improved health. In these ways, policy analysis supports more realistic 
expectations about the timeframes and nature of policy reform, ‘can assist’ in 
enabling successful policy development and implementation, and can support 





Establishes Policy Objectives 
Health policy analysis assists in understanding how public policy makers set 
objectives and make decisions on health priorities and actions. Health policy analysis 
can help explain why certain issues receive political attention in a political 
environment and why others do not.  For example, the Kingdon (1984) model is 
often used to test the criteria of an issue making it onto a government agenda. The 
Hall model of analysis can be used to ascertain whether an issue and likely response 
would be high in terms of its legitimacy, feasibility and support and meeting all three 
criteria, and Kingdon’s three stream model can be used to understand the perceptions 
of problems as public matters requiring government action and efforts of government 
to act on an issue.  
 
Further and most importantly for this study is that the role of policy analysis can 
assists policy makers better understand how a government sets a policy agenda and 
what role stakeholders play in supporting (or not supporting) governments to 
implement their agenda (Gilson & Raphaely 2008). The journey of getting 
tuberculosis on the policy agenda and formulating the DOTS policy provides a good 
example of the use of health policy analysis as a tool for advocacy and negotiation 
(Ogden et al., 2003). 
 
Helps Understand the Policy Process 
Health policy analysis can help in understanding important stages of the health 
policy process such as: 
 
x Agenda building 
x Policy formulation 
x Planning 
x Monitoring and evaluation 
x Assisting in understanding which factors affect processes and how 
researchers can influence policy. 
 
The latter includes considering whether and why routine practices differ from, and 





policy intentions and routine practice (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). This particular 
aspect of health policy analysis is important to this project. 
 
For improving evidenced-based policy, the usefulness in health policy analysis lies in 
the opportunity in these processes to include much more technical evidence into the 
policy development process. Ultimately, policy makers through this process will 
have a more realistic understanding of policy success. It helps explain aspects of the 
policy making process, such as the roles of actors who influence policy change at 
different levels—from individual, organisational, national to global—and their 
interests in a country (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008).  Studies undertaken by Thomas 
and Gilson (2004) on actor management in South Africa help explain the 
complexities of actors’ behaviour and their influence on reform implementation.  
 
Further, the study by (Green, 2000) on the role of policy actors in health sector 
reforms in Thailand shows that the policy formation processes can only be successful 
when there is critical support from policy actors in the system. These types of studies 
describe the environmental and contextual factors that affect policy processes and its 
health outcomes (Walt, 1994). Although health policy analysis can be used to 
increase our knowledge of the complexity of the health policy process as a tool, it 
has remained underdeveloped and subsequently has limited application in LMIC 
(Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). 
 
Helps to Understand the Role of Power and Politics in the Policy Process 
There are many ways in which people can participate in the policy process and 
therefore influence governments to promote the policies that they want. Power can 
often be seen to be only in the hands of a few (Walt, 1994) and policy can often be 
decided by a small group of elites within government or outside of government. 
Health policy analysis can assist policy makers to: 
 
x Better understand the influence of power relations, institutions (the rules, 
laws, norms and customs that shape human behaviour) and ideas (arguments 





x It can also help us to better understand the global political economy issues 
that influence the policy making processes (Gilson et al., 2008). 
 
Impact on Implementation 
Health policy analysis can be used as a tool to identify the obstacles that undermine 
policy implementation. An important aspect of health policy analysis is that it can:  
 
x Assist with identifying which stakeholders who will support policy reform or 
those who might reject it 
x Assist policy makers to develop strategies to improve the prospects of a new 
policy change activity 
x Help identify barriers to the policy implementation process 
x Assist in creating a smoother pathway for policy. 
 
2.10.1 Health Policy Analysis and Developing Countries 
In many developing countries much of the international and global health agenda, 
such as Health for All (HFA) and Primary Health Care (PHC), initiatives have 
struggled to achieve their goals and targets. These initiatives have not succeeded and 
failure has been attributed to the lack of knowledge around factors such as health 
policy content, context and processes (Walt et al., 2008, Gilson et al., 2008).  Over 
the past several decades, international agencies have tried to improve population 
health by merging international health programmes with national health policies. In 
developing countries, the policy process is different, for example, the relationships’ 
and interaction between policy makers, decision makers, and public servants 
influence the implementation process and affect the way a policy is developed and 
implemented.  Many of the traditional policy process such as the heuristic approach 
cannot be used to guide developing countries experiences, given that the political 
economic and social and cultural contexts in which the policies take place in the 
developed world is vastly different than in developing countries (Gilson and 
Raphaely, 2008). 
 
Much of the theory from health policy analysis to date has come from high income 





such concepts to developing nations needs to be undertaken with caution (Walt et al., 
2008). Health policy environments in high income countries differ from those in 
low-income countries. Much of the learning that has emanated from studies in 
developed (Stone, 1998) countries are not useful in developing countries. Health 
policy environments in middle and high income countries also differ from those in 
low-income countries, where, for example, there are weaker regulations, regulatory 
capacity and monitoring systems, lack of purchasing power as a leverage to influence 
types and quality of services delivered, more patronage in political systems, and 
more reliance on external donor funds, among many other differences. 
 
The importance of understanding the unique aspects and nature of health policy, in 
particular, for LMIC according to (Walt et al., 2008) lies in the importance of 
generating an understanding of the factors that influence the experience and results 
of policy change. Health policy analysis can inform action to strengthen future policy 
development and implementation.  The same review further highlights that the issues 
of politics, process and power were necessary and essential key considerations in the 
study of health policies and practice of health system development (Gilson and 
Raphaely, 2008), an area that has according to (Walt et al., 2008) been seriously 
neglected. Further, there is little knowledge and experience of the issue of power and 
its role in developing countries in health reforms.  Gilson and Raphaely’s (2008) 
review noted that there are very few explicit or formal assessments of the practice of 
power and policy change in LMIC. From an implementation perspective, there is 
little consideration in the literature on the role of institutions, rules and laws that 
shape actor behaviour (Parsons, 1995). 
 
2.10.2 Key Issues in the Literature of Health Policy Analysis 
Up to 1990, much of the literature on the topic of health policy analysis has been 
framed around the traditional policy frameworks that have been couched in both 
rationalist and behaviourists’ models of analysis. Traditionally, health policy analysis 
has been located in the area of technical and economic analysis and centred on 
industrialised and advanced economies. Prior to 1990, the majority of health policy 
literature focuses on the policy process that emanated from the theoretical 





This has now been highlighted as a problem as those models have not necessarily 
been helpful in understanding what and why health policies succeed in being 
implemented in the developing countries. As noted earlier, these frameworks have 
not taken account of some more complex elements such as processes, power, 
institutions and the effect of actors on health policy, and recent research has 
highlighted that these concepts are necessary to understand the policy making 
environment. Walt and Gilson (1994) have argued that much health policy in recent 
years has wrongly focused on the content of policy and reform and has neglected 
actors involved in policy change. In the late 1990s, policy analysts recognised that 
current approaches to health policy and health policy analysis were not helpful in 
understanding or explaining the experiences of health policy analysis in developing 
countries. As such, new ideas emerged as demand grew to better understand ‘how 
and why’ certain policies seemed to succeed and others did not. 
 
In 1994, Walt and Gilson developed a policy analysis framework (policy triangle) 
specifically for health. The framework emerged from their recognition that health 
policy research has focused largely on the content of policy, neglecting actors, 
context and  process (Walt, 1994, Buse, 2008).  In the development of the 
framework, Walt took account of both rational and behaviourism approaches as well 
as consideration of the context. The policy triangle is grounded in a political 
economy framework and has been used extensively since its development in health 
policy research, including the analysis of health sector reforms (Gilson and 







Figure 3 Model for health policy analysis (Walt, 1994) 
 
Mark Considine (1994) similarly developed a generic framework for the study of 
public policy. It is an approach based on a combination of both behaviourist and 
rationalist principles called the diamond framework. This includes policy culture, 
actors, institutions and political economy (figure1).  The methodology used to 
answer the research questions in this thesis is guided by Considine’s framework. In 
developing countries, there is now much more recognition that policy processes are 
important in order to understand how and why policies succeed or do not. More 
importantly is recognising that the theories and models of Kingdon (Kingdon, 1984) 
and Sabatier (Sabatier, 2007) are not appropriate for developing countries. Rather, a 
combination of both the rationalist and the behaviourist approach is more suited to 
ask questions around policy implementation practices.  The majority of policy 
analysis lessons come from developed country experiences (Gilson and Raphaely, 
2008). 
 
Gilson and Raphaely’s (2008) literature review on health policy analysis shows that 
out of the 130 articles they reviewed five articles sought to explain or describe 
successes in policy outcomes, including: differences between countries examples 
include HIV AIDS experiences (Gauri and Lieberbman, 2006, Allen and Heald S, 











as a the Bamako initiative (Gilson et al., 2001) and safe motherhood outcomes 
(Shiffman and Garces de Valle, 2006).  
 
Studies were inductive in nature rather than deductive, and were often focused on 
testing a theoretical application. Many of them focused on describing what has 
happened in a particular setting rather than explaining ‘why’ it was the case. Despite 
the central role that health policy analysis should play, the reviewers argued that 
much of health policy analysis work has not been reported in the key medical 
journals and, given the considerable difficulties in undertaking rigorous policy 
analysis research; the limited knowledge of the field is understandable. It is 
imperative therefore for developing countries to undertake their own research so as 
to better understand the complexities that relate to poorer economies with limited 
health systems development and different epidemiology and political economy and 
policy infrastructure (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). 
 
Recent global discussions on sustainable health development, universal health 
coverage and equity, captures some of the learning from previous policy approaches 
that may assist in improving health policy outcomes (World Health Organisation, 
2011).  Policy analysis theorists have advocated for some years the problem of 
insufficient evidence in the current body of knowledge on the subject of health 
policy processes and implementation in LMIC (Sabatier, 2000, Walt et al., 2008). 
Much of the current research knowledge has been generated from higher income 
countries, where health policy analysis has had a much stronger and longer 
recognition in the academic field of practical relevance. As a result, health policy 
analysis research and knowledge is still in its infancy and remains an area of 
underdeveloped work in low and middle income settings (Buse, 2008). 
 
The first ever review of literature analysing the health policy process of LMIC 
carried out by Gilson et al. (2008) highlighted that much of the knowledge and 
literature in this area was limited, small, fragmented and descriptive and had limited 
understanding of policy change processes. It noted that much of the learning 
stemmed from case studies dominated by authors from the northern hemisphere 





Grindle, 2000, Klugman, 2000). The review highlighted that no studies had been 
undertaken in the Pacific region (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008, Gilson et al., 2008). 
 
Analytical Weakness 
There is concern about both the depth and quality of data presented and collected in 
studies and potential analytical weakness.  Gilson (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008) note 
that many of the studies are a cross sectional descriptive analysis and exclude any 
assessment of the historical influences over experience and many of the studies fail 
against basic criteria of rigour, validity and authority.  Gilson explains that many of 
the articles in their recent literature review asked what happened, but not enough 
explained what happened. Subsequently, they suggest this has led to a weak 
foundation for informing future policy action.  Despite various studies, the existing 
body of knowledge published on health policy analysis is small with the majority 
analytically weak. The quality of the literature varies enormously in intellectual 
rigour, theoretical perspectives and descriptive accuracy (Marmor et al., 2005) 
 
Limited Use of Policy Analysis Theory in Health Policy Studies 
Very little is known about the research methods and research designs and theories 
that best lead to understanding how to undertake health policy analysis (Walt et al. 
2008). There has been a gap in the literature on the methodological challenges for 
research studying health policy analysis. The lack of methodological thinking in the 
study of health policy analysis has created an imbalance in the literature that has 
traditionally focused on methods, designs and theories on how to do policy analysis 
and not necessarily on why we should do it. Many studies are not appropriate 
because the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of the policy process in 
the developed world are vastly different for developing nations. In developing 
countries, health policies need different but comprehensive approaches (Walt, 1994). 
 
Limited Understanding of the Importance of Power 
Different groups of actors have different resources and reserves of power and hence 
varying abilities to influence political contests (Lewis, 2005). Policy making is 
shaped by actors who use the resources at their disposal to have their concerns taken 





thinking about policy analysis. Understanding how these actors use their power and 
shape the policy debate is key to recognising the role of power in the health policy 
debate (Walt and Gilson, 1994). 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
Recent health policy literature recognises that there is limited knowledge and 
understanding of the social, cultural and political aspects of policy systems as well as 
knowledge of the role of actors within the policy environment and their influence on 
health reform implementation and effectiveness (Considine, 2005, Lewis, 2005, Walt 
and Gilson, 1994). They have suggested that this limited knowledge base now poses 
serious problems for health reformists and health reform research. Subsequently, the 
call for health policy analysis is becoming more important and reformists are 
beginning to recognise the need for more research in areas such as the role and 
influence on implementation of stakeholders and policy actors, power and 
institutions in the policy areas that have not been well considered by policy analysts 
(Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). 
 
The existing body of knowledge in the area of health policy analysis is largely 
inadequate and currently does not sufficiently help policy practitioners better 
understand the key challenges and issues that relate to improving health policy 
implementation in LMIC. Recognition that the majority of current studies focuses on 
content rather than process and therefore the importance of building a greater 
knowledge in this area relates to integrating concerns regarding politics process, 
power and analysis into the study of health policy. The study of health reform 
implementation and its success requires an understanding of the factors that affect 
policy. This study looks at the health reform experience of the Fiji health system 





Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the case study methodology and the theoretical framework 
that was used to the guide the study. The methods used to collect, manage and 
analyse the data are described and discussed. The criteria used in the study and the 
ethical considerations of the study are also outlined. 
 
3.1 Case Study Methodology 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context; it is a method that is useful especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Patton 
(Patton, 1990). Case study is a research methodology that comprises covering logic 
of design, data collection techniques and specific approaches to data analysis (Yin, 
2012a). 
 
Until the 1990s, approaches to health policy analysis were entrenched in economic 
and rationalist approaches to health policy development theory (Reich, 1995a, Walt 
et al., 2008). Health policy analysts recognised that this type of approach and 
analysis could not explain how and why certain policies succeeded and others failed, 
nor did it assist policy makers and mangers to make strategic decisions about future 
policies and their implementation. Gilson and Raphaely (2008) suggest that this 
traditional approach has led to a weak foundation for informing policy action. 
 
A literature review by Gilson and Raphaely (2008) highlighted several key concerns 
relating to the quality of health policy analysis studies in recent years. First, the 
authors suggest that many of the studies lacked real methodological rigor, meaning 
there was poor analysis of data. They further suggest that many of the studies also 
lacked a strong explanatory focus in the research, meaning that research focused on 
answering what happened rather than why. They also note that much of the literature 
and the studies in health policy analysis lacked use of health policy analysis 
frameworks and policy analysis theory. Fourth and most importantly, analytical 





Gilson and Raphaely (2008) concluded that the policy analysis field would benefit 
from more reflection on the use of different research approaches, in particular, case 
study methodology, which would enable a depth of data as well as the rich historical 
analysis of country experiences that has been lacking in current studies. Further case 
study methodology would enable the use of theoretical frameworks and allow for the 
assessment of both historical political and policy as well as systems knowledge. The 
authors note that many of the studies undertaken in this area did not demonstrate 
clarity or describe analytical approaches and commentary on how they added to the 
existing empirical evidence base. These issues accordingly have led to a weak 
foundation for informing future policy action. A case study approach allows the 
researcher to find answers to questions in the area of decision making, in particular, a 
case study illuminates why particular decisions were made and why they were taken 
and how they were implemented (Schramm, 1971). This is the essence of case study 
and one of the one of the reasons why case study was selected as the preferred 
methodology for this project. 
 
3.2 The Fiji Case 
The Fiji health management reforms 1999 to 2004, is an intrinsic case study and is 
bounded by that period. Intrinsic case study according to Stake (Stake, 2006, Stake, 
1995) is undertaken because first and last the researcher wants a better understanding 
of the particular case, not because the case represents other cases or because it 
illustrates a particular problem, but rather because in all its particularity and 
ordinariness, this case is itself of interest. Yin affirms (Yin, 2012a, Yin, 2009)  that 
case study research is appropriate when studying process, and suggests that when 
process issues are involved together with multiple sources of evidence, case studies 
offer a holistic perspective allowing for a fuller exploration of the issues in question. 
A case study design in this instance has been used to gain an in depth understanding 
of the situation and meaning for those involved. The interest has been in the process 







3.3 Theoretical Framework used for the study 
Yin (2004) highlights the importance and necessity of developing a theoretical 
framework within case study research. This is congruent with Gilson (Gilson and 
Raphaely, 2008), who suggest that policy analysis research needs to be underpinned 
by a theoretical framework. Case study methodology is more effective if the research 
design includes a specification of the data to be obtained from the case and can be 
integrated with the key design tasks (George and Bennett, 2005). Further, without a 
theoretical framework all these choices can be difficult and hamper the development 
of a rigorous case study (Yin 2009, p 223). Without a theoretical framework, the case 
study researchers are in severe danger of providing description without wider 
meaning. Considine’s (1994) diamond public policy framework has guided the 
design of this study’s data collection and its analysis. 
 
After an assessment of other key policy frameworks such as Walt and Gilson’s 
(1994) diamond framework, which captures the broader contextual and process 
issues of policy analysis, Kingdon’s (1984) agenda setting framework, as well as the 
stakeholder holder analysis framework by Varvasovszky (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 
2000), Considine’s (1994) framework was found best suited to guide the study. 
Considine’s public policy diamond was chosen because of its broader perspective on 
the use of culture and cultural issues related to policy. Walt and Gilson’s framework 
would not sufficiently capture some of what Duncan (2011) calls the Pacific’s 
‘below the iceberg’ factors, such as beliefs, culture and values; power, authority 
and social patterns and relationship (Duncan, 2011). 
 
Considine’s framework was utilised to study the policy reform experience in Fiji and 
is shown in Figure 1. The framework was used to develop the theoretical proposition 
and to guide and determine the priorities of the data collection and analysis process. 
The key areas that guided the study were Fiji’s policy culture, institutions, actors and 
the political economy of Fiji’s health system.  
1. Policy Culture is defined as the value or the emotional environment that 
existed within the policy system. An analysis of the culture of the policy 
system that existed in Fiji during the reforms is important as it becomes a 





about what was valuable to those engaged in the policy making process 
(Considine, 2005). The concept of culture was further extended in this project 
to include an analysis of issues that related to Fijian culture and traditional 
power. 
 
2. Policy has always been seen as an expression of governmental authority 
and traditionally it has always been defined by key politicians and 
bureaucrats who had command of the institutions. Considine (Considine, 
1994) however, describes policy makers as any individual group or institution 
who are able to take action on a public problem or issue. An analysis of 
policy actors from within a policy process is important as it helped identify 
who and how the policy processes were influenced. 
 
3. Public policy is the achievement of actors making use of institutions and 
being shaped by them (Considine, 1994). Policy institutions refer to the 
machinery of government as well as other institutions, which control the 
authority and resources needed to initiate and sustain policy. These 
institutions not only impose constraints on policy systems, they also lay down 
pathways for action and send signals to actors about how to move forward. 
Understanding the behaviour and influence of policy institutions in the policy 
making process highlights how institutions can control and influence the 
policy design and implementation (Morone, 1994). 
 
4. All policy systems have been defined by a Particular Political Economy, 
which has been inherited from the past. The political economy of a system 
has been defined as the relationships between the many actors within the 
policy system (Considine, 1994). These relationships included the way the 
policy institutions, communities, networks and individuals inter-related. The 
concept of political economy further draws attention to the importance of the 







3.4 Research Methods 
Four qualitative methods to study Fiji’s reform implementation experience included 
document and archival collection and in depth interviews and focus groups. The 
three sites, Suva, Lautoka and Labasa, were the locations where interviews and focus 
groups were completed. All data collected via documentation collections, interview 
and focus groups were transcribed and triangulated together. Figure 4 summarises 
how the methods were used. 
 
Objective 
A To investigate the role of the key stakeholders, their relationships and the extent of their 
influence in shaping the development and implementation of the Fiji Health Management 
Reform Project 
B To analyse the role of the various policy institutions and their influence on the reform 
implementation process 
C To investigate the role and nature of the political, economic and social environment and its 
influence in shaping the design and implementation of the reforms 
D To determine the importance and role of culture and values in the development of policy during 
the reform process 





























3.5 Stages of the Research 
There were 10 stages identified as part of the case study approach: 
 
1. Development of a case study database 
2. Document analysis (preliminary background reading) 
3. Key informant interviews 
4. Development of case study protocol 
5. Data collection preparation 
6. Data sources 
a. Data sources 1 
b. Data sources 2 
c. Data sources 3 
7. Data management and analysis 
8. Analysis 
9. Quality criteria 
10. Reflexivity. 
 
3.5.1 Stage 1: Establishment of Case Study Database 
The establishment of a case study database was important for two reasons. First, 
within case study research the distinction between a separate collection of 
information and the case study is important so that the case study report and the 
critical reader would be able to have a sense of recourse, should they want to inspect 
the raw data that led to the case study’s conclusions. Second, the case study database 
allowed the researcher to return to various points in the study and track the process 
of decision making as well as having the ability to return to various points in the 
study. This process adds another level of reliability to the entire case (Yin, 2012a, 
Yin, 2009). The development of the database ultimately allowed me to organise all 
my field notes, data from interviews, draft reports, documents and diary, and I was 
able to track my decision making points. The collection of data within the case study 







3.5.2 Stage 2: Preliminary Document Analysis 
Becoming familiar with the background and context of a case is essential. Yin (Yin, 
2012a, Yin, 2009) highlights the importance of understanding the theoretical and 
policy issues prior to commencing a study so that analytical judgments can be made 
throughout the data collection phase. Yin has suggested that without a firm grasp of 
the issues, one can easily miss important clues and would not know when a deviation 
was acceptable or even desirable. A preliminary document analysis and key 
informant interviews made up the two background activities necessary for me to 
become more directly familiar with the context and policy issues of the case. 
 
An initial analysis of key planning documents and reports that were prepared by the 
Australian government (AusAID) and the consultants contracted to plan, design and 
implement the reforms (AusHealth) were analysed. This preliminary assessment of 
information was useful in identifying the boundaries of the case (i.e., the time frames 
in which particular activities took place), and the development of a preliminary set of 
issues that emerged from the documents.  The reports that were identified for this 
exercise were ‘milestone reports’ and were written by the reformists at the various 
points that implementation of the project were analysed. From these reports emerged 
a preliminary list of key issues that contributed to the key thematic areas for the 
structured interviews. Further, from this process I was able to identify key 
stakeholders and actors in the reform process. 
 
3.5.3 Stage 3: Key Informant Interviews 
The first seven interviews carried out were key informant interviews for the sole 
purpose of gathering information and background from a contextual view point. Key 
informants came from the Office of the Prime Minister, an ex-Minister of Health, a 
senior manager from the department of planning and a senior official from the Public 
Service Commission, two NGO community leaders and the first AusHealth project 
manager of the project. The results of these interviews added further to the 
development and refinement of the case study protocol and themes, which guided the 






3.5.4 Stage 4: Development of Case Study Protocol   
The development of a case study protocol is seen as essential in case study 
methodology (Yin 2009, p 224). It assists in increasing the reliability of the case 
study design and is intended to assist the investigator in carrying out the data 
collection. As part of my preparation for the data collection phase of the project, I 
completed four tasks: 1) An analysis of key documents; 2) A series of key informant 
interviews; 3) The development of a case study protocol; and 4) The establishment of 
a case study database, which held all the key documentation. All of these approaches 
are recommend by Yin (2009, 2012) as part of the training required for case study 
researchers. These activities further assisted in enabling me to become familiar with 
key issues in the project and identify further case informants (Yin 2009, p. 224). Yin 
cautions against the lack of preparation in case studies and notes that if it is not done 
well it can jeopardise the entire case. 
 
The development of a case study protocol after the completion of the document 
analysis and key informant interviews enabled me to develop a set of key themes, 
issues and questions that were important to the study. The protocol enabled me to 
keep track of issues and assisted me to think through how I would manage other 
sources of data as well as ideas for arranging the data. More importantly, the protocol 
allowed me think through the structure of the case study report early on in the data 
collection process and helped me to clarify my theoretical framework prior to 
commencing the data collection process. What emerged from the design of the 
protocol was a timeline of key events and decisions that I used as part of my 
interview process to jog the memory of interviewees and to confirm events and 
decision activities. The protocol also included my introductory and background 
information to the study as well as the ethics permission documentation. I used this 
daily during the interview period to guide my actions and behaviour. 
 
3.5.5 Stage 5: Data Collection 
Case study is not merely a matter of recording data in a mechanical fashion. One 
must be able to interpret the information as it is being collated and to know 
immediately for instance if several sources of information contradict one another and 





data collection methods were utilised: document and archival analysis, in depth 
interviews and focus groups.  
 
3.5.6 Stage 6(a): Data Source 1 (Document and Archival Documentation) 
Archival Data 
Archival data is defined as taking the form of computer files and records, service 
records, organisational records, maps, charts, survey data and personal records such 
as diaries (Yin, 2012). The collection of archival records from MOH, the Public 
Service Commission, the Fiji Government Archives, WHO and the Fiji National 
University (previously known as the Fiji School of Medicine) relevant to the case 
commenced early in the study and was a major source of the background 
information. Archival data was identified based on a study of the documents from 
AusAID and AusHealth and the MOH over the period 1998 to 2005. From this, a 
systematic search for documents important to the study was undertaken in these three 
databases. An initial review of all the documents held in the databases enabled me to 
collect and copy documents that related to the establishment, development and 
implementation of the project. Most of the archival records were produced for a 
specific purpose and a specific audience and these conditions were taken into 
account when interpreting the usefulness of the archival records. 
 
Documents 
Documentary information is defined as including letters, memos, minutes of 
meetings, written reports and agendas(Yin, 2012) It. Key reports written by the 
contract Australian consulting company Aus Health were accessed with permission 
and forwarded to me by their senior office staff. Other key documentation included 
Fiji government documents, interim reports on progress, legislative reports, memos, 
newspapers articles, academic reports and archival documents from the government 
archives library. The majority of this information was already in the public domain 
and approval was given for the information to be used as background information 
only. 
 
Permission was given by AusAID to collect all relevant information relative to the 





and Canberra AusAID offices. A number of senior health officials within the health 
sector also lent me key reports that they had kept in their personal filing system. 
These proved to be invaluable and not available on the public databases. The WHO 
Pacific regional office library identified further historical documents relative to the 
project and these were made available and copied for me . 
 
Assessment of Archival and Documentary Evidence 
The collection and assessment of documentary evidence was carefully collated. As 
many of the documents and reports analysed were written and designed for specific 
communication, it was important to take account of possible bias in the documents. 
Many of the reports were written by consultants as part of their reporting, and other 
reports were reviews of activities by monitoring and audit teams. I used a framework 
to assess the meaning and evidentiary worth of the documents and reports to help me 
interpret the meaning and significance of what was written (George and Bennett, 
2005). As part of this process, it was necessary to consider who was speaking in the 
reports, to whom and for what purpose and under what circumstances when 
assessing the evidence. 
 
The bulk of the documentary evidence retrieved were reports written for the funder 
of the project and were designed to provide information related to budgetary and 
contractual requirements of the project. Determining the usefulness and validity and 
accuracy of the documents was part of the research process. The AusHealth 
milestone reports proved most useful and were used to corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources (Yin 2009). Various interviewees mentioned articles 
and reports during their interviews and the corroboration of events and issues were 
substantiated in this process. 
 
Yin (Yin, 2012a), however, does caution against the extensive use and over reliance 
of documents and reports and suggests that they should not be accepted as literal 
recordings of events that have taken place but are useful and give a study broad 
coverage. The usefulness of the reports lay in the extraction of specific facts and 
events that related to the reform policy planning, development and implementation 





related to the wider contextual nature of the reforms (Merriam, 1988). Documentary 
evidence further gave richness to the analysis of the data collected from the 
interviews. 
 
3.5.7 Stage 6(b): Data Source 2 (Open-ended Individual Interviews with Three 
Groups) 
 
Interviews: Informal and In Depth 
Interviews were essentially the main source and arguably the primary data source for 
this explanatory case study. It is through the interviews that the researchers can best 
access case participants’ views and interpretations of actions and events. 
Interviewing is a research method that allows one to explore what is in and on 
someone else’s mind, to access the perspective of the person being interviewed and 
to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe (Patton, 1990). 
 
Good interviews are those that provide an opportunity for respondents to tell their 
stories and allow the participants to share their feelings, thoughts, knowledge and 
experiences (Patton, 1990). I used a semi-structured interview process to 
accommodate a flexible approach to the interviews, which provided me with a wider 
scope to probe responses. I used the case study protocol to ensure that key topics 
were discussed with all interviewees, though none of the themes or issues were 
investigated in the same order or in the same depth. I relied on generating a sense of 
spontaneity, which helped to bring about a natural flow of interaction between 
myself and the respondent. 
 
Forty days was allocated to all the interviews and the three focus groups over a 
period of two months. This spread allowed for unexpected cancellations, 
postponements and other possible interferences and delays. I completed one 
interview per day, allowing me ample time for each interview as well as time to write 
up my notes directly after the interview and to listen to my interview recording, 
ensuring it was audible and that interview notes were clear. This process helped 
ensure my data was as near to accurate as possible (Patton, 1990). It also allowed me 





Interviews were conducted in English and recorded and transcribed by me. English is 
the language of the public service in Fiji and was the comfortable choice of most of 
the respondents. Further, Fijian was not the native language of all of respondents and 
my Fijian vernacular was not good enough in formal situations. 
 
Where respondents did use Fijian language to describe something, I would translate 
their meanings in English during the interview to ensure that I had interpreted what 
they were attempting to convey correctly. Interviews commenced with ensuring that 
the consent forms were completed and that the respondent was clear on their rights 
during the interview process. Signatory consent required in depth explanations to 
most interviewees as I needed to repeat explanations regarding the privacy and 
confidentiality of the research consistently. Given the sensitivities in the political 
environment in Fiji at the time of the study, this was to be expected and anticipated. 
All interviews allowed for small talk and banter, this made for a more relaxed 
setting, including the appropriate protocol and engagement of ‘cultural jibing’ that 
is acceptable among Indigenous Fijians of different tribal affiliations (Nayackalou, 
1975). 
 
Depending on whom the interviewee was, and his or her role in the health sector or 
wider community, their status and title, the meeting would commence with 
recognition of their position and the importance of their contribution to the study. If 
the individual was connected to me via traditional or mutual clan affiliation, this was 
also recognised and affirmed at this point. 
 
In cultural settings such as this, it was important for me to prepare well by gathering 
information on the potential interviewee and their cultural background so that I could 
locate my traditional place and status in relation to theirs prior to exchange of 
information. This ensured the balance of power and position in a situation 
particularly when it was necessary to interview senior politicians who held 
traditional chiefly titles. Ensuring the cultural protocols were complete and assessing 
the appropriateness of when it was acceptable to start the interview was a necessary 
action and showed respect to the interviewee so that they felt that interviews were 





could contribute to the study. A significant amount of time and emphasis was taken 
prior to the conducting of some of the interviews to ensure comfort and protocol 
safety was necessary with some respondents. For some interviews the exchange 
formal greetings and acknowledgment of clan histories and place often took up to 
forty minutes before the start of an interview. 
 
The concept of cultural respect meant that priorities were different when talking to 
both Indigenous and non-Indigenous Fijians. Often, when speaking to male 
Indigenous Fijians, I was more restrained and less informal. Interviews with 
Indigenous Fijian women were less restrictive and more informal.  The concept of 
‘Fiji time’, meaning that life is taken at a very leisurely pace, further allowed for 
many of the interview times to be changed at short notice or interview appointments 
never started on time nor did they finish on time.  All interviews included 
refreshments, which I provided whether in the respondent’s home or their office 
place. Refreshments were recognized as a sevusevu4 (welcoming gift) (Ravuvu, 
1987). 
 
Identification of Informants for Interviews 
There were 39 separate individual in depth interviews, five focus groups and seven 
key informant interviews. In total, the project had 70 informants. The following table 
identifies the stakeholders, the number of interviews, data collection method and 
category of the respondent (Yin, 2012a, Yin, 2009). 
 
  
                                               
4 Sevusevu is a traditional welcoming ceremony and normally would include the presentation and 





Table 4 Categories, Numbers and Methodology of Key Stakeholders Interviewed (data collected from October 
2007 to March 2008) 
Stakeholder Number of 
Units 
Category Data Collection 
Method 
Senior MOH officials 10 Planners and 
implementers 
In depth 
 3 Implementers Focus group 
 




4 Planners and 
implementers 
In depth 
Senior public sector 
officials 
 
5 Implementers In depth 
Ex-ministers of 
health 
2 Planners In depth 
 




3 Observers In depth 
 
Nurses 4 (Central) Implementers In depth 
 
 4 (Lautoka) Implementers Focus group 
 
 4 (East) Implementers Focus group 
 













Unions  2 Observers In depth 
 
Traditional leaders 2 Observers In depth 
 
NGO 2 Observers In depth 
 
Ex-politicians 1 Observers In depth 
 
 
Identification of participants for interviews came via two processes. One was through 
the analysis of reports and documentation, where individuals were identified as part 
of their roles and tasks in the reform process. Second, there was personal referral of 
senior policy staff within the MOH who had knowledge of individuals and their 
involvement in the reforms. Respondents who were interviewed from NGOs, 
academic institutions and professional associations came from referrals from my Fiji-
based supervisor and from colleagues of mine located in various sectors of the 
community. Other respondents included public health officials, health managers, 
public servants, ministers of government, traditional leaders and ex-politicians. In 
identifying key public servants for the interviews, I was mindful to not only 
interview officials who were ‘high in the hierarchy’ of policy making or had ‘too 
close’ an involvement in the reform process, but purposefully selected a cross-
section to obtain multiple views at several levels. 
 
I recognised throughout the process that often it is the lower level officials who have 
worked on everyday issues who often have stronger recollections of how policy was 
decided than senior officials who actually made the decisions. High level policy 
makers are often only focused on the issues in question and only intermittently, and 
subsequently do not often have the full and wide range of knowledge of many of the 
middle managers who were interviewed. Further, given that middle managers and 
officials did not have complete accounts of what happened, it was important to 
interview other policy actors in the system who often had different views from those 







A review of the information and my own knowledge of the case enabled me to gauge 
the point of saturation where I felt that I had collected and explored a wider range of 
experiences by those involved in the reforms to meet my research objectives, at 
which point I stopped collecting interview data. Saturation can be dictated by issues 
such as  project design sample size and therefore saturation might be achieved earlier 
or later depending on these factors . Given the time limitations of the study and 
availability of many of the participants, I did not have the luxury of funded research  
or an open ended amount of time.  Ensuring that I had sufficient data and that I felt I 
have exhausted all avenues of information possibilities (Morse, 1994). The point of 
saturation was difficult to identify (Charmaz, 2006).  However, it is important and 
necessary according to Yin (2012) for the researcher to make judgments about 
continued data collection; it depends mostly on the level of new knowledge that 
emerges from on-going interviews, which are relevant to the case. Three groups of 
interviewees were identified as potentially those who would provide the most 
information on the case. 
 
Group 1 (Planners) 
Individuals in this category were those who had been identified in the various reports 
studied as part of the documentary evidence process. They were identified by their 
role in the project and specifically by their involvement in the pre-planning work, 
development, design and negotiation of the reforms. Stakeholders included Aus AID, 
Aus Health, MOH officials and WHO. These groups were specifically involved at 
the front end of the reforms and their stories reflected the early stages of the 
development of policy work. 
 
Group 2 (Implementers) 
These were identified stakeholders from within the MOH and the broader public 
reform process (policy managers). Respondents included health leaders inside the 
MOH, health managers and ministers of government, and senior public servants from 
within the MOH. Officials of the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of 
Finance, Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Office, representatives of other public sector 
agencies and AusHealth consultants were also included. This group reflected 





Group 3 (External Observers) 
Open-ended interviews were held with a series of individuals who represented 
organisations and institutions within the health sector but not directly or intimately 
involved in the planning or implementation of the reforms. Informants included 
organisations such as industrial unions, academic institutions, traditional Indigenous 
chiefs and leaders and community leaders, health sector representatives outside of 
the MOH and international NGOs. Information gleaned from this group added to the 
wider contextual knowledge of the reforms and provided a perspective on 
implementation issues outside of the policy process. 
 
3.5.8 Stage 6(c): Data Source 3 (Focus Groups with Reform Implementers) 
Focus Groups 
The focus group approach has been defined as ‘group discussions organised to 
explore a specific set of issues’ (Kitzinger, 1994). According to McDaniel and Bach 
(McDaniel R and Bach, 1996), such discussion takes place in a social setting 
moderated by a group leader, so as to generate descriptive or explanatory 
information. Other researchers simply refer to it as a process of group interaction that 
serves to generate data for analysis (Stewart and Shamdassani, 1990, Patton, 1990). 
Patton (1990) further states that the focus group is an interview and not a discussion 
nor a problem solving session. He suggests that groups can be used to examine what 
people think, how they think, why they think in specific ways and their 
understandings and priorities in a given subject area. 
 
The focus group approach was used to interview health workers in three sub-
divisional hospitals who were involved in the implementation of the health reforms. 
Four focus groups were completed. Each was separated by gender and profession to 
allow a much more open and culturally safer and intimate sharing of information to 
take place. Gender separation mostly related to doctors (males) and nurses (females) 
and minimising power and gender cultural issues within the interviews. The purpose 
of using the focus group approach in this study was to explore a specific set of issues 
(Kitzinger, 1994).  The smallest group numbered 7 participants and the largest group 





both doctors and nurses group together as it was recognized that the different and 
dynamic discussions between both groups would have produced valuable dialogue.  
 
The interview structure and format used allowed for contentious (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985) issues raised to be more fully examined. More importantly, it allowed for 
members of the group to express what they thought and why they thought it more 
freely. This was consistent with fundamental qualitative research assumptions that 
advocate the insider’s standpoint or ‘emic’ perspective.  On reflection, I felt that the 
focus group interviews drew me into the issues with a bit more intensity than the 
individual interviews and I found myself much closer to research topic and better 
understood the issues of the actors involved (Clarke, 1999, Buse, 2008)).  
 
In particular, I found that fuller explanations of sensitive issues were easier for 
participants than in the individual interviews. Hence, the most important aspect of 
the focus group exercises was the ability of respondents to validate issues that arose 
from the interaction of the members within the focus group. Often a member of the 
group would raise an issue of sensitivity and immediately other members would 
support or comment on the issue. This type of validation as expressed by Stewart and 
Shamdassani (1990) would not have been possible to ascertain in face to face 
interviews. 
 
Planning the Focus Groups 
The organisation of focus groups was the most challenging aspect of the data 
collection activities. In each sub-divisional hospital it was intended that two focus 
groups would be conducted. This did not eventuate as coordinating health workers in 
their workplace proved too difficult. Focus groups that were planned in Suva were 
much easier to organise than the other two sub-divisional hospitals. I had preliminary 
conversations with all the focus group participants prior to inviting them to gauge 
whether they were able to make a contribution to the case. I asked questions about 
their role, tasks and their comfort to participate in the group. It was also at this stage 






It was important to have focus groups take place during their time of work as outside 
working hours was not appropriate, as most interviewees saw this exercise as related 
to work and therefore not a conversation to have outside of the work place. In all 
three hospitals, all those who were invited attended.  Adopting a strategy of over 
recruiting for the focus groups proved useful as not everyone who was invited 
attended.  Stewart and Shamdassani (1990) highlight the merits of over-recruiting to 
focus groups, suggesting that it is likely that at least two potential participants will 
not turn up, subsequently it pays to over invite. This strategy was adopted in 
recruiting participants for the subsequent groups.  
 
Conducting the Focus Group 
Focus group participants were provided with written material on the aims and 
objectives of the study. In order to maximise the accuracy of the data, the discussions 
were tape recorded. I recruited a student researcher to assist with note taking and the 
operation of the recorder and gave the assistant both ethical and translation 
guidelines and training for this exercise. Both these tactics had the effect of 
enhancing the validity of the data analysis (Patton 1990, p. 171).  All participants 
gave consent to this method of recording interviews. At the outset, it was necessary 
to ensure that all participants felt welcome and comfortable. 
 
Having explained the purpose of the focus group, I then reassured them all that their 
involvement would not adversely affect their work and that all their responses would 
remain confidential to the study. While each group began with general questions, I 
was able to probe further with more specific questions until all respondents got an 
opportunity to express their views. The sessions ended with a summary of the 
discussion and seeking verification from all the participants on the issues discussed. 
In particular, the focus group processes resulted in a consideration of the many 
voices of those who were involved at the forefront of the reform process. 
 
3.5.9 Stage 7: Data Management and Analysis 
Case study documents were collected prior to the field work and throughout the 
duration of the study. This resulted in a large collection of documents. All documents 





depending on their usefulness. The purpose of this process was to make documents 
readily retrievable for later perusal. In instances where the documents had been 
relevant to specific interviews, the documents and interview were cross-referenced 
so that the interview notes cited the document. 
 
The creation of a case study database assisted me to keep information collated and 
orderly and allowed ease of referencing to support the evidence of the study. At the 
end of the project, the case study database had 147 entries, these included reports, 
memos, letters, emails, cabinet memos, AusAID reports, AusHealth reports and both 
Australian and Fijian government official documents. 
 
Narratives as Evidence 
(Carter, 1993, Buse, 2008) calls for letting the case ‘tell its own story’. This study 
highlighted the importance of storytelling as personal experiences were important to 
the emergence of themes and issues that were relevant to the completeness of the 
case study. The data therefore was in the form of the participant’s own words, 
including direct citations from documents and added to the evidence and support of 
the findings of this study. Storytelling in the interviews provided a way of capturing 
the respondent’s view of how things happened and what they experienced. This 
provided a much more real understanding not only for the respondents but also for 
the researcher. The data from the interviewees were used to support the themes and 
ideas that had emerged from the document and archival analysis process (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). 
 
Note Taking as Evidence 
Most interviews took longer than 1.5 hours. All interviews were recorded. During the 
interview, substantial notes were taken to ensure I captured what Patton (1990) calls 
‘tracking of key phrases, major points, key terms or words in quotation that capture 
the interviewees own language’. The notes took on a variety of forms but mostly 
were handwritten and then typed. They eventually were collated and formed part of 
my diary and the case study database. Entire interviews were transcribed by me, 
allowing for a more controlled interpretation of the interview and further allowed for 





3.5.10 Stage 8: Analysis 
The importance of analytical strategies in case study analysis is highlighted by Yin 
(Yin, 2012). The theoretical framework helped focus my attention on certain data 
and evidence. Using an inductive approach, I merged indexed and coded data 
together using NVIVO® (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2008). All the data (from the 
various sources) were triangulated to provide an in depth analysis of the FHMRP. 
The relationships between the four major research objectives, the instruments and the 
data collection strategies are shown in Figure 4 as part of the research methodology 
diagram. 
 
Thematic Analysis and Interpretation 
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns of 
themes within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This study utilised thematic analysis. 
According to both Braun and Clarke (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and Attride-Stirling 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001), the process of thematic analysis starts when the researcher 
begins to notice and look for patterns of meaning and issues of potential interest in 
the data. As part of the analysis of the data, Braun’s six steps were used to guide the 
analysis process. These included data familiarisation, generating codes, searching 
and reviewing, defining themes and explanation building (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
 
Familiarisation of the Data 
In order to become familiar with the raw data, I read all reports, documents and 
archival materials numerous times. From this process emerged a preliminary list of 
key issues and ideas being identified. I read and re-read transcripts several times 
checking for accuracy against the audio recordings. This process brought another 
level of understanding of the data and further added to the list of key issues and ideas 
being identified. Interview notes and other case study background notes were also 
scrutinised. Becoming familiar with the raw evidence, according to Braun and Clarke 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006), is vital so that the researcher is familiar with the depth and 
breadth of the content. Further, they note that repeated readings of the data in an 
active way strengthens the search for meaning and patterns (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). At the conclusion of the familiarisation process, more than 135 issues and 





Generating of Initial Codes 
According to Boyatzis (1988), codes identify a feature of the data that appears 
interesting to the researcher and refers to the most basic segment or element of the 
raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the 
phenomenon. Further, the process of coding as described by Miles and Hubermann 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) is part of the formal process of analysis as in order to 
organise data into meaningful groups. I used NVIVO®, a computer software 
specifically designed for qualitative research (reference), to collate and categorise 
my data. The software tools assisted me to explore, manage and shape the 
unstructured bulk of the data collected. Tools within NVIVO® included sorting, 
classifying, and arranging the research into categorised themes. I systematically 
worked through the entire data set and gave full and equal attention to each data 
item. Handwritten notations and the use of highlighters and coloured pens were used 
at this stage to identify initial themes and patterns. I used NVIVO® to collate, sort 
and file the codes. 
 
Second, I moved through the entire data once again set asking specific questions that 
were relative and linked to Considine’s (1994),  framework and proceeded to code 
the data around four key issues (policy actors, policy culture, policy institutions and 
political economy). From this dual process emerged two separate types of coded 
data. One set that was coded for ideas and themes and another set that was cross 
coded with framework. 
 
This process allowed me to code and identify as many themes and patterns as 
possible. It assisted me to capture potential and future issues that specifically did not 
relate to the theoretical framework but issues that I felt were important to the case. I 
coded extracts of data inclusively so as to keep a little of the surrounding data where 
relevant to ensure that I did not lose the context of the quotation (Bryman, 1989). 
Where I identified key issues that did not fit into this initial framework, these were 






Search for Themes 
Once all the data had been coded and collated and I had a list of codes, I began the 
process of identifying themes by sorting through the codes. This process focused me 
at the broader level of the themes rather than the codes and resulted in the 
identification of a range of themes, which I was now able to collate with relevant 
coded data extracted within the identified theme. I drew a series of maps, one for 
each theme, and organised the codes into themes this way using NVIVO®. This 
process concluded with a collection of main themes and sub-themes and all the 
extracts of data that were coded in relation to them. Codes that did not belong were 
retained separately 
 
The case study approach allows for the investigation of information that revolves 
around themes. According to Braun and Clarke (Braun and Clarke, 2006), a theme 
captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and 
represents some level of patterned response or meaning with the data set. Braun and 
Clarke (Braun and Clarke, 2006) further suggest that a theme is not necessarily 
dependent on quantifiable measures but rather on whether it captures something 
important in relation to the overall research question. This definition was used to 
define and interpret the themes in this study. 
 
Reviewing the Themes 
I approached this phase in two stages.  First, I reviewed themes by revisiting the 
level of the coded extracts and decided whether they appeared to form a coherent 
pattern.  Returning to analyse the extracts and the evidence was necessary to ensure 
all the themes were coherently supported by the extracts. In some instances, I found 
that some themes were too big and were better separated and, in other instances, it 
became evident that some themes were not themes at all as there was insufficient 
data to support them. There were a range of themes that did not fit and the extracts 
that supported them better supported other themes. 
 
The second stage in this process of review and as suggested by Braun and Clarke 
(2006) was the consideration of the validity of all the individual themes in relation to 





ascertain whether the themes worked in relation to the data set and second to code 
any additional data within themes that I had missed in earlier coding stages. 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006), this is necessary as the need for re-coding is 
an ongoing organic process. As part of this process, I laid out all the themes on a 
whiteboard and attached to them the coded data that supported the theme. This 
process was helpful as it helped refine the themes further and I was able to visually 
see all of my data quickly. This process concluded with a thematic map of my data 
and 25 themes were identified at this stage. 
 
Defining and Naming the Themes 
The next stage in this process as suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) is necessary 
to ensure the final themes are refined. At this point, I returned to the collated data 
extracts and systematically checked the themes and the data for internal consistency, 
further ensuring that my themes were true to the data and what I was interpreting as 
evidence. Returning to the collated data extracts was necessary to ensure the themes 
were internally consistent with the result theme. This process also required me to 
identify what was of interest about them and why. 
 
For each theme I ended up with the identified theme and an accompanying narrative, 
a process made easy by NVIVO®. I then wrote a detailed analysis of the theme and 
how it linked to the greater aspect of the analysis and the broader story in the data in 
relation to the key objectives of the research. As I moved through this process, it 
naturally progressed into a process of refinement and I was able to identify further 
sub-themes that warranted further analysis, which added to the development of the 
structure of the story. This process was completed with the identification 16 key 
themes that related to the research objectives. 
 
3.5.11 Stage 9: Quality Criteria in the Study 
Tests to establish the validity and reliability of qualitative data are important to 
determine the stability and quality of the data obtained. However, there is no single, 
coherent set of validity and reliability tests for each research phase in case study 
methodology (Andreas M. Riege, 2003). The approach taken in this study enables 





for the highlighting of various techniques which can be used to address objectivity 
and rigor relevant for the case study. Using standard measures of validity I have also 
included for other measures such as credibility and authenticity. 
 
Case study research is difficult because the rigor of the process used to arrive at the 
results and the validity of the findings and the conclusions reached need to be 
established (Yin 2009). Four tests have been commonly used to establish the quality 
of any empirical social research and as case studies are one form of such research, 
the four tests are also relevant for this project (Judd et al., 1991). I used the following 
case study methods to ensure rigor in the study (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Case Study Methods to Ensure Rigour of the Study 







Use of multiple sources 
of evidence 
Data collection Archival, historical documents, 
reports, interviews, focus 
groups 
 Establish a chain of 
evidence 




Explanation building Data analysis Peer briefing with supervisor 
 Feedback workshops Data analysis  Delivery of two workshops to 
respondents in the study 
External 
validity 
Use of theory research 
in single case study 
Design phase Health policy analysis theory 
Reliability Use of case study 
protocol 
Data collection Design of study protocol part 
of preparation of data 
collection 
 Develop case study 
database 
Data collection  
 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity as defined by (Judd et al., 1991) asserts the necessity of 
establishing correct operational measures for the concept being studied. In this study, 





to the objectives of the study.  The first was the use of multiple sources of evidence, 
which allowed for convergent lines of inquiry, which as described earlier is a process 
of triangulation. Various sources of data allowed for testing and confirmation of 
ideas from various sources not a single source. This approach allowed for a stronger 
validation of the data. The second method used was the collation of evidence (chain 
of evidence). This included timelines, historical evidence and recording and filing of 
reports and use of the case study database. The maintenance of a chain of evidence 
enabled for an identified pathway from the case study questions, to the case study 
protocol, to citations in the evidence through to the database and the eventual writing 
of the report. The collection of case notes, interview evidence and other factual 




Guba and Lincoln (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and Klenke (Klenke, 2008) used the 
concept of ‘credibility’ of internal validity and described it as an attempt to establish 
the match between the constructed realities of respondents and those realities as 
represented by the researcher. Patton asserts that validity is replaced by authenticity 
and credibility and that the ultimate test of a report is the response of the information 
users and readers to that report. In order to ensure the validity and authenticity of my 
work, two techniques were used. First, I undertook a peer debriefing with my 
supervisor and colleagues who worked in the Fiji health sector. Peer debriefing is 
recommended by Guba and Lincoln (1989) as an important strategy to enhance 
credibility. I was mindful that there were many instances where I inferred that 
particular decisions were made or I assumed that a particular result could be directly 
the result from some earlier occurrence based on interview or documentary evidence. 
 
Peer briefing allowed me to account for these assumptions and gave my data a level 
of protection from my own self-assumptions. These threats to validity were treated in 
the study by the process of explanation building. Critical insights established during 
the analysis phase of the study particular in areas such as public policy processes and 
health policy analysis were tested in this manner. This process enabled me to 





about health policy and Fiji. What eventuated was a gradual building of explanations 
and the refining of ideas (Yin 2009, p 230). As I became more confident with 
theoretical statements, these were tested by my supervisors and with my peers. 
 
A second test of internal validity was the hosting of report back workshops, which 
were used to gain feedback from those who were involved in the focus groups and 
the individual interviews. This process allowed for critique and discussion between 
myself and interviewees and resulted in the emergence of other issues that added to 
the process of alternative explanation building. Equally important from a 
researcher’s view, the workshops allowed for the return of the information to those 
who actually owned it. This is also an important element of cultural reciprocity. 
 
External Validity 
External validity is concerned with the extent to which the findings of the study can 
be applied to other situations or generalised beyond the immediate case study 
(Merriam, 1988). In traditional experimental research, researchers are interested in   
research situations in which a sample can be readily generalised to a larger universe. 
This is not the intention of case study methodology. Case studies rely on analytical 
and theoretical generalisation, where the researcher is striving to generalise a 
particular set of results to some broader theory. The theoretical proposition that led to 
the study of this case was based on the lack of knowledge of health policy analysis 
theory and limited experiences of health policy in developing countries. This 
proposition or gap in the knowledge has been reflected in my theoretical framework 
and research design and shaped how I collected my data (Yin, 2009).  
 
Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with the stability of data over time or the extent to which 
findings may be replicated (Merriam, 1988, Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Merriam 
(1988) suggests that the use of an audit trail is essential to increase reliability. An 
audit trail is a process that is established, trackable and documentable so that the 
analysis of the collected data can be confirmed (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To ensure 
dependable results, the study used two tools to ensure reliability: a case study 






A case study is known as a triangulated research methodology and triangulation can 
happen with data methodologies and theories (Patton, 1990). The concept of data 
triangulation is when the researcher looks for the data to remain the same in different 
contexts. This is also a form of assuring reliability. The use of multiple sources of 
evidence in case studies according to (Yin, 2009) allows an investigator to address a 
broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues. This is one of a case 
study’s major strengths. 
 
Yin (2009) argues that when process issues are involved, multiple sources of 
evidence and case studies offer a holistic perspective, allowing for a fuller 
exploration of the issues, and that the use of multiple sources of evidence far exceeds 
that in other research strategies such as experiments, surveys or histories. The ability 
for case studies to have multiple perspectives triangulated gives a study a multi-
dimension of the case study experience and is an important feature of case study 
methodology, which was an important aspect of this project’s design. 
 
3.5.12 Stage 10: Reflexivity 
My own set of beliefs and cultural values guided the way I went about the research; 
my cultural position affected the way I collected the data. As an indigenous Fijian 
woman, who has spent a significant number of years outside of Fiji, I had two 
challenges.  First, recognising my own cultural values and the constraints that this 
put on the research process, and second, as an outsider to my own culture and the 
acceptability of validity of my personage in this process and how I conducted the 
interviews and my role within the interview process. Remaining in a cultural 
framework while carrying out interviews and while speaking and gathering 
information was an important aspect of the research and data collection. 
 
During the analysis phase of the project, I was conscious that my cultural knowledge 
and beliefs as well as my extended knowledge of the health sector in Fiji through 
years of association with the system influenced some of my judgments. My 





feedback workshops and the peer briefing exercises created opportunities for me to 
test my cultural biases and assumptions. 
 
Positionality 
As a health policy analyst and researcher it is important to state that one of the key 
issues facing health policy analysts is how they are viewed or situated as researchers  
their institutional base, and perceived legitimacy and involvement in policy 
communities (Walt et al., 2008). This project was personally an important and 
meaningful experience, and was strengthened by the opportunity provided to me to 
access the policy environment as both a researcher and also as a practitioner. I not 
only had the opportunity to conduct the research but also I was able to engage with 
the policy and political elites, a necessity when investigating sensitive political issues 
(Walt et al., 2008). I had what Merriam describes as “positionality”, the ability to be 
both the insider and the outsider (Kobayashi, 2003).  
 
I commenced the research as an outsider so I had the advantage of curiosity and was 
unfamiliar with many processes within the Fiji health systems. I was seen as neutral 
but understanding and safe and more importantly not aligned with any of the 
stakeholders. Towards the end of this study I commenced working for World Health 
Organization in the Pacific Regional office based in Suva Fiji. In this role I worked 
closely with the MoH in Fiji and was part of central MoH policy team. I shifted from 
an outsider to an insider and this allowed me to continue to discuss my findings and 
learning’s and ask more meaningful questions. As the analysis progressed I was able 
to describe better an understanding of the reality in which the health sector operated.  
According to Buse and others studies that include both insiders and outsiders as 
members of research teams yield the richest and most comprehensive understanding 
of the policy process (Buse et al., 2007). The benefit of this position I would hope 
would allow me to deliver better and relevant policy conclusions and new theoretical 
and methodological understandings in the policy analysis space. 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the theoretical framework and methodology used to 





methodology and the key elements of case study research. Considine’s (1994) 
theoretical framework was introduced and discussed and highlighted how the 
framework has guided the entire study. The project’s research issues and the research 
method were introduced and discussed. Data collection techniques and the 
management of the data and thematic analysis were also highlighted. The importance 
of quality and validity in the research was discussed and the chapter concluded with 
introducing the concept of explanation building and how it has related to the overall 
development of the report, its analysis and its conclusions.  The next chapter 







Chapter 4: The Republic of Fiji’s Socio-political Context in 
1999 
 
4.0  Introduction 
It is now well accepted that an understanding of policy processes needs to be 
grounded in analysis of the context within which the policy dynamic occurs (Walt & 
Gilson 1994b). This chapter introduces key background information necessary to 
understanding the environment and context and highlights issues important to 
understanding the environment in Fiji up to and prior to the 1999 reforms. It has been 
structured in three parts.  
 
The first part introduces Fiji and its people and provides a brief discussion on the 
early history and migration of the Fijian people. This discussion is important because 
it helps put in context the role of indigenous leadership and Fijis social structures and 
the importance of this in relation to the influence of Fijian culture on the reform 
process.  Understanding Fiji’s history and the formation of its political system and its 
colonial past helps to provide context to how Fiji has formed its political identity 
today, recognition of the formation of Fiji’s early political institutions and the role of 
ethnic protectionism. Part two discusses Fiji’s health system, its challenges and its 
problems. This discussion intends to highlight key issues that were seen as major 
drivers for the reform process prior to 1999. Part three discusses the Fiji health 
reform project and its governance structure and the role of the donor. 
 
4.1 The Republic of Fiji 
Fiji is a sub-tropical nation made up of more than 520 islands and islets and two 
larger volcanic islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu (Figure 5). The total land area of 
18,343 square kilometres is scattered over 650,000 square kilometres. The country is 
approximately 1,700 miles north-east of Sydney, Australia, and is centrally placed 






Figure 5- Map of the Fiji Islands (Gravell 1979) 
 
4.1.1 The People 
There are several views on the origins of the indigenous people of Fiji. Historians 
have provided a variety of explanations on the arrival of Fijians based on historical, 
emigration and language patterns, which suggests that Fijians travelled the oceans 
and sea currents for thousands of years out of Africa, stopping in Asia and then 
eventually dispersing throughout the Pacific (Gravell, 1979).  
 
The most common and considered oral traditional story of early migration of the 
Fijians is the Kaunitoni migration story ((Geraghty, 1977 p 77{Government of Fiji, 
2006 #1038, Buse, 2008)}. The Kaunitoni myth describes the journey of Fijians from 
the Middle East through the Red Sea to Ethiopia and to settlement in Lake 
Tanganyika. According to this story, upheld in oral history today in Fiji, all 
indigenous ‘Fijians are the descendants of Chief Lutunasobasoba, who led the 
expedition. Today, the Kaunitoni story has become intrinsically part of Fijian history 
and tradition (Tuwere, 2002). Anthropological authorities have suggested that people 
migrated into the Pacific from South-East Asia via the Indonesian islands. 
Polynesian, Melanesian and African blood are traceable, and there have been recent 
archaeological discoveries that have suggested that there have been South American 





Fijians that are dark-skinned, of Melanesian origin, predominate in the western part 
of Fiji. However, Indigenous Fijians of the eastern islands of Fiji come from 
Polynesia and are mainly of Tongan descent. The 1996 Census numbered Fiji’s 
population at 775,077, which made it the largest of all Pacific Island nations in the 
region excluding Papua New Guinea (Government of Fiji, 2006). 
 
Two major ethnicities, Indigenous Fijians5 and Indo-Fijians, make up the greater part 
of Fiji’s population. Fiji’s Indo-Fijian6 population originally came from India 
between 1879 and 1916, as indentured workers for the British and all other plantation 
owners. During the 1960s and prior to independence in 1970, the Indo-Fijian 
population grew to outnumber the Indigenous Fijian population.  In 1975, the Indo-
Fijian population represented more than 55% of the population of Fiji. Indo-Fijians 
migrated from Fiji in large numbers after the first political coup in 1990, and for the 
first time since independence did not represent the majority population (De Vries, 
2002).  In 1999, Indo-Fijians represented 37.5% of the population, with Indigenous 
Fijians comprising 58.6% of the population. Chinese, Rotuman and other Pacific 
ethnicities made up the rest of the population at 3.9%. 
 
The bulk of Fiji’s population lives in urban centers, namely, Suva, Nadi, Lautoka and 
Labasa. Small groupings of populations mainly in villages are spread through rural 
areas on the two main islands, with also smaller groupings of villages scattered 
throughout the various small-inhabited island groups. Fiji promotes itself as a 
Christian nation; the majority of the Indigenous Fijians belong to Christian religious 
denominations with the Fiji Methodist Church being the most sizeable. The majority 
of the Indian population practice Hinduism, with a quarter of them followers of 
Islam. The official languages are Fijian and English, but Hindi is also spoken widely 
among both the Indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian population.7 
 
4.1.2 Early History 
Dutch navigator Abel Tasman was the first known European visitor to Fiji in 1643. 
Captain James Cook visited the islands in 1774(Gravell, 1979). It was not until 1789, 
                                               
5 Commonly referred to as itaukei 
6 More commonly now known as Fijians 





however, that the islands were charted and plotted, when William Bligh, the 
castaway captain of the HMS Bounty, passed the outer island of Ovalau and sailed 
between the main islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu en route to Batavia, in what 
is now Indonesia. Bligh Water, the strait between the two main islands, is named 
after him, and for a time, the Fiji Islands were known as the Bligh Islands(Gravell, 
1979). The first Europeans to settle among the Fijians were shipwrecked sailors and 
runaway convicts from Australian penal colonies. In 1804, the discovery of 
sandalwood on the south-western coast of Vanua Levu led to an increase in the 
number and frequency of western trading ships visiting Fiji. The 19th-century further 
brought other European traders in search of beche de mer (sea cucumbers); other 
settlers arrived in search of land and the first Christian missionaries arrived in search 
of stray souls. 
 
Early tribal wars and politics in the middle of the 19th century played a significant 
role in the establishment of Fiji’s early political structures. There were tribal wars 
between chiefs, Ratu Seru Cakobau and the great Tongan chief Ma’afu, who fought 
over the right to rule and the domination of various geographical parts of Fiji. Years 
of fighting temporarily halted when Cakobau accepted Christianity and during this 
period of calm an agreement was reached between the chiefs to establish a 
confederacy of native kingdoms(Geraghty, 1977).8 
 
4.1.3 Establishment of the Fijian Indigenous Administration System 
Fiji was ceded to the United Kingdom on 10 October 1874. The first Governor, Sir 
Hercules Robinson, established a formal colonial administrative system, which 
carried out the day-to-day affairs of ruling the country. In addition to the colonial 
administrative system, a traditional system of administration was also established by 
the colonists to help order the affairs of the Indigenous Fijians (Figure 6). 
 
The British, as part of their programme of colonisation, purposefully designed policy 
within the new infrastructure based on upholding principles of Fijian supremacy and 
interests over and above the interests of any other racial or ethnic group. A system of 
indirect rule, similar to that used by the British in India  (Etherington, 1996), was 
                                               





achieved by taking the existing authoritarian Fijian chiefly structures and using them 
as way to organise by law some of the activities of the Fijian people for their own 
social and political development (Nayackalou, 1975). The main institution 
established in this process was the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), which provided 
advice on Indigenous and leadership issues to the colonial government and enabled 














Figure 6 Traditional administration structure 
 
The two additional institutions that were established as part of this process were the 
Native Land Trust Board, an institution that promoted the safe guarding of native 
lands for Indigenous people, and the Native Regulation Board, which allowed Fijian 
chiefs to control policies and laws only for Indigenous Fijians based on the concept 
of protectionism (Gravell, 1979). Both the GCC and the Institution of the Native 
Regulation Board, which was renamed the Fijian Affairs Board, made up the higher 
echelons of the system of Fijian administration and directly supported the colonial 
administrative processes (Figure 6). The new infrastructure further enabled 
indigenous Fijians to establish separate policy and infrastructure for self-
management, including a separate system of law (Ravuvu, 1992). 
 
Fijian provincial magistrates were employed to solve conflicts at the provincial level, 
while traditional chiefs continued to resolve conflicts at the village level or within 
their Vanua boundaries. While Fijian magistrates operated within the modern rule of 





rulings of the traditional chiefs derived validation from customary practices and from 
the traditional authority that had been bestowed on them by the predecessors of the 
people within a Vanua.9 
 
The indigenous socio-political system that evolved in this process, combined with 
the traditional legal system, became the colonial version of an indigenous rights 
system. This is a system that has been described as a ‘state within a state’ and 
justified in terms of protecting the interests of Indigenous Fijians (Laramour and 
Qalo, 1985), a justification that in recent years has become the motivating claim for 
supremacy of Fijian interests in modern day politics (Lawson 1991). The ‘traditional’ 
chiefly elite supported British rule in return for continued control over Indigenous 
Fijian society. It was intended that these new structures would preserve Fijian 
indigenous rights and the Fijian way of life (Nayackalou, 1975). Early concerns 
about various aspects of the system led to a major reorganisation in 1944 and a 
further review in 1985.  The overarching concerns in these early days related to the 
distribution of rents derived from land leases of native land, a concern which 
illustrates the underlying traditional cleavage between chiefs and commoners and the 
increasingly bureaucratic nature of the system. The presence of traditional Fijian 
structures has continued to infiltrate the behaviour of political institutions and 
politics to this day (Lawson, 1996). 
 
Towards Self Rule: 1964 to 1970 
Fiji’s early political history has its roots in the transfer of political institutions in 
various stages of colonisation to independence. After nearly 60 years of colonial rule, 
Fiji held its first elections in 1967, signalling the emergence of modern party politics 
and Fiji’s first step towards independent rule (Mataitoga, 1992). As independence 
drew closer, Fijian politics began to coalesce around ethnically based parties. The 
Alliance Party was formed by Fijian chiefs and the National Federation Party was 
supported by Indo-Fijian sugar farmers and workers.  
 
The Alliance Party won the first election and Fiji’s first cabinet system of 
government was formed in 1967, with Ratu Sir Kamese Mara, a high-ranking Fijian 
                                               





chief, becoming the first Chief Minister (Lal, 2006). In 1970, Fiji’s Legislative 
Council agreed on a timetable to transition Fiji to independence and on 10 October 
1970 Fiji became an independent country and a member of the Commonwealth (Lal, 
2006). The colonial government recognised the process of transition from colonial 
dependency to Independence was difficult for Fiji given the growing ethnic tension 
between Indigenous Fijians and the fast growing Indian population.  The Governor 
of Fiji at the time cited the following: 
 
Seldom can a country have prepared for independence with such aplomb. The 
diverse people of Fiji do not yet think of themselves as a united nation. 
(Governor of Fiji 1970)(Mataitoga, 1992, Buse, 2008) 
 
Although the British colonial government actively supported the transition, they 
were concerned at this early stage that Fiji was not prepared fully for the implications 
of independence. 
 
4.1.4 Fiji’s (iTaukei) Socio, Community and Political Structures 
The Indigenous Fijian (iTtaukei)10 communal and traditional system or way of life 
represents to the Fijians the highest form of human value within in their lives, and is 
reflected in how Fijians live within their customs, traditions and their material 
achievements (Bole 1992).  The Fijian chiefly system embraces the entire indigenous 
Fijian people and is at the heart of the Fijian political and social economic systems. It 
draws its strength and cohesiveness from a well-defined hierarchy of groups and sub-
groups with clearly specified roles. These roles have their roots in history and 
tradition (Bole, 1992). Cultural and social society is highly hierarchical and 
authoritarian. Chiefs generally have a defined status within communities and society 
over commoners. There are also divisions of gender and age (males versus females 
and elderly over youth). These lines of differentiation are an important factor when 
considering what happens in Fiji society and its interface in all forms of society.  
 
                                               





The concept of Vanua11 (behaviour, knowledge, values land, lineage and traditional 
customs) is at the heart of all things. Vanua represents all things that are paramount 
to Fijian identity. It provides a sense of identity and belonging and is an extension of 
the concept of the self (Bole, 1992). Every iTaukei belongs to a clan called 
a Mataqali and a sub-tribe called an Itokatoka, which belongs to a Yavusa (clan 
comprising several Mataqali or several tribes), that is part of a Vanua (bigger social 
and political unit). Each sub-group has a leader or chief chosen from its members.  
 
In a Vanua, Yavusa or Mataqali, (Figure 7) these leaders know their responsibilities 
with regard to members of the sub-group as defined in custom and tradition (Bole 
1992). As such, all Indigenous Fijians live within a tension that ensures that they 
keep their Yavusa and Mataqali values alive so that their relationships remain intact 
and preserve their way of life (Nayackalou, 1975). It is the proper performance of 
these responsibilities with regards to members of the sub-group that confers mutual 
respect between members and their chiefs. In this system, the chiefs and the people 
are indivisible. Neither can exist independently of the other. This bond between 
chiefs and people is traditionally linked by their interdependence for survival and 
reinforced by blood ties (Bole, 1992). 
 
                                               
11 Vanua is an essential concept of indigenous Fijian culture and society. It is generally translated in 
English as ‘land’, but Vanua as a concept encompasses a number of inter-related meanings. According 
to Fijian academic Asesela Ravuvu, a correct translation would be ‘land, people and custom’. Vanua 






Figure 7 Fijian socio-political structure 
 
The Fijian social system, of which the chiefs are an integral part, remains a virtually 
unaltered structure impervious to new political influences (Bole, 1992). The 
persistent survival of its structure has provided a strong basis of political self-reliance 
for the Fijian people. In other words, through their own traditional social structure, 
the Fijian people already have a system that they can utilise for political purposes. 
Customs and traditions still regulate the lives of individuals in many parts of Fiji 
from the moment of birth until death. This kinship system is the structure that holds 
Fijian communities together and the relationships among the groupings is governed 
by adherence to recognised codes and customs. Fijian culture and its highly valued 
place in Fiji society is the cornerstone of Fijian peoples’ identity and is a powerful 
force in the political, socio and economic relationship of people (Bole, 1992). In 
more recent days Fijian culture and traditional structures have been dismantled 
challenged as part of an overall focus for the current Bainimarama Government. 
These policies have been recognized as direct attacks of the foundation of Fijian 
society(Lal, 2007). 
 
4.1.5 Paramountcy and Protection 
The concept of paramountcy and protection is a principle that demands that the 
interests of Indigenous Fijians should always remain paramount and protected. It was 





strategy for the protection and position of Indigenous Fijians within the colonial 
processes. The first British Governor to Fiji in 1865 noted that the necessity of 
paramountcy was a temporary protection to stabilise Indigenous society (Lal, 2006). 
The suggestion that Fijian indigenous society needed protection was related to the 
idea of Indigenous Fijians managing their own political protection and destiny; 
however an opposing view is cited in Lawson (1991) that Indigenous paramountcy 
was more to do with opposing European political and land claims. 
 
Post-independence, the concept of Indigenous paramountcy and protection moved 
from the idea of paramountcy as a protective principle of privilege for indigenous 
chiefs to paramountcy as a right. According to Lal (2006), paramountcy became a 
principle to deflect the growing demand for political representation for Fijian Indians 
(Lawson, 1996). Fijian academics, chiefs and leaders begun to equate paramountcy 
with political control and entrenched this view within the first constitution of the 
country in 1970. The same notion has infiltrated current political discourse and until 
recently continued to be an uncontested part of Fiji’s political landscape (Lal, 2006). 
 
The differing views of paramountcy and its interpretation in the electoral system has 
been the basis of much of the political tension in modern day Fijian politics. The 
concept has been challenged in recent years as its practical implementation within 
legal frameworks in Fiji such as the constitution and public policy legislation and 
institutions has caused ethnic backlash with the Indo-Fijian population. Horscroft’s 
study of paramountcy showed that the concepts of Paramountcy throughout Fiji’s 
political history has detrimentally affected and exacerbated race tensions in Fijis 
political structures (Horscroft, 2012). 
 
Throughout the Twentieth Century, ideologies of Indigenous paramountcy and 
individual equality have competed in Fiji’s political dialogue. They represent 
different conceptions of political rights for ethnic groups and individuals; differences 
not yet resolved into a conception of common national citizenship with wide 
acceptance. The ideology of paramountcy and its ostensible incompatibility with 





overthrowing democracy in 1987 and 2000. This political instability has severely 
impeded Fiji’s social, political and economic development (Horscroft, 2012) 
 
Following British colonisation in 1874, Fiji has struggled to resolve contests played 
out in political dialogue between claims to paramountcy by Indigenous Fijians and 
claims to equality by Indo-Fijians. In his definitive history book “Broken Waves 
(Lal, 1998) Lal writes:  The problem of reconciling these competing, indeed, 
incompatible, interests – paramountcy for Fijians, parity for Indians, and privilege 
for Europeans – is a central theme of the history of Fiji in the twentieth century.  
 
4.2 Fiji’s Constitutional Crisis and Politics of Exclusion  
Since independence, Fiji has suffered a history of political instability. Commentators 
suggest a variety of reasons for this: the inheritance of Fiji’s colonial imported 
political system, the formation of the traditional and Indigenous systems that 
stemmed from the establishment of the traditional administration established by the 
British, issues of Indigenous leadership, Fijian paramountcy, and growing ethnic 
tensions between Indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijian population, as well as 
problems related to the constitution (Lal, 2006). For Fifty years, Indo Fijians were 
the largest ethnic group, a demographic feature which has fuelled perceptions of a 
“threat of Indian domination” (Lal, 2006). 
 
Ethnic tensions have manifested in both political and economic dimensions of Fijian 
society between Indigenous Fijians and Indians born in Fiji (Indo-Fijians) who were 
brought to Fiji under the indentured Labour system in the late 1800s. By 1916, a total 
of 60,000 Indians had immigrated to Fiji from India (Gravell, 1979). A series of 
compromises and accommodations among community leaders during the 60s and 70s 
ensured a delicate balancing of ethnic interests for two decades (Lal, 2006).  
 
Conflict began to emerge between the Indian population and Indigenous Fijians 
during the colonial era.  By the time of independence, ethnic tensions had escalated. 
There were tensions directly related to the perceived dilution of democratic 
principles promised after independence during the negotiation process by colonial 





ensure control over the political landscape and public service through the continued 
promotion of paramountcy and protection policies and by policies that advanced 
Indigenous Fijians in both economic, employment and educational opportunity were 
the basis of many of emerging tensions (Lal, 2006). 
 
The threat of Indian domination has been the fundamental cause of Fiji’s political 
problems according to one academic is its obsession with race and its entrenchment 
in the political and public policy process. The result of this preoccupation is that 
every issue is seen through the prism of ethnicity as opposed to national interest. 
Ethnic fears and prejudices are cynically exploited for political gain during elections 
(Lal, 2006).  Although Fiji’s growing tribal structures and the historical ethnic 
tensions have always been viewed as the basis of the political tension in Fiji, it is 
also important to note that the growing emergence of a class structure  in Fiji where 
interests are been increasingly defined by the role in the capitalist division of  labour 
has also played a part in the political tensions. The increasing unequal division and 
distribution of power through class has been hidden because of the overt focus on 
racial issues. Indians are no better off than indigenous Fijians as both groups have 
suffered under the political system which has concentrated power in the ruling class. 
 
At independence in 1970, Fiji established its first constitution. Its framework 
reinforced the social and political divisions of Indigenous protection instigated under 
the colonial period (Lal, 2006). In May 1987 Ratu Sir Kamasese Mara the head of 
the indigenous led conservative party that had been in power since Independence lost 
the elections to Dr Timoci Bavadara who led a multi-ethnic party primarily 
supported by Indian Fijians. Indigenous traditional leaders viewed his election as a 
threat to indigenous control and authority (Lal, 2006).  What followed were two 
military coups in quick succession led by Military Commander Sitiveni Rabuka. The 
second coup resulted in Fiji been removed from the Commonwealth and the 
establishment of Fiji as a Republic.  
 
Political unrest prompted the review of the 1970 Constitution. Indigenous political 





that the 1970 constitution did not go far enough to protect Indigenous Fijians.12   The 
result of the review was the creation of new 1990 Constitution, which was primarily 
motivated by the desire to exclude permanently any possibility of Indo-Fijian parties 
forming a government. Unhappiness ensued with the 1990 constitution again on the 
part of Indo Fijians who again felt disadvantaged.   
 
The Constitution was once again reviewed in 1995 by the Fiji Constitutional Review 
Commission (CRC).  The results of the review and report, entitled, The Fiji Islands: 
Towards a United Future, raised two key issues which commanded the most 
attention and linked to the question of Fijian paramountcy and political 
representation. The results of the review noted that Indigenous leaders agreed that 
some form of multiracial politics was necessary to secure the country’s economic 
and political future (Sherlock, 1997). The issue of representation is on the one hand, 
the desire to continue to entrench Fijian political supremacy and on the other, the 
wish for fair and adequate representation for all ethnic communities.  Between 1992 
and 1997 the mood of public debate shifted from testy defensiveness, aggression, and 
disdain of most Fijian Leaders, and bitterness and rebuke from their Indian 
counterparts to an optimistic accord (Norton, 2000). 
 
Subsequently, in July 1997, the Parliament of Fiji passed the Constitution 
Amendment Act to move Fiji away from the discriminatory constitution of 1990. The 
new constitution was a partial move towards a multiracial government. The process 
of Fijis constitutional reform highlight the dilemma of reconciling a principle of 
indigenous Fijian paramountcy with an imperative to shape a multi ethnic nation for 
which non-Fijian particularly Indian, contributions have long been crucial. 
 
A paragraph in the Constitutional review report explains further the discourse that 
existed in Fiji during the review of the Constitutions in 1995 some years before the 
commencement of the FHMRP: 
 
                                               
12 The principles that framed the Fiji Constitution of 1990 were that the interests of indigenous Fijians 
could be protected only if Fijian leaders were guaranteed political ascendancy, a formula based on the 
effective political exclusion of the Indo-Fijians: ‘to assure that the interests of the Fijian race are 
safeguarded and a guarantee be given that Fiji is to be preserved and kept as a Fijian country for all 





Fijians have always categorised the inhabitants of the country, or of any 
locality or village, into two main divisions: a person is either a taukei 
(indigenous owners) or a vulagi (visitor or foreigner) in any place… The 
Taukei are normally at the forefront of decisions making.  The vulagi are 
allowed to participate but they must not be domineering or forceful… Whilst 
they are welcome to stay and enjoy the fruits of their labour… they need to 
be reminded time and time again of this fact… The taukei and vulagi concept 
host/guest relationship, continues to be challenge and upset by the human 
rights concept in which all are considered equal (Constitutional Review 
Committee, 1995 pg 27-29 )  
 
Fiji’s Methodist church has also been a vehicle for the promotion of Fijian 
paramountcy. Preserving ethnic dominance is a central theme of the church: “God 
made Fiji for Fijians”.  The Fiji Methodist church note in their submission on the 
constitutional reform processes: 
 
Whilst we appreciate the democratic arguments of equal rights, we also 
realise that such a liberal tradition will gradually take away our ownership 
and governance rights… The paramountcy of Fijian interests is an issue that 
Fijians cannot be made to apologise about... It does not mean that Fijians will 
impose their own way of life or religion on the non indigenous 
(Constitutional Review Committee, 1995 pg 45) 
 
Fiji’s electoral system has been described within the constitutional debate as 
discriminatory (Swastika, 2008, Lal, 2006). Ethnic-based constituencies have been a 
key feature of Fiji’s electoral system since independence, while also prior to 
independence all elected seats in the legislative council were based on ethnic 
allocations. Voters could only elect the same seats from specific population groups. 
Although the system changed slightly in 1966, ethnic candidates and roles remained 
(Swastika, 2008). The 1970 constitution retained ethnic rolls. Under this constitution, 
the House of Representatives compromised 22 Indigenous Fijian, 22 Indo-Fijians 
and eight other races. The constitution of 1970 provided for a parliament composed 





‘national’ seats. The 1990 constitution, which was developed after the 1987 coups, 
further guaranteed Fijian dominance of parliament.  
 
The system has enabled the further entrenchment of racial based politics in Fiji. 
Subsequently, Fiji’s electoral system has been a mechanism in which the concepts of 
paramountcy have been promoted. One might argue that the entire constitutional and 
electoral process in Fiji over the past 30 years has been based on the necessity to 
ensure Fijian paramountcy and Indigenous protectionism, as various commentators 
suggest that Fiji’s political instability is directly related to the ethnic-based electoral 
system in Fiji (Head, 2001, Lal, 2006). 
 
4.2.1   The Role of Chiefs in Political Integration 
The management of ethnic conflict has been seen and favoured by both leading 
chiefs in communities and the institution of the Great Council of Chiefs, which was 
established during the colonial period. Both were rallying points for Fijian ethnic 
unity in oppositions to Indians (Norton, 2000). Norton further suggests that 
community chiefs’ long term leadership and contribution in the national political 
arena has not been to guide Fijian communities and society at large but have by their 
position obstructed a solution to the problem of establishing a viable democratic 
polity (Norton, 2000 pg 35). 
 
Fijian chiefs deepening sense of conflict with the growing Indian population, 
especially during the last thirty years of colonial rule reinforced the chiefs identify as 
ethnic group protectors.   Up to 1999 the Great Council of chiefs had operated as 
both an important constitutional and symbolic institution with legislative authority, 
reaffirming the role of Fijian indigenous traditional leaders in Fiji’s political 
landscape. 
 
4.3 Fiji’s Economic Landscape, 1999 
In 1999 Fiji was recognised as a developing nation and not considered a poor country 
by world standards. It is the largest and most resource-rich nation in the central 
South Pacific (excluding Papua New Guinea). It was known as the unofficial leader 





health and education system (Asian Development Bank, 1999). Its main sources of 
revenue are tourism, sugar, mining and agriculture and bottled water. Over the past 
three decades, Fiji, like most developing countries, has undergone profound 
economic policy change. 
 
While the 1970s has been described as the ‘decade of independence’ for the Pacific, 
the 1980s were substantially the ‘decade of big government’. Government 
expenditure in the region as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) grew to 
one of the highest in the world, assisted by high aid inflows (Asian Development 
Bank 1999, p 63). Typical of developing countries, post-independence, Fiji adopted 
an economic strategy largely based on protection of domestic industries and a large 
public enterprise sector. Stabilisation policies were developed primarily to contain 
and correct the inflationary consequences and macro-economic imbalances of the oil 
crisis and other causes of destabilisation inflation in the late 1980s.  
 
Economic progress in Fiji over the 1980s and 1990s remained slow and the 
protectionist approach and focus by government in the 1980s, with poor revenue, led 
to a build-up of inefficiency in both the public and private sectors (Reddy et al., 
2004b). The widespread failure of this approach to deliver a growth rate sufficient to 
match the increasing domestic demands caused both policy makers and development 
banks to re-examine the country’s growth strategy from the early 1980s. Fiji 
subsequently moved to focus on open market oriented policies (Reddy et al., 2004b). 
Furthermore the end of the Ninety nine year sugar land leases in 1997 leading to  the 
deterioration of the sugar industry added further to poor economic outlook for Fiji 
during late 1990s.   (Lal et al., 2001, World Health Organisation, 2011) The sugar 
industry was the main commodity export earner for Fiji, directly contributing about 
22% of the national GDP and supporting over 25% of the country’s active labor 
force. Fiji’s sugar exports relied heavily on preferential access to the European 
Union (EU) and the USA, and bilateral contractual arrangements with countries such 
as Malaysia and Japan. Fiji exports 80% of its sugar production, earning on average 






The end of the leases and the slow deterioration of the sugar industry saw the loss of 
the significant level of income to the Government of Fiji. It has been suggested that 
much of Fiji deteriorating health system issues have been a directly linked to the 
reduction of government resources towards health(World Health Organisation, 
2011).  Of the 97,046 hectares of land under cane, 63% is leased from indigenous 
Fijians who own about 83% of some 1.8 million hectares of land in Fiji. In 1996, 
there were over 12,500 sugar cane growers farming over 60,000ha of Native land.  
 
In 1999, Fiji’s economy had a strong export focus with manufacturing and tourism 
making up more than 35% of Fiji’s GDP at the time. The challenge for Fiji’s 
economic management during the 1990s in the area of public finances was the 
problem of low growth due to mismanagement and corruption in the public sector 
(Reddy et al., 2004a). The government ran consistent budget deficits between 1993 
and 1996 totalling 4.9% of GDP. While public finances did began to improve during 
this decade, there was the discovery of fraudulent behaviour and mismanagement in 
the state-owned National Bank of Fiji, the largest domestic commercial bank, and the 
accumulated bad debts of more than F200 million (Reddy et al., 2004a). The effect 
of the government’s financial rescue on the budget deficit was enormous and reached 
9.2% of GDP in 1997 (McMaster, 2002). By 1999, the country was still in a cycle of 
low growth with an export-driven, fiscally weak economic situation. 
 
4.3.1 Fiji’s Public Sector Reforms 
Public Sector reforms have been a part of the discourse on management in the public 
sector for three decades in Fiji. Since Independence, Fiji’s public sector has 
developed under the post-colonial model of socio economic development and nation 
building characterised by policies and heavy reliance on the public sector to generate 
growth. Fiji’s public sector therefore has for many years grown into a large 
ineffective machine. In 1985 a move towards public sector reforms saw the 
Government of the day introduce a wage freeze as its first substantive step in the 
direction of public reforms, a process that was seen to be part of a process required to 






The coup of 1987 disrupted plans of the government to continue restructuring plan. 
Political uncertainty continued and lasted till after the 1992 elections and the 
distractions of the ethnically biased Constitution of 1990.  From 1994 through to 
1996 at the commencement of the FHMRP Fijis public sector went through a period 
of unpredictability in public policy.  Principles of good governance were rapidly 
compromised and where bribery, corruption, lethargy and poor performance by civil 
servants was alarming (Lal, 2006).  Public sector reform and public sector efficiency 
was not considered a primary objective for the Government (Appana, 2007). 
However between 1996 and 1999 the Government under Sitiveni Rabuka introduced 
a range of structural adjustment policies which centered on private sector and public 
sector reforms were again finally a priority.  
 
The reforms promised to do several things. First, reduce the size of the public service 
that had burgeoned out of control under the fiscal economic policies of protectionism 
discussed earlier (Vallance, 1996). Second, the reforms intended to introduce a new 
public management performance mechanisms for permanent secretaries who led 
public sector agencies and by this introduce a new performance management culture 
across the public sector. The reforms were heralded as visionary and a new way 
forward for Fiji (Sharpham, 2000). In introducing the reforms, Prime Minister 
Rabuka in (1994) is quoted as saying that they were implemented: 
 
To counter a tradition of nepotism and poor performance by public servants. 
The government’s vision as part of the reforms is to introduce a new 
performance management system for senior managers and CEOs in the public 
service. One which hold them more accountable for their performance and 
where the criteria for promotion and progress and reward would be solely on 
merit (Sharpham, 2000). 
 
It was intended that these reform actions would increase efficiency, decrease public 
spending and therefore reduce the national debt but also incentivise public servants 
to improve their performance (Lal, 2006). The reforms were also positioned to create 





responsive to community needs and be more accountable to both government and 
communities. In introducing the reform programme, Prime Minister Rabuka stated: 
 
We must co-operate, minsters and administrators to build a public service that 
is efficient accountable, and dedicated in properly managing and 
administering the operations of government (Sharpham 2000, p 35). 
 
In 1999 the public sector reforms enabled the enactment of the Public Service Act 
1999 and the Finance Management Act 1999, both critical to the implementation and 
alignment of the FHMRP(Government of Fiji, 2001). Sixteen government 
departments and statutory bodies were reorganised during the period of 1996 to 
1999. In May 1999 (six months after the start of the FHRMP), the Rabuka 
government lost the elections. In the first 100 days of the new incoming Chaudhry 
government, the public sector reforms, including the review of key legislation 
necessary to the reforms were halted whilst an interim administration took over for 
12 months before democratic elections ensued. Public sector reforms continued after 
the 2001 elections, and then was again halted and then rolled back. In 2002 the 
reforms recommenced. 
 
4.4  Fiji’s Health System and Summary of System Changes 
In 1999, Fiji’s health system was based on a three-tiered structure that provided an 
integrated health service between primary, secondary and tertiary care, a system 
inherited from the British colonial administration. Prior to 1999, the system had 
undergone small improvements. The 1999 reforms, however, were the most 
significant proposed modifications since Fiji’s independence in 1970 (World Health 
Organisation, 2011).   In 1999, the Fiji MoH’s stated goal was to promote the health 
and wellbeing of the population through the provision of a range of primary, 
preventive and curative services (Government of Fiji, 1999a). The national health 
system was delivered through 16 provincial hospitals, three specialist hospitals, three 
divisional hospitals in the main cities (Suva, Lautoka and Labasa) three nursing 
homes, 74 health centres, three area hospitals, one hundred nursing stations and 17 
community nursing stations. Health centres and nursing stations serviced suburban 





across all health facilities in Fiji at this time numbered 1,600 and every inhabited 
island had an airstrip that allowed for medical and emergency evacuations.  
 
Table 6 Number of Health Facilities in Fiji, 1999 
Institutions Central Western Northern Eastern Total 
Divisional hospitals 1 1 1 - 3 
Specialised 3 - - - 3 
Sub-divisional 4 5 3 4 16 
Area hospital 1 - - 2 3 
Health centres 18 24 18 14 74 
Nursing stations 20 26 21 33 100 
Community nursing stations 5 3 2 7 17 
 
Prior to the reforms, the MoH central responsibilities included planning, policy and 
service delivery. All key decisions related to service improvements and financing 
were managed at the central and national level of the system. The senior 
management team of the MoH managed the operations of the three major hospitals 
and their divisions from the centralised arm of the ministry. The MoH was led by the 
Permanent Secretary for Health (PSH). The Minister of Health oversaw the MoH and 
its services. The service delivery structure of the Fiji health system was based on the 
traditional structures of primary and preventive health care and curative health care 
services. Both these two programmes and their respective disciplinary areas 
determined the organisational structure of the MoH. 
 
The structure of the MOH pre-reforms consisted of four divisions with four national 
directors each with different responsibilities (see Figure 8) and three divisional 
directors for each of the three sub-divisions. The three divisional directors located in 
Suva (Central Eastern Division), Lautoka (Western Division) and Labasa (Northern 
Division) reported to the Director of Primary and Preventive Health and were located 
in the MOH headquarters. (Divisional positions but centrally located) Directors were 
responsible for the delivery of divisional health services. Hospitals were directed by 
the medical superintendents in a framework of centralised control and were 






Medical officers working with one or two nurses managed health centres and 
provided first level of referral for nursing stations and were generally staffed by one 
nurse who conducted outreach visits to communities in a designated nursing area. 
Community nursing stations complemented and functioned like stations except that 
they were built and funded by the community themselves (Negin et al., 2010). In 
1999, Fiji’s private sector consisted of a less than 20 private GPs, 10 private dentists 
and one private hospital (Government of Fiji, 1998).   
 
Fiji’s health system has always been financed by general taxation, with the Fiji 
government providing 98% of the costs of Fiji’s health services. Established early 
through the colonial administration, medical treatment has always either been free, or 
inexpensive. A small fee is charged at hospitals and some medical centres. Reports 
have shown that the government budget for health has increased each year, since 









Figure 8 Pre-reform structure of the MoH (1999) 
 
However, government budget allocations for health remained constant from 1985 to 
1999, despite the increasing demand and cost for health care. Over the period 1995 to 
2004, the government allocated between 9% and 11% of its total yearly public 
expenditures to health, except in 1999 when it hit a low 7.6% (World Health 
Organisation, 2011) Total health expenditure has always been around 3% of GDP 
and was capped to a maximum of 3.5% of GDP. This is one of the lowest rates 
among Pacific Island countries (WHO 2011) (see Table 7).13   It is suggested that the 
                                               
13 Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP for other Pacific countries: Papua New Guinea 3.2%, 





explanation for Fiji been at the lower end of health spending levels compared to  
other Pacific countries is related not only to political commitment but also the 
inability of the Government of Fiji to invest in its health system at greater levels 
(World Health Organisation, 2011 , World Health Organisation, 2014) Fiji made 
considerable progress in improving its key health indicators up to 1990, with 
increases in life expectancy and decreases in maternal and infant mortality, but since 
then progress has stalled (Carter et al., 2010, World Health Organisation, 2011).  
 
Table 7 Comparative Figures for Per Capita Health Expenditure, Pacific Island Countries, 1999 
 
Country Per Capita Health 
Expenditure (USD) 
Cook Islands 264.8 
Fiji 54.7 
Kiribati 93.7 
Marshall Islands 85.0 
Federated States of Micronesia 143.4 
Niue 364.7 
Palau 236.5 
Papua New Guinea 32.7 
Samoa 49.0 






The maternal mortality rate, for example, fell from 156.5 per 100,000 live births in 
1970 to 53.0 in 1980 and 26.8 in 1990; it then rose to 67.3 in 2005 to fall again in 
2007 to around the 1990 level. The infant mortality rate, which was 16.8 per 1,000 
live births in 1990, was higher, at 18.4, in 2007; under-five mortality showed a 
similar flat trend. (Government of Fiji, 1994, Government of Fiji, 1999a). Progress 
against key indicators such as maternal mortality ratio has increased worryingly 






Like most developing countries in the region during this period, health system 
challenges related to the continued management of communicable diseases and 
emerging issues around non-communicable diseases.  The Carter  et al., (2010) study 
looked at routine mortality in Seven Pacific Islands countries highlights that Fiji’s 
declining health status has been a trend for some years now. Life expectancy at birth 
declined from 72.9 years in 2000 to 67.8 years in 2005 (Ministry of Health, 2005) 
with women living on average five years longer than men. The study looked at health 
data over the past 20 years and concluded that adult mortality in Fiji is higher than in 
Australia and New Zealand and showed high levels of premature mortality due to 
non-communicable diseases (Carter et al., 2010). It’s important to note that the 
majority of data in the Pacific is based on WHO estimations (Naidu et al., 2013). It 
has only been in recent years 2011 onwards that doctors in Fiji have received 
adequate training to improve their capacity to certify deaths correctly and therefore 
improve the accuracy of mortality data (Walker et al., 2012). 
 
4.5 Culture of Policy Development 
Since independence in 1970, and up to the commencement of the 1999 reforms, no 
formal national health policy framework has guided Fiji’s development of its 
national health system.14 An analysis of all health policies in the MOH in 2004 
highlighted that the majority of health policies in the MOH were disease focused 
policies (M Fong, 2004). In the 1980s, Fiji chose to pursue a ‘village-based approach 
to primary health care’ in line with its existing rural health programme and along the 
lines of the Alma Ata Declaration (Negin et al., 2010). Since then the progression of 
concepts of community health and health sector priorities has moved from PHC to 
health promotion (Roberts et al., 2008) to Healthy Islands and the Yanuca 
Declaration15 and to health sector reform.  A lack of a formal policy framework in 
Fiji has resulted in a consortium of different policy responses without a national plan 
or a strategic approach to national health system development. Rather, Fiji’s health 
system over the past 30 years has developed under a series of ad hoc, informal, 
                                               
14 The Alma Ata Declaration and a focus on primary care has been the most substantial health policy 
focus throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, health promotion and village-based PHC 
became a central focus. 
15 Healthy Islands is a policy initiative of the Pacific Health Ministers ( 1995) Its focus proposes an 
ecological model of health promotion emphasizing the environment and advancing the concept 





donor-driven and disease-specific policy development experiences. The culture of 
evidence-based policy making has not been part of Fiji’s health sector development 
prior to 1999 (Aus Health International, 2000). 
 
4.5.1 Centralisation as a key Concern in the Fiji Health System 
The structure was based on a centralised administrative system, where planning, 
service delivery decisions and key financing and budgetary decisions were made at 
the center of the system. The sub-divisional health system delivering the core 
services to the majority of the population and over the years had struggled to ensure 
not only a level of adequate services but also maintain resources necessary for the 
ongoing provision of basic services. A series of reports from 1979 to 1997 
highlighted Fiji’s health system challenges, noting that the system was under duress 
and struggling to deliver services for its growing population (Coombe, 1982, Dunn, 
1997, Auditor Generals Office of Fiji, 1996, Senate Select Committee, 1997). The 
report further suggested that Fiji’s health system had evolved into an unmanageable 
uncoordinated administrative system, struggling to deliver core health services in a 
sensible and planned manner (Dunn, 1997). 
 
A WHO consultant report more commonly known as the Dunn Report (1997) and 
the Auditor General Report (1996) included an assessment of the structure and 
functioning of the MoH. Its conclusions highlighted that the highly centralised 
policy, planning and service arrangements did not provide the necessary synergy nor 
structural ease between primary and preventive health services and curative services 
at the sub-divisional level (Dunn, 1997, Auditor Generals Office of Fiji, 1996). Other 
key concerns in the same report noted that the system had problems of service co-
ordination and resources issues both at the central and at the health facility level, 
resulting in the growing discontentment of communities who perceived that the 
health system was deteriorating (Auditor Generals Office of Fiji, 1996, Dunn, 1997). 
Inadequate numbers of health workers plus the poor availability of health supplies 
were key indicators in the demise of many of the rural health facilities. Fiji’s health 
system was constructed to purposely serve the rural communities, hence this 






A report by the Senate Select Committee (1997) was prompted by community 
agitation at the poor quality of rural health facilities. Concerns were levelled at the 
failing quality and access of services (Senate Select Committee, 1997). Concerns 
regarding the management and delivery of services of the three divisional hospitals 
were further reflected in criticism by the Auditor General in 1996 and the Senate 
Select Committee review (Auditor General’s Office of Fiji, 1996). The culmination 
of various reports provided the impetus for the FHMRP (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9 Key health reports that have provided the growing impetus for the FHMRP reforms 
 
4.5.2 Rural and Urban Health Services 
Fiji’s health system comprised of three Divisional Hospitals, sixteen Sub-divisional 
hospitals and more than 100 nursing and community health facilities (see Table 6). 
The rural health services were the mainstay of Fiji’s health system. Rural health 
services however were the most challenging of the system to maintain with few 
doctors and nurses and supplies (World Health Organisation, 2011).. Between 1985 
and 1995, the MoH received more than 1,000 complaints from patients and 
consumers related to the quality of health services (Senate Select Committee, 1997). 
Issues, in particular, concerned long waiting times, lack of beds, inadequate 
treatments, poor health worker attitudes, lack of doctors, insufficient drugs and 
pharmaceuticals in rural health centres (Kudrani and Tuisuva, 2004).  
 
Communities who live in the outer rural areas often have not had adequate access to 
sufficient services compared to those who live closer to the urban-based facilities and 
who have access to a broader range of services. The outcome of these problems and 
arrangements resulted in communities losing confidence in sub-divisional level 





divisional hospitals in the major urban areas who were unable to cope (Aus Health 
International, 1998c). A leading primary care practitioner and Fijian academic noted 
that patients were happy to travel to the urban centres because ‘at least they would be 
assured of a week’s supply of medicines even if the consultation was agonisingly 
slow’ (interview data).  Urban drift as well as the increased movement by the 
population to the city as a result of expiring land leases further increased the urban 
facility burden. The reducing level of government investment into urban based 
facilities and increasing investment into sub divisional based highlights the growing 
use of rural health facilities as shown in Figure 10.  
Figure 10 Government provision for health by category, 1982-2000 
 
Rural health officials noted that these frustrations related directly to the problem of 
centralised management arrangements that prevented them from been utilised to 
maximum potential (Coombe, 1982). An analysis of the resource allocations in the 
health system in 1998 highlighted an emerging shift of resources away from primary 
care towards the larger curative-based services (AusHealth International 1998). 
Divisional hospitals, because of their specialist infrastructure, were the most 
expensive point of health service delivery and drew most of the health budget. In 





management of their health budget. Dr Sharma (2003) further comments as part of 
his interview for the study 
 
Unfortunately, with a centralised administration, we have paid a heavy price 
in terms of poor planning, inappropriate resource/finance management a very 
high attrition rate of health care providers. Primary care has not been given its 
due and we see nursing stations and health centres without funding and 
resources, particularly medicines (Dr Neil Sharma ex academic and current 
Minister of Health 2013,)  
 
4.5.3 Inability to Control Health System Resources 
A central concern of the MoH prior to the reforms related to the lack of control of the 
MoH to manage its own human and financial resources. Prior to the FHMRP, 
government legislation did not give authority to the MoH to manage these key health 
system inputs, which were mandated through legislation to the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) and the Public Service Commission (PSC). This structure hindered the MoH’s 
ability to make timely and appropriate investments both in human resources and 
services, at the right levels of their health system. 
 
The MOH was required on an annual basis to submit its annual plans and these were 
funded on the basis of agreement with cabinet. There was little possibility of change 
or movement or control for the MoH in these processes. This rigid funding 
methodology did not allow the MoH to respond to the divisional and sub-divisional 
challenges in both services improvement and resources. All hospitals were centrally 
budgeted on the basis of their salaried personnel, which accounted for a substantial 
proportion of hospital budgets, often leaving very little resources for service and 
resources improvements (Aus Health International, 1998c). 
 
4.5.4 Declining Workforce 
Fiji has for many years been committed to training large numbers of health workers 
within their system. The challenge for Fiji has been the problem of retaining doctors 
and nurses (see Table 8) in the system. The most significant loss has been doctors 





instability and issues related to poor career opportunities, pay structure issues such as 
overtime rates, long hours of work in the system and lack of transparency of 
processes for promotion in the system (WHO, 2001). A MoH unpublished survey on 
health workers noted that between 1987 and 1999, a total of 510 doctors and 600 
nurses left the Fijian government health services, the majority emigrating to New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada (WHO, 2001). 
 
Retaining staff at the divisional and sub-divisional level of the health system had its 
separate challenges. Career opportunities for both nurses and doctors were perceived 
to only exist at the central level of the system and not the divisional or sub-divisional 
level. Health workers at the divisional level were often considered second class 
health workers and felt they were often overlooked; they perceived that their careers 
were compromised by serving at the divisional level; hence many of the sub-
divisional facilities could not attract highly skilled staff (Aus Health International, 
1998c).  Both public and private institutions have been severely weakened by human 
resources loss through accelerated emigration of skilled workers. The emigration of 
over 13% of the population since 1987 can be considered a state of disintegration 
(Naidu and Pillay, 2004).  It has been suggested that the disparate rates of workforce 
attrition in the various fields  are the consequences of post coup ethnic 
tensions.(World Health Organisation, 2011) 
 
Table 8 Workforce figures, Fiji MOH, 1997-1999 
Category 1997 1998 1999 
Doctors 396 299 271 
Dentists 36 28 32 
Pharmacists 61 59 51 
Nurses 1,622 1,622 1,500 
Health managers - - 3 
Assistant nurses 70 66 72 
Other para-medicals 250 395 355 






4.6 Fiji Health Management Reform Project 1999 
The Fiji health reforms were based on two well-understood principles: that health 
services, health and ultimately health outcomes can be improved with a more 
effective management of resources, both human and physical, and that decision 
making should occur as close to the point of implementation of that decision as 
possible (Aus Health International, 1998c). The theoretical philosophy that 
underpinned the reforms were based on the idea of decentralisation as and 
managerialism would deliver a more focused, responsive and efficient system.  The 
reform approach was based on the transfer of authority from the centre of the health 
system to the sub-divisional health system. The assumption been that more control 
by people making decisions closer to the point of service delivery would improve the 
health outcomes of the Fiji people. 
 
The objectives of the FHMRP project were to design, develop and implement a new 
management structure that would enable an improved and responsive resource, 
planning and effective decision making at the sub-divisional levels of the health 
system. The intention of the decentralised management structure was to separate the 
responsibilities of the MoH central office of policy and planning so that the divisions 
could focus more on development and implementation and service improvement. It 
was intended that the MoH central division would then be able to focus more on 
centralised planning, national health policy and standards and monitoring of the 
health sector (Aus Health International, 1998c). 
 
The purpose of a feasibility study undertaken by Australian consultants in 1998 was 
to consider the political and health sector support environment for ‘readiness’ for the 
reforms (Aus Health International, 1998b). The feasibility study concluded that the 
reforms would benefit Fiji at this time and that the sector and community were 
supportive of the proposed reform agenda.16 The FHMRP project commenced in 
February 1999 and had a five-year duration with the bulk of changes and activity 
intended to be made in the first three years.  The main implementing agency of the 
                                               
16 The feasibility study did not take account of the economic feasibility of the reforms from a cost 
perspective nor did it consider technical capability and personnel of the MOH to implement the 
reforms or an assessment of the political risks of implementation. It was based purely on whether the 





reforms was the Ministry of Health.  The reform objectives who co jointly identified 
by both the GoA and GoF.  The redesign of the system was  conceptually designed 
by the HMA but the bulk of the implementation of the reforms was the responsibility 
of the GoF.-The project intended to achieve several goals (Aus Health International, 
1998b);  
 
x A decentralised and professional health management system that provided a 
cost effective and quality service for the people of Fiji. 
x A strengthened primary health care system would be preserved and enhanced, 
leading to improved attendance at sub-divisional facilities and the 
development of appropriate referral patterns. 
x The MOH headquarters would be restructured with a stronger focus on 
planning health services, developing policy, equitably allocating resources, 
setting standards and monitoring and evaluating the delivery of health 
services. 
x Divisions would be managed by a CEO who would report to the Permanent 
Secretary and be responsible for the total management of integrated hospital 
and community health services. Appropriate authority, responsibility and 
accountability would be decentralised to all levels of management. The three 
divisional hospitals would function as referral institutions catering for the 
needs of patients referred from sub-divisional hospitals and would provide 
outreach services to smaller hospitals. 
x Hospitals would be managed by a General Manager, leaving doctors free to 
carry out professional services. 
x The MoH would be characterised as ‘Learning Organisations’, in which 
knowledge would be readily acquired, shared and utilised. 
x The new organisational structure would provide for increased health 
management career development opportunities. 
x One hundred and five milestones guided the implementation of the initiative. 
 
4.6.1 Governance of the FHMRP 
In 1998 the Government of Fiji requested the assistance of the Government of 





request came directly from the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Health to the 
Senior Aus Aid officials in the Fiji country office.  The reforms were intended to be 
based on the establishment and creation of a new health management system 
structure.  
 
The management of the project would sat between the GoF and GoA, through the 
managing contract agent, AusHealth International, an Australian management 
contractor with a speciality in health systems and health reform management. In 
country the AMA team was led by a project team leader and project director.  The 
governance structure of the reforms is shown in Figure 11. The GoA and GoF were 
responsible and accountable for the development and planning of the reforms 
through their various committees and working teams with the primary holder of 
responsibility been the MOH of Fiji.  The GoA established an independent Technical 
Advisory group that provided independent technical advice throughout the program. 











Australia has played a central role in the aid and the health sector in Fiji since the 
1980s. Australia’s support continues through their investment through the Fiji Health 
Sector Support Program 2004-2015 (Australian Government, 2013).  Today 
Australia remains the largest single donor to Fiji and Fiji’s health sector: a total of 
FJD $97.9 million dollars (AUD $53.8 million) (Australian Government, 2013). 
Approximately 40% of this total amount goes into the health and social sector. 
 
Walt and colleagues (1999) discuss the concept of systemic issues which govern aid 
contributions to developing countries and how health sectors have been subject to 
differing reforms which have affected the manner in which is aid is managed. Aid 
coordination between donors is a critical challenge and often a barrier to smooth 
implementation of health sector changes and reforms in developing countries (Walt 
et al., 1999). In the case of FHMRP Australia was the only donor involved. They 
funded the entire reform initiative with the Government of Fiji (GoF) contributing 
less than 1%  from its health sector budget.  This placed Australia as a donor in a 
position of power and dependency within the reform program, a situation that tended 
to often-undermine the recipient Government. As Fiji, in particular was a cash 
strapped Government with weak technical expertise, the analysis shows that they 
tended to defer to donor expertise without really identifying their own priorities for 
aid. There is a tendency for poor developing countries to develop an over reliance on 


















 Table 8 (a) Key Stakeholders involved in the Reforms   
 
Stakeholder Definition Resources Perceived Attitude 









Political disengaged high 
Minister of 
Health 








Appointed Political Supportive/disengaged low 
Permanent 
Secretary of 

















Institutional Followers/and blockers high 
Senior 













Institutional  Followers /blockers medium 
Nurses Public 
servants 































4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a social and political context to this study. It has given a brief 
review of the political history of Fiji, as well as an explanation of the key social and 
cultural issues that make up Fijian society. It has asserted that Fiji’s colonial history 
has to a large extent influenced the political landscape of Fiji; in particular, Fiji’s 
troubled political, constitutional and ethnic challenges have overshadowed the 
political landscape. The chapter also introduced the concept of protectionism and 
paramountcy, two key principles that have influenced the political environment and 
policy institutions.  
 
The establishment of Fiji’s early colonial structures has played a significant role on 
how Fiji’s traditional and political structures operate today. Twenty years of 
unpopular reporting highlighted the key concerns for the Fiji health system, which 
provided the impetus for a review of the system and ultimately became the basis for 
the proposal for the Fiji health management reforms of 1999 to 2004.  The chapter 
concludes with a brief overview of the objectives, outcomes and structure of the 
intended reform process. The discussion includes a table on the various key 
stakeholders who participated in the reform activities. The role of the stakeholders 
and the issues they advocated within  the reform implementation is further explored 
in the following two chapters. . The following chapter examines the role of Fiji’s 






Chapter 5: Political Institutions 
 
5. 0 Introduction 
Reform programmes in the Fiji public sector have suffered from the existence of 
inappropriate and under-performing public institutions (Reddy et al., 2004b). 
Political institutions are defined as organisations supported by the government that 
create, enforce and apply laws; that mediate conflict; make (government) policy on 
the economy and social systems. Their importance according to Lewis (Lewis, 2005) 
is related to understanding how they can determine the future course of policy. 
According to Considine (2005), the importance of evaluating the role of policy 
institutions within the public policy process requires an understanding of the history 
of the institutions, recognition of how legislation is formed within a political system, 
what regulatory roles particular institutions play, how institutions use their legislative 
power to implement rules and what constraints they put in place to ensure rules are 
followed (Considine, 2005). 
 
This chapter examines and discuss a range of issues related to the behaviour of 
political institutions in the FHMRP. It seeks to answer question two and four of the 
research objectives by analysing the role of three institutions involved in reforms. 
How political institutions in Fiji utilised their powers during the reform process, how 
they affected the policy implementation process and what tensions they brought to 
bear on the reform pathway is examined. 
 
Ideas of authority and capacity are discussed, as they were critical features of Fiji 
institutions, both of which had a major effect on the ability of any government to 
make and implement policy (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995).  In this context, authority 
means the ability of government institutions to be able to independently control a 
policy process; capacity refers to the ability of the government system to make and 
implement policy. This analysis is essential as it explains how institutions can 








5.1 Fiji’s Political Institutions 
The three central political institutions involved in the FHMRP and responsible for 
supporting and facilitating the legislative pathway for implementing the new 
structural and policy changes necessary for the reforms were the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) and the Ministry 
of Health (MOH). While a MoH is instrumental in policy formulation, often other 
agencies or bodies are responsible for policy implementation (Walt, 2006). 
 
5.1.1 Ministry of Health  
The MoH was governed in 1999 by the Public Health Act of 1970, and was the lead 
agency in the reform process, with its key role in the development, planning and 
implementation of the central policy actions. It was charged with advocating and 
negotiating support of the reform policy programme with other key political 
institutions such as the Public Service Commission (PSC) and Ministry of Finance 
and Planning (MoFP). A central role of the MoH was the provision of the policy and 
strategic leadership as well as dissemination of information and communication 
across the public sector as part of its overall accountability to report on the reform’s 
progress. A key priority of the MoH was the oversight and guidance of the necessary 
amendments to the legislation to enable the MoH to perform its new functions within 
the reform structures (Aus Health International, 2004b). 
 
5.1.2 Public Service Commission  
In 1999, the PSC was governed by the Public Service Act of 1999. The PSC was the 
most legislatively powerful institution17 in the public sector involved in the reforms. 
The PSC was the central human resource agency for the public service. Its legislative 
responsibilities included the recruitment, retention and career management of all 
public servants. At the time of the commencement of the reforms, the PSC was the 
central employer of all professional staff for the public service and was responsible 
for the training and career development of 75% of the public service. Further, the 
PSC  under the Public Service Act of 1999, had the mandate for setting regulations 
regarding salary control and promotion of public servants’ careers, as well as for 
                                               
17 The original Public Service Act 1974 was established at the time of independence. In 1999, the act 





enforcing the public sectors values and the code of conduct and behaviour 
regulations for public servants. Its key responsibility was the implementation of the 
legislative authority for the establishment of the new structure and new positions in 
the MoH, including the new role of the PSH and the proposed new senior divisional 
director positions within the MoH. This critical function of the PSC required close 
collaboration with the MoH in designing the necessary authorities. 
 
5.1.3 Ministry of Finance and Planning  
In 1999, the MOFP was governed by the Finance Management Act of 1994 and the 
Finance Amendment Act of 1998. Its central role within the public service was the 
maintenance of the vision and financial planning goals of the government. It was 
charged to manage the financial accountability of the public sector, and controlled 
the government’s budget spending and financial management of all public 
institutions within the public sector. The central role of the MoFP in the 
implementation of the FHMRP was the devolution of financial delegation and 
authority to the MoH through amendments to the Finance Act 1998, thus enabling 
the MoH to have the authority to manage its own financial resources. This action 
necessitated close collaboration with the MOH.  The majority of public servants are 
indigenous Fijians. In describing the context of the institutions it is important to also 
note that institutions are also represent the traditional indigenous actors whom Fijian 
custom and tradition is given a central place in the wider public sector. For them 
constitutional recognition of Fijian custom and tradition is essential 
 
5.1.4 Institutions and the Reforms  
The central role of the PSC and MOFP in the reform process was the devolution of 
authority of powers to the MOH. It was intended this process would be managed in 
four stages (see Figure 12). The delegations to the MoH would allow them to recruit, 
employ and manage their own staff, set salary and employment contracts and to 
manage their own budgets. Further, the devolved powers would enable the PSH to 
transfer these tasks to newly established divisional directors who would then become 
responsible for managing their own human and financial resources (Government of 








Figure 12 Process of the flow of authority 
 
The MOF and the PSC controlled the legislative authority and had the power 
necessary between them to enable the advancement of the reforms, making them the 
two most critical institutions outside of the MoH with legislative authority.  
 
Implementation of the FHMRP necessitated amendments and changes to 14 key 
pieces of legislation. The three critical pieces of legislation requiring  immediate 
action and necessary for the reforms were the Fiji Public Finance Management Act 
1999, the Public Service Act 1974 and the Public Health Act 1970 (Figure 12). Fiji’s 
public sector reform program which had been underway for sometime was the 
driving impetus for these legislative changes. Although all three legislation Acts 
were necessary for the FHMRP, the Financial Management Act (1999) amendments 
were the most critical as it intended to harmonise the finance legislation with the 
Public Service Act 1999 and the Public Service Regulation Act of 1999  
(Government of Fiji 1999)18,19 and enable agencies such as the MOH to take on 
budget responsibilities.  In 1999, the Cabinet had approved amendments to all three 
pieces of legislation.20  
 
The task of the institutions was therefore to implement the legislative changes within 
the FHMRP timelines. The PSC Act and the Finance Act had been enacted early in 
                                               
18 In the exercise of its powers under this section, the PSC must have regard to the need to synchronise 
and harmonise its functions with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act 1999 
(Government of Fiji 1999) 
19 The public sector reform programme had been underway for some years prior. The initial reform 
programme had focused on economic reform, labour reform and public sector service (Reddy 
et al. 2004) 





1999, however, the Public Hospitals and Dispensaries Act  needed reviewing and 
changing to enable the MOH reform changes to take place. 
 
Both the MoFP and PSC signalled that these changes would be forthcoming and that 
the respective agencies would start reviewing the legislation to accommodate the 
MoH reform programme. As such, the MoH was encouraged to press forward with 
their planning. Positive institutional signals (by the PSC and MoFP) to proceed gave 
the MoH the mandate it was seeking to commence reforms. This process involved 
political institutions granting permission for the proponents of a new initiative. 
However, for the first three years of the reforms, the legislative changes were not 
forthcoming, with both political institutions intentionally delaying clearance of the 
legislation. An examination of the data shows that between 1999 and 2002, both the 
PSC and the MoFP purposely resisted devolving authority to the MoH (Aus Health 
International, 2004b). Data suggest that the reasons for withholding authorities 
related to public agencies’ concerns regarding threats to governance, paramountcy 
and leadership and capacity.  These issues are discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.2 Threat to Traditional Governance and Paramountcy 
A central issue related to the resistance of political institutions to support the reforms 
can further be explained by understanding how the principles of paramountcy (as 
described and explained in 4.1.5) were interpreted in the political institutional 
environ. As described in the previous chapter, the identity and values in Fiji’s 
political institutions were shaped by their colonial establishment and experience. 
Post-independence, these same ideals of Indigenous control and paramountcy were 
transferred into the modern day political and policy environment. Fiji’s public sector 
and Fiji political institutions have always been the mainstay of Fiji’s political 
environment and the promoter of these ideals (Reddy et al., 2004a). Further, high-
ranking chiefs remained part of the many public institutions’ legacy.  
 
The protector of paramountcy in the public sector was mandated via the constitution 
to the PSC.21 The PSC through its legislation was granted by Government to be the   
                                               






primary promoter and protector of Indigenous power in the public sector through the 
control of PSC recruitment processes.  The PSC bureaucrats took these 
responsibilities seriously and interpreted the pending devolvement of human 
resources power (a key and essential aspect of the reforms) to the MoH as a direct 
contradiction of its legislation and traditional authority empowered to them via the 
constitution. The PSC interpreted the reforms as contradictory to the spirit of the 
PSC legislative mandate, as suggested in the following comment. 
 
If we opened up public sector management and handed over our legislative 
responsibilities and control to the MOH … it would be a disaster … Our job 
is to control the human resources entering the public sector … We cannot 
give that authority away … They (the MoH) would recruit inappropriate 
people, you know what I mean they would not be Fijians but other races.  The 
PSC has always had control of the personnel of the PSC and our legislation 
allows us to retain this control (Senior PSC official). 
 
In this instance, control referred to Indigenous control of the public sector and 
Indigenous preference for public servants in the public service. The promotion of 
these concepts lies at the heart of the PSC legislation and constitution. However, 
much more than just protection and safety in the public service, the concept of Fijian 
protectionism is linked to political and economic stability, and the understanding that 
the Fiji public services and government is only safe in the hands of indigenous 
Fijians (Government of Fiji, 1982, Buse, 2008). The idea that protectionism is related 
not only to indigenous authority in the public sector but also linked to the economic 
wellbeing of the nation gives this concept collective strength across the wider public 
sector. 
 
A long standing politician explains the resistance of the PSC: 
 
If you look closely at the PSC legislation, you will see that the power of that 
institution is what holds the Fiji public sector together and it enshrines in it 
the power of control over all Fijian authority in the public service … So 





we have never changed the legislation of the PSC for two decades (Ex-
Senator, Fiji government). 
 
Understanding how the PSC interpreted its traditional role of protection explains one 
aspect of cultural authority; the other aspect of cultural authority and a reoccurring 
theme in the data was the concept of the role of chiefly leadership in the political 
institutions. 
 
5.3 Chiefly Leadership and Resistance 
The placement of traditional chiefly leadership at the top levels of the public 
institutions was a strategy to protect traditional governance structures by the British. 
The colonial regime strategically trained Fijian chiefs, who were people of towering 
personalities and influence, to assume power when Fiji became independent (Lal 
2006). Post-independence has seen the reign of Fiji and Fiji political leadership 
continue to fall to traditional high-ranking indigenous leaders across political 
institutions within the public service.  
 
These same leaders have advocated that only an indigenous Fijian-dominated 
government would protect their heritage and rights after colonisation and that it is 
this cultural authority that gives Fijians a sense of political and economical comfort 
and safety (Lal, 2006). Fiji’s Constitutions (1970, 1999) have also reflected this 
preference of ethnic loyalty with reservations of the highest political posts in the land 
retained only for indigenous Fijians (Lal, 2006). 
 
The analysis shows that the health management reforms (in particular the devolution 
of powers from the PSC to the MOH) were viewed by institutional leaders as a 
strategy to reduce the control of Fijian traditional structures within the public sector, 
therefore challenging traditional governance in the system. Institutions viewed and 
interpreted the reforms as a new model of governance for the MoH that contradicted 
public sector values and furthermore would have reduced the control of the PSC . 
The introduction of legislation that allowed human resource and financial control to 
move away from the PSC and MOFP was viewed as a threat to traditional structures, 







We could see the MoH leadership wanted more control of resources and 
decision making but this was not aligned to traditional public sector 
structures. They were pushing for something different and we could not allow 
that to happen (Senior official, PSC). 
 
A similar experience is also described by academic Dr Mahendra Reddy et al in his 
assessment of the implementation challenges related to the financial management 
reforms in Fiji during the 1990s, who notes that the biggest resistance to 
implementing the financial reforms was the unresponsive political institutions and 
the difficulty he suggests lies in the problem of reorienting value laden and complex 
agencies (Reddy et al., 2004a).  
 
In attempting to explain the limited success of governance reform in the Pacific more 
broadly and, in particular, in Fiji, Ron Duncan (2011), a Pacific expert in 
governance, notes that the challenges related to the political aspects of Pacific 
culture, specifically concepts of leadership and obligations within political 
hierarchies, have remained since colonial times. Many Pacific Island leaders and 
other influential members of politics grew up in pre-independence times and their 
values and actions are guided by the norms and expectations of the Pacific political 
culture (Duncan, 2011). As such, many of the cultural values that were in place 
before colonisation remain in place and heavily influence governance of the 
economies. Recognition of this helps explain the resistance of traditional leaders to 
the shifting of power in any kind of reform activity.  
 
Sensitivities in this regard were further heighted by the loss of the 2000 election, 
(one year after the start of the reforms) resulting in a shift from the traditional Fijian 
power base of leadership to a non-chief and non-Indigenous Fijian leader. Outgoing 
Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka lost the 1999 election, and Fiji acquired its first 
Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, and Leader of the Labour Party. 





already growing tension in the public sector over paramountcy.22 In May 2000, a 
year after the election and 17 months into the implementation of the FHMRP 
reforms, Prime Minister Chaudhry and his entire cabinet were taken hostage by coup 
leader George Speight in the name of indigenous power. A senior official in the 
Prime Minister’s Office at the time shared the following: 
 
Unfortunately our traditional leaders felt very threated during this period 
…the reforms unfortunately started during a time when our country was not 
interested in public policy debates over health or other social sector issues, 
we were a country really under siege with political instability and multi-racial 
problems . 
 
Comments such as these highlight the challenging environmental context during the 
implementation of the health reforms. 
 
5.4 MoH as a Low Level Political Institution 
Relationship challenges between the public institutions were further compounded by 
disparaging attitudes within the public sector agencies towards the MoH. Exploring 
this issue with interviewees revealed that the PSC and MoFP viewed the MoH as an 
agency with no significant political authority nor any formal legislative power (had 
no power to create independent policy) and therefore a public agency with no ‘real 
grunt’ in matters of public sector policy making.   As a senior PSC official 
suggested, 
 
The MOH is a weak ministry legislatively … so what can it do? It really has 
no authority to tell us what to do (Senior PSC official). 
 
According to Buse and colleagues (2007), this is a common perception of MOHs in 
developing countries, where they are often referred to as ‘low lying agencies’. Buse 
et al. explain that the concept relates to understanding where a MoH sits in a 
hierarchy within a public sector setting. A common perception particularly in low-
income countries is the MOH is often seen as low down in the hierarchy of public 
                                               







agencies and well behind the MOF, and is often described as the Cinderella among 
ministries (Walt, 2006). Similarly, in Fiji, this view had been established and 
ingrained as part of Fiji’s colonial history where legislative and political power has 
always sat with the PSC and MoFP, and confirmed by the senior PSC official quoted 
above. Further probing of this idea with interviewees revealed that the perception of 
political weakness was related to the MoH not having constitutionally based 
authority nor being a holder of traditional and cultural authority.23 Both these 
opinions further validated the concept of the MoH as having low lying agency status. 
 
5.5 Synchronisation with Public Sector Reforms 
A central and key issue advocated by the PSC and the MOFP as part of their 
rationalisation for not supporting the reforms related to the timeliness of the Fiji 
reforms. The Fiji Public sector reforms, as described in Chapter 4, were halted in 
2000 after the Labour Government came to power. Concerns by the PSC in particular 
related to the perceived push by the MOH to keep advancing the reforms and outside 
the synchronisation of the rest of the public sector reform program. This described by 
an official of the PSC:  
 
Why is it that the MoH should keep pushing its reforms along a timeline that 
is not supported by the rest of the public sector… what makes them so 
special, that they don't have to conform like the rest of the public service… 
the Public sector reforms are in limbo and have been halted by Government 
but the MOH keeps pressuring us to support their timelines… 
 
Comments such as this suggest that the MOH viewed their reforms as sitting outside 
of the main public sector reform program and timelines. This idea was confirmed by 
interviewee data by senior health officials who suggested that the health reforms 
were not perceived to be linked to the rest of the public sector reforms as the funding 
for the health reform program was independently funded by Aus Aid and not by the 
Government of Fiji. This gave the MoH a false sense of agency independence as it 
did not need to rely on resources from within its own system that might require 
cabinet or government approval (Aus Health International, 2004b). 
                                               






5.6 Strategies to Delay Reforms by the PSC and MOFP 
A key and significant deterrent to the successful implementation of the reforms was 
the delay of the approvals and authorities from the PSC and the MOF to the MoH.  
At the heart of the agencies’ resistance to devolve power to the MoH was the 
recognition that the health reform policies would ultimately affect and decrease their 
own institutional power base. Public agencies admitted that they attempted to delay 
the reforms through a range of tactics, such as refusing to attend meetings or not 
showing up for meetings, or attending meetings with no information, forcing MoH 
officials to become frustrated with the repetition of information and data. Dispersing 
low level staff to meetings who had no power or influence to make decisions was a 
common strategy by the PSC. The same institutions admitted they purposefully 
delayed and created barriers to the reform process by banding together to slow it 
down. The rationale for the behaviour they suggested was a lack of confidence in the 
MoH reform processes to deliver the anticipated outcomes, but also a fear of the loss 
of their own institutional power and the perceived threats to paramountcy, 
highlighted in the following comments by public sector officials. 
 
We had no confidence that the MoH leadership understood what it was they 
were attempting to do and the impact that it would have, they gave no 
thought to how their reforms would impact the protection of their own 
Ministry long term.  So we tried to delay their process (MoFP official). 
 
We also knew that what they were trying to do did not fit the general public 
sector framework, they were way ahead of themselves … so we tried to slow 
them down (PSC official). 
 
We didn't trust them, they didn't share the detail of what they were trying to 
do…( MoFP official).  
 
The analysis shows that the attitude of both the PSC and MoFP was viewed by MoH 






agencies to support the reform process was essentially related to power and loss of 
authority. As one health official shared: 
 
We understood the PSC and the MoFP position but we didn't anticipate their 
reaction. In reflection it was really about power for them….. 
 
What developed from within non health agencies was a ‘non-caring’ attitude towards 
the MoH and resulted in the agencies not prioritising MoH reform actions in their 
work plans and delay tactics used to respond to MoH concerns. This is a common 
response by agencies whose policies can affect health, but to which they give no 
priority and consequently prefer to remain absorbed within their own policy space 
(Walt, 2006). Other external Fijian public sector agencies viewed the lack of 
information sharing by the MoH as a strategy to purposely withhold information 
from them, creating an environment of mistrust and reduced confidence in the MOH 
and their reform approach. 
 
5.7 Capacity of the MOH to Implement the Reforms 
Interviewee data and reports analysed indicate that many of the concerns related to 
process, and implementation challenges were NOT just related to external political 
institutions issues as described above but key implementation challenges additionally 
sat within the realm of responsibility of the Ministry of Health. The management of 
the health reform strategy by the MoH has been a central concern.  Ministries of 
health in middle and low-income countries have a reputation for being the most 
bureaucratic and least effectively managed institutions in the public sector (Bossert 
et al. 1998). 
 
5.7.1 Changing Role and Culture of the Ministry 
Fiji’s MOH was established during the colonial period and up to 1999 had developed 
as part of its responsibility the operation of financing a large rural and urban 
extensive hospital and primary health care system (Coombe, 1982). The role of the 
MOH as the central political institution in the reform process was to provide the 
strategic leadership for the health sector in the development and implementation of 





the necessary development of capacity in several key areas, such as public sector 
management, analysis and planning capacity, leadership and management. 
 
Further, and a most critical role of bureaucracy in this instance, was to recruit allies 
to the reform process. Equally important was the need to convince opponents and 
ensure that blockages among stakeholders, such as delaying the operationalizing of 
decisions they did not support, did not occur (Considine, 2005).  
 
The reforms required the MOH to reorient its functions from a large centralised 
health service bureaucracy to an institution with a stronger policy mandate and focus 
on policy planning regulation and monitoring. It required the development of new 
functions both at the centralised arm of the MOH system and at the sub-divisional 
level (Ministry of Health Fiji, 2001). It was necessary therefore to develop new ways 
of working between divisions in the MOH, both internally and across the wider 
health sector. Interviewee data suggest that the MOH struggled to internalise the new 
functions and develop a new culture and way of doing things. Reports analysed 
together with interview data found that the MOH was challenged to deliver on these 
core and central functions and struggled to build the necessary capacity to oversee 
the management and implementation of the reforms. 
 
5.7.2 Constraints to Changing Culture and Capacity in the MOH 
Inability of the MOH to Frame the Policy Dialogue 
Effective and open communication is essential in a reforming organisation. (Bossert 
et al., 1998). Hogwood and Gunn (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) discuss the 
importance of clarity of understanding and agreement on reform objectives as an 
essential pre-determinant of the success of implementing reforms. MOH and 
interviewee data suggest that the biggest deterrent to winning the support and 
engagement of stakeholders in the reform process in the MoH, was the inability of 
the MOH to present the reforms in a clear, coherent and transparent way or as 
described by Bossert (1998; pg 18) ‘the lack of ability to frame the policy dialogue’. 
 
A recurring theme in the analysis suggests that staff within the MoH had very little 






understanding of how the reforms would affect them and their role in the system.  
Framing the policy dialogue among staff is a critical imperative in implementation of 
reforms, that is explaining how the policy problems are defined, analysing 
specifically what is included and excluded from consideration (Apthorpe and Gasper, 
1996). Bossert and colleagues (1998) discuss the importance of reform objectives as 
critical for a transforming a MOH: 
 
A health system needs to demonstrate that it is clear about where the 
inefficiencies are in its system and that any changes related to its structure 
will not burden or drain resources from other sectors or use public funds. 
Most importantly a MOH must be able to articulate these goals and gain a 
broad consensus from its stakeholders (Bossert et al., 1998 p18). 
 
The lack of ability for the MoH to develop and convey clear objectives caused both 
internal and external confusion with stakeholders. A critical impact was the delayed 
agreement and understanding on an agreed reform model. As such the reform model 
evolved in a fragmented and incoherent staged process, changing many times and 
going through numerous stages. The lack of clarity and coherence in the process 
further created an air of suspicion and scepticism around the reforms. 
A MoH official shared the following: 
 
I remember looking at version 22 of the health reform model … We had a 
very confusing process, we really didn’t know what we were doing. Were we 
decentralising, devolving powers or were we just creating new structures and 
doing business as usual? 
 
The lack of clarity of reform objectives is evident in the following comment from a 
doctor in the CWM Hospital: 
 
I never knew if the reforms would give me more bedpans, more surgical 
gloves or it would give nurses more money that they deserved or if it was 






A senior nurse shared the following: 
 
From day one right to the end of the reform period … I had no idea what the 
reforms were about and what changes I could expect with my job (Senior 
sister, CWM Hospital). 
 
These comments highlight the different levels of understanding and confusion 
around the reform purpose and goals. 
 
Reform Model  
The analysis suggests that the reform design was essentially driven by the timetable 
and donor milestones of the contracted outputs and outcomes designed by the 
Australian management agents.  The HMAs who led the reform internally within the 
MoH were contracted to deliver 105 contracted milestones developed as the key 
deliverables that guided the implementation of the consultants work plans. In 
reflection MoH bureaucrats recognized that the technical gap and capacity in reform 
modelling within their own system created a skills gap, and thus enabled the 
milestones and accountability framework used by the HMAs for their contract with 
the Government of Australia to become the reform design and framework. In essence 
the Terms of Reference of the consultants’ contracts became the reform model. A 
health official shared the following: 
 
The consultants couldn't identify what really the reform design was, it kept 
changing over a period of two years, eventually what happened was the 
reports and the milestones designed by the donors to monitor the consultants 
became the blue print for the reform design. 
 
This comment suggests that the reform model ultimately was developed by the 
donors and the HMA  with very little local MoH input. According to Grindle (2000), 
this is a common practice in developing countries that do not have the internal 
technical capacity for reform modelling. The over-emphasis on the contractual 
outputs of the donor as a design tool for the reforms added further to the confusion 






reform model was based purely on what the donor was trying to achieve and not 
based on the needs of Fiji’s health system.  
 
An analysis of the consultants work plans highlights that the GoA was interested in 
contracting for things that they viewed were controllable and demonstrably 
attributable, suggesting that the funders wanted to buy outcomes that they could 
control.  This meant that for Fiji donors were fixated on outputs and HMA’s had very 
little flexibility or room to incorporate outcomes that might have been identified by 
the local counterparts as part of the reform process.  The data analysis suggests that 
the 105 milestones and outputs were ideologically oriented towards ‘decentralisation 
concepts’ rather than an assessment of the problems the reforms were trying to fix.  
Reports identified (Coombe, 1982, Senate Select Committee, 1997) as key 
documentation that provided the impetus for the reforms emphasised that the health 
sector’s concerns related to problems of health service delivery and the stifling of 
management resources at the centre of the health system.  
 
However a review of the feasibility study undertaken prior to the reforms to test 
feasibility and suitability of the reforms intentions noted no formal diagnosis of the 
health sector was completed prior to the reform commencing (PW Associates Pty 
Ltd, 1998) nor were the contracted milestones related to a formal diagnosis and 
assessment of the health systems problems (Aus Health International, 1998b). 
 
On reflection, reform designers noted that the diagnosis of these issues was not well 
enough tested and that further analysis should have taken place to enable stronger 
analysis to reveal causes of poor performance. As one senior official reflected: 
 
We should have worked backward and we should have kept asking why until 
we discovered why we had a problem … also I think we had evidence but we 
didn’t use it when formulating our plans … I think we weren’t smart enough 
here…(MoH official). 
 
Furthermore the approach to identifying or diagnosing Fiji health systems challenges 





approvals had already been completed during negotiations between the MOH and the 
donor (which explains how the 105 outputs were negotiated before the reforms 
commenced).  Interview data revealed that the need to establish “real evidence for 
the reforms appeared to not be a priority as the decision to reform was already 
politically endorsed by the donor and the need for diagnosis and evidence was less 
important.   
 
The analysis of reports and interviewee data suggests that the lack of ability to get 
clear on the reform design was related to the MOH’s inability to first assess what the 
problems were and then agree on how they would fix them. Exploring this issue 
further suggests that the MOH was not clear at the outset about which performance 
problems to focus on, which suggests that the diagnosis of the health system issues 
may not have been accurately assessed (Grindle, 2000).  Diagnosis is referred to as 
the first key step in figuring out the causes of a health system’s performance (Roberts 
et al., 2008). The overt influence of the 105 milestones further confused the 
diagnosis, design and assessment stages of the reforms. 
 
The data highlighted that many of the reform model discussions held within the 
MOH during the start-up period had a strong technical focus.  Vallis and Tierney 
(Vallis and Tierney, 1999, Gilson et al., 2008) discuss how the role of technical 
information and its dominance in reform planning processes is problematic and that 
it has the capacity to dominate and distract reform development by its focus on 
technical infrastructure discussions rather than on the process work. Without clear 
diagnosis of the health system’s problems, poor clarity of reform objectives and a 
lack of a clear reform model and plan for implementation, it was impossible for the 
MOH staff to understand what effect the reforms would have on them as individuals 
and as an institution. 
 
Delayed clarity resulted in a range of other poor decision making processes by the 
MoH and delayed their ability to plan future human resource investments and other 







Unfortunately, throughout the reforms we never really knew what we were 
doing, each day new information would come to the various parts of the 
MoH. We had to think on our feet most of the time. 
 
Formulating a cohesive vision of the change process was impossible and 
subsequently disallowed any success of the MoH to work towards developing a new 
culture of change, furthermore the role of the HMA who played the key role of 
reform design   also warrant taking some of the responsibility for the failure of the 
reforms. 
 
5.8 Relationship Failure with External Agencies 
5.8.1 Communication  
Successful implementation of the reforms relied on the ability of the MoH to 
negotiate the reform vision and changes through the policy and legislative 
frameworks with the PSC and MOFP. Central to this negotiation was the 
management of relationships between institutional bureaucrats.  A recurring theme 
highlighted in the analysis and directed at the MOH was their lack of ability to 
engage with the agencies in a timely and consultative manner. The MoH failed to 
formalise the relationships with the two key agencies and struggled to get a joint 
understanding and agreed approach to the work programme and legislation timelines.  
Reports suggest that the MOH presented with an attitude of information ‘sharing’ 
rather than approaching the agencies in a spirit of ‘collaboration and consultation’ 
(Aus Health International, 2004b). A senior public servant in the PSC shared the 
following: 
 
When the MOH came to talk with us about the reform plan, they told us what 
they wanted us to do, they didn’t discuss it nor seek our views. They didn’t 
come with any information that assisted us to understand the purpose of the 
reforms … they showed us the structure of the new organisation and asked us 







Agencies were concerned at the attitude of the MoH in this regard. Further 
relationship management was not helped by the fact the MoH appeared to be 
disorganised, meetings were planned last minute, often with poor information 
distributed at the meetings, and with no coherent strategy from the HMAs regarding 
processes and timelines. As one MoPF official noted: 
 
We were invited to poorly organised meetings where nobody seemed to know 
what was going on. 
 
Inadequate and clear communication further aroused suspicion by public agencies 
who felt that the MOH’s lack of clear communication was due to their inability to 
articulate the reform process suggesting that the MoH ‘did not know what it was 
doing’. A senior official from the MoFP shared the following: 
 
We saw that very little thought and planning had gone into the design of the 
implementation of the reforms and the staging of the legislative changes … 
sometimes they (MOH) did not speak confidently about what they were 
doing … We felt that this was the reason they didn’t communicate well with 
us. 
 
The issue of communication and relationship management by MoH during the 
reform period is noted in a report carried out by Fiji National University (2004). 
Researchers interviewed public agencies on their understanding of the reform 
process. The report highlighted that both the MoH and other external agency officials 
‘felt in the dark’ on reform processes and suggested that poor communication was a 
key factor in the lack of support by the institutions (Kudrani and Tuisuva, 2004). 
Lack of confidence by the PSC in the MoH reform processes became further 
apparent when the agency questioned the technical soundness of the reform plan in a 
confidential memo to Prime Minister’s Office in June 2001 and noted in a report by 
the Technical Advisory Group 24 (AusAid Review Team, 2006) 
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Interviewee data analysis and reports suggest the effect of communication 
mismanagement resulted in reduced credibility of the MoH (Aus Health 
International, 2004b). The MOH struggled to overcome the resistance by the 
agencies to build collaborative and sustaining relationships throughout the project. 
The MOH did not develop what (Bossert and Wodarczyk, 2000) describe as the 
necessary bargaining influence essential for the reform process. Inability to manage 
these relationships resulted in a tense and unhelpful atmosphere between the PSC 
and MOFP throughout the five-year reform period. 
 
5.9 Effect of Delays on MOH 
The delay of the legislative and formal authority by the PSC and MoFP for the 
establishment of the new sub-divisions worked against embedding the new change 
management culture. Delays caused confusion about processes, structures and 
responsibilities; further, it created a culture of sluggishness and reduced interest in 
the reforms. Limited capacity to make decisions on issues related to the reforms, 
forced a culture of non-accountability and non-management in the MoH and enabled 
the same old practices in the MoH to continue to operate under its old objectives. 
Cassels (1995), in his assessment of institutional challenges for MOH in developing 
countries, notes that the issue of capacity for a MoH to make strategic and 
operational decisions is often constrained by the fact that no one is in overall charge 
due to the absence of clear management structures. A senior medical officer in the 
newly formed sub-division noted:  
 
I knew I was supposed to have some authority to make some decisions but 
my counterparts in the central office continued to act as if they were still in 
control. 
 
For the first three years of the reform, the MoH struggled to align its organisational 
structure and its human resources with the new roles and functions that the reform 






5.9.1 Lack of Analytical Capacity 
Bossert (2000) and others (Gilson et al., 2008, Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000) 
suggest that a critical and necessary skill for any MOH to have while reforming is 
the essential capacity to undertake both political and policy analysis. At the 
commencement of the reforms, the MoH had no formal health policy or health policy 
analysis trained human resources (Aus Health International, 1998a). Health policy 
focus in the MoH over the years had been on developing vertical disease 
programmes. An analysis of the MoH health policies prior to 1999 reveals that the 
MOH did not have a substantial history or developed culture of health policy 
development or have established health policy framework that guided the system (M 
Fong, 2004). A report by a WHO Consultant in (2001) also confirms that the MOH 
did not have a track record of health systems strengthening policy (O'Connor, 2001) . 
Much of the MoH historical policy experience in recent years focused on primary 
health care and health promotion policy (Negin et al., 2010). 
 
During the reform process, the MOH needed key data such as regulatory and 
legislation knowledge, human resources information on supply and availability, data 
on service utilisation and budgetary analysis. It further needed information on 
monitoring and evaluation as part of the improvement of their health information 
systems.25 The necessary skills and information needed to support decision making 
and planning for the reform process was not built up nor available in the MOH  
during the reform period and compromised the ability of the MOH to make timely 
and responsive decisions. A report written in 2001 by WHO26 midway through the 
reforms recommended that the MOH establish a policy analysis capacity unit under 
its own direction and not under the direction of reform consultants (Oconnor, 2001).  
The establishment of such a unit (which did not eventuate during this period) would 
have enabled the MoH to develop capacity to increase its ability to collect and use 
information for the policy process as well as identify the necessary training and 
capacity needed to ensure the success of the reform program.. An interview with a 
senior official of the MOH at the time revealed the following: 
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A lot of the technical knowledge was needed. It was something we didn’t 
appreciate at the time … we didn’t know our workforce numbers, we didn’t 
know real costs of services and we didn’t really know much about health 
reforms and we needed to take control of our own information. 
 
Not establishing some kind of unit was a big oversight on our part, we needed 
different competencies at all levels of the system. We did not understand 
what skills decentralisation would need and we didn't understand how to 
develop those skills. Unfortunately no one thought that in spite of the reform 
there were going to be more people and more skills needed (Senior health 
official). 
 
At the end of the five-year reform plan, the MOH was left with very little reform and 
institutional capacity. 
 
5.9.2 Stakeholder Management as a Political Strategy 
A central and key skill necessary as part of the MOH’s capacity to build a culture of 
change and ensure the safe pathway for the reform process was the analysis needed 
to understand the political nature of its stakeholders in the environment. According 
to (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008), knowledge of the political context includes 
understanding what is important to the stakeholders in the environment and the 
ability to recognise and anticipate how they might react to the reforms is crucial to 
reform management. 
 
The political analysis of stakeholders is an essential element of any health reform 
and a necessary consideration. These are critical capacity issues and necessary to 
have for reforming institutions (Bossert and Wodarczyk, 2000, Buse et al., 2007, 
Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000). While the MOH was the primary institutional 
leader in the process of implementing the reforms, the PSC and the MOFP were also 
a central part of the ‘task network’. As noted earlier, the relationships between the 
agencies remained tense throughout the five years. The lack of management of these 





develop political strategies to respond to the issues raised by their counterpart 
institutions.  
 
The MOH lacked political analysis knowledge that would assist them to not only 
identify the relevant groups and individuals that were important to the reform 
process. The MOH did not understand the relative power of the stakeholders over the 
reforms, nor did they have the capacity to evaluate stakeholder positions on the 
proposed policies, including the level of their commitment or their underlying 
interests. A significant failure by the MOH was the inability to anticipate which 
stakeholders had influence to shape the policy discussions, what resources they had 
and what interests they were advocating. As one senior health official stated:  
 
We didn’t anticipate the level of opposition to the reforms by some of the 
stakeholders… we couldn't understand their reaction and poor support. 
 
The lack of recognition by the MoH of the power of stakeholders highlights the 
MoH’s limited understanding of policy processes and context as described by Walt 
(1994).27 
 
Part of the MoH struggle to grasp with the importance and necessity of developing 
political strategies showed in their inability to build and lead consensus building both 
internally with MoH staff and outside of the MoH walls.  
 
The data point out that that the MoH leadership was more focused on trying to “win 
the authority war” with its stakeholders and focused on the positions that 
unsupportive agencies took on the reform work, rather than trying to understand 
what was at the heart of the resistance. The inability of the MoH to develop 
bargaining skills to influence and shift the power positions of the political institutions 
outside of the MoH was a testing and disappointing outcome for the MoH (Aus 
Health International, 2004b). 
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For the first three years of the reform programme, the MoH failed to deliver a win-
win situation for all involved. A negative tone ensued early on in the agency’s 
negotiations with the PSC and MoFP, resulting in a stand-off between the agencies 
for the first three years of the reforms. The use of power by both the PSC and MoFP 
to achieve their own desired outcomes was not understood nor anticipated by the 
MoH. The MoH were not able to influence at any level, nor develop strategies to 
sway the stakeholders. Subsequently, the lack of ability of the MoH to analyse the 
political and contextual environment in which the reforms were taking place resulted 
in their limited ability to manage and control the policy dialogue and provide a 
strong policy context in which the reform programme could progress (Bossert and 
Wodarczyk, 2000, Lewis, 1999).  Institutions need to interact with the outside world, 
and the main modality for interacting with external stakeholders, as Lewis et al 
describe, has to be with a carrot, rather than a stick, through steering rather than 
control and processes. 
 
5.9.3 Political and Institutional Leadership 
The political instability of the environment in which the reforms were taking place 
has been explained earlier (4.2). Berman and Bossert (Berman and Bossert, 2000) 
highlight the importance of stable political and bureaucratic leadership in a period of 
reform change. They state the orientation of any MoH needs sustainable and 
effective leadership. A recurring theme in the data suggests that much of the MOH 
inability to drive the MoH institutional reorientation and keep safe the reform 
pathway during its implementation was related to the lack of political ownership by 
the Government of Fiji.28 
 
Lack of visible political support of the reforms during the five-year period limited 
the opportunities of the MoH to canvass the reforms outside of the walls of the MoH. 
The analysis highlighted that very few political health ministers understood the real 
nature of the reforms and therefore did not champion the reforms and provide 
important political leadership for them (Aus Health International, 2004b). Examining 
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how the reforms got on the political agenda helps explain why the reforms were 
never entrenched in the political environment.  
 
The analysis reveals that the agreement to undertake the reforms by the Government 
of Fiji was declared in a MOU signed in 1998 as a declaration of support by the GoF 
and GoA. It was declared that the MOU was sufficient endorsement to enable the 
start of the reforms and that it was not necessary for the proposal to go through a 
cabinet process or be debated in parliament (PW Associates Pty Ltd, 1998).  The 
MOU and the agreement protocols of the reforms were therefore managed at the 
level of the Permanent Secretary. 
 
The senior official in the Prime Minister’s Office at the time of the reforms 
confirmed this in his interview and noted that the reason for this was primarily 
because the reforms were not reliant on Fiji government public funds, but were 
funded by AusAID and were directly funnelled into the MOH. He further noted the 
government cabinet process in 1998 was a declaration of support rather than the 
result of rigorous public policy debate. It is likely, he further stated: 
 
.. the majority of government ministers did not know the detail regarding the 
reforms nor were involved in any of the discussions between the MOH and 
the GoA.  The reforms started under the parliamentary radar, there was not 
much visibility from where I sat…  
 
Health officials reflected that the lack of formal and visible public policy debate at 
the early stages of the reform did not give the reform programme the political 
visibility it needed to canvass the reforms more publicly. At the time, this was not 
seen as problematic as there were many other distracting factors within the 
environment such as the impending elections, however and as Grindle (2000) notes, 
in many developing countries reform initiatives are more commonly started at the 
level of the executive and not at the political level (Grindle, 2000).  
 
It was recorded that every Government of Fiji between 1999 and 2004 endorsed the 






individuals endorsed the reforms as part of ministerial tasks but the reform 
programme was never submitted to the government as a formal process until 2002. 
 
An interview with an ex-senator of Fiji’s parliaments sheds light on why there was 
poor visible parliamentary debate on the reforms.  
 
Politicians in Fiji are ex public servants, they do not know how to have policy 
development discussion, they don't have the training and they are inept in this 
regard. This is why we don't have good public policy dialogue in any of our 
sectors (ex-Senator of Fiji Parliament). 
 
Considine (1994, 2005) affirms this dilemma; he notes that the policy-making role of 
ministers in parliamentary institutions is distinctive. The fact that their recruitment, 
from among the ranks of different aspects of the legislature, makes them more apt to 
be policy generalists than specialists. He further notes that the generalist background 
of ministers makes them even more heavily dependent on the bureaucracy. 
 
 The test of the Fiji Government’s commitment to the reform process was seen in 
their lack of intervention on behalf of the MOH during the stand-off period (1999-
2003) with the MOFP and the PSC. In exploring this issue further, MOH 
stakeholders suggested a possible explanation for the lack of government support 
was related to the government’s general lack of interest in the health sector. Other 
commentators have suggested that the political attention of government before and 
during the reforms was solely focused on the issues of the new constitution, 
stabilising government amid the rising ethnic tensions, the upcoming elections and 
political coup included, and therefore common public policy work was ignored. A 
hands-off approach by political leaders is a common practice during periods of 
political instability (Considine, 2005). 
 
5.10 Health Ministers’ Engagement 
Berman (1995) highlights the importance and need for leadership at the highest 
levels both at the political and civil service levels in order to provide consistency 





prior to 1999, the Fiji health bureaucracy as not recognised as having strong policy 
leadership within the health sector (O'Connor, 2001). There appears to be only three 
periods up to 1997 in which a genuine widespread discussion of national policy and 
development of new directions took place: the introduction of primary health care 
around the time of the Alma Ata Declaration in 1977; the introduction of health 
promotion policy and ideas in 1989; and again in 1997, the era of health promotion 
and Healthy Islands (Pacific Island Health Ministers Forum, 1980). In each of these 
phases there appears to be strong bureaucratic and political leadership (Negin et al., 
2010). As such, Fiji political leadership has historically not had a strong presence in 
the health sector. 
 
During the period of the reforms Ministers of health came to power by democratic 
election and or by interim government appointment. (1 elected, 3 appointed) A 
central role of health Minsters in a reform activity includes championing, promoting 
and protecting reform dialogue and processes.  Interviewee data suggest that the 
various (four) health Minsters during the reform period were not actively engaged in 
advocacy activities or in encouraging public policy debate with stakeholders (in 
particular, the resistant stakeholders). Interview data with three health ministers 
during the reform period further affirm that the health agenda was not a priority 
during the period of political conflict. 
 
The interim and military governments were preoccupied with the 
development of the new constitution and managing a political landscape of 
ethnic tensions. We didn’t have time then to be concerned with policy 
debates … this was a very politically difficult time (Ex-health minister 2000). 
 
Interviewee data with the individual ministers who held posts during the reform 
period confirm this conclusion. Interviewees further confirmed that the only time that 
the health reforms discussion made it to the cabinet agenda was when the PSC raised 
its concerns regarding the reform agenda. This reflects Walt’s (2006) observation 
that it is unlikely that health appears on executive cabinet agendas except at a time of 







Further, interview data with four ex-health ministers highlighted that during the 
reform process the various Ministers appeared to not be able to form a view of what 
they wanted the reforms to achieve and were vague in their articulation of the 
outcomes. Subsequently they generally felt they that were persuaded by others to 
agree to the processes. An interview with one health minister during the period 
revealed the following: 
 
There were times admittedly when I was Minister that I felt I didn’t know a 
lot about the reforms but I trusted the bureaucracy and the AusAID 
consultants to manage this … what could I add, I was put there as Minister 
(Ex-health Minister). 
 
An analysis of cabinet papers during the period 2000 to 2004 reveals that the reforms 
were not formally discussed in cabinet until 2002, three years after the 
commencement of the reforms. The cabinet paper referenced in 2002 was the first 
formal endorsement of the FHMRP.29 An ex-health minister commented: 
 
In my short time as health minister, I was never asked nor required to report 
on the progress of the health reforms (Ex-health minister). 
 
 
The lack of political leadership and protection was a failure on the part of the 
Government of Fiji. A senior public official shared the following: 
 
I felt sorry for the health sector as their reform programme stayed under the 
political radar for the entire five years. I always thought that the ministers of 
health were probably the biggest single deterrent of the reforms because of 
their lack of commitment to the reform programme (Secretary to the Prime 
Minister’s Office). 
 
The lack of political commitment and the political disruption of the reforms by 
several changes of Government and a coup ultimately resulted in much of the 






leadership of the reform efforts falling to the bureaucracy and the Permanent 
Secretary of the MoH to manage the policy dialogue at all levels within the sector. 
 
The  downside of this is that the MoH  became exposed  to constant criticism that the 
reforms were driven and championed only by bureaucrats and that therefore the   
reform efforts were most likely to be only about improving the ‘lot’ of 
bureaucrats. The shifting responsibility of the success of the reforms fell to the 
MOH bureaucracy and therefore the benefits of the reforms were perceived to be 
associated with the MOH leadership. Comments such as the following were 
common: 
 
“The reforms are all about new jobs for the directors in the health sector … 
the reforms are about seven new jobs for seven new directors” (Senior 
academic FNU). 
 
Suspicion in the public sector regarding the motivation of the Ministry’s bureaucratic 
leaders was perceived as “attempts by them to create a new and strengthened policy 
base through the reforms. Furthermore the PSC which controlled the employment 
pay scales and promotion policy for the public sector were concerned that the efforts 
by the MoH senior bureaucrats to advance the reforms was motivated by their desire 
escalate their careers, and an attempt by senior health officials to work around the 
PSC employment regulations. This view of MoH officials became a constant sticking 
point throughout the reforms and adding to the perception that the reforms were not 
necessarily about improving the system but as Green (2000) describes ‘improving 
the lot of bureaucrats’.(Green, 2000, Buse, 2008) 
 
The effect of the poor political leadership of the reforms is highlighted by the 
difficulties the MoH had in managing the policy dialogue within the public sector. 
The fact that no political champion supported or advocated on behalf of the MoH 
with external stakeholders further inhibited the MoH to maintain its reform timelines. 
Maintaining a high level of political commitment due to the constant changes in 






institutional capacity needed by the MoH to implement the reforms and identification 
of key challenges is summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 9 MoH institutional capacity and challenges 
Essential Institutional Capacity of 
the MoH 
Problems in the MoH 
Analysis capacity: human resources 
needs. 
 
Policy analysis and political strategic analysis 
knowledge lacking. No fixed infrastructure or unit to 
create the space for analysis capacity building. 
Clarity of reform goals. Confusion over reform goals and objectives. Result of 
poor diagnostic analysis of health sector problems. 
 
Environment of change. No anticipated political strategies to manage unstable 
political environment. 
 
Sector leadership and management: 
ability to provide leadership for 
sector and enable consensus 
building both internally and 
externally to the MOH. 
MOH Permanent Secretary showed strong 
commitment to the reforms. Unable to provide either 
internal or external leadership to the reform. 
Consensus never reached during the five-year period 
on reform objectives, both internally and with 
external stakeholders. 
Participation incentives. Recruitment of new senior level positions provided 
some incentives for engagement by senior doctors. 
 
 
5.11 Limited Public Policy Dialogue 
The importance of public policy discussions during a reform process to test its 
acceptability is a critical aspect of policy dialogue (Bossert, 2000). According to 
Considine (2005), the electoral system is undoubtedly the most formal institutional 
framework that has the most effect on policy making. Elections are normally the 
most obvious window of opportunity so far as policy making is concerned; once an 






As noted elsewhere (Section 4.2), two elections were held during the five-year period 
of the health reforms. An analysis of political party manifestos for both the 1999 and 
2001 elections highlighted the absence of any political parties promoting the 
importance of the health reforms.30  In 1999 Rabuka’s Government and the initiator 
of the public sector reform program did advocate the continuation of the reforms if 
successfully elected. As noted elsewhere Rabuka’s Government lost the election. An 
assessment of the 19 political parties that stood for election in the 2001 election 
noted that only one party mentioned the health reforms as part of their political 
agenda.31 
 
The importance of analysing manifestos according to Considine (2005) is that the 
manifesto becomes an authoritative document, which future governments can wield 
in parliament; commitments made in manifestos therefore take on great significance. 
As such, the 2001 elections never provided a health policy platform to test 
governments’ commitment to health and the health reforms.  
 
5.12 Institutional Resistance to Change 
The set of relationships called the policy system in Fiji is composed of several 
different kinds of actors and institutions. Their joint identity as a system is defined as 
a pattern of dependency between actors and organisations (Considine, 1994). The 
most important means for providing structures between actors is through institutional 
legislation and procedures. When these procedures are applied to policy making and 
implementation we see these regulations in more formal terms (Considine, 1994).  
 
The governing institutions in Fiji were central to the policy implementation process.  
Their role to provide a regulated structure through which the policy proposal was to 
travel.   Institutions are able to confer advantage on policies or they can restrict 
others (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993, Considine, 2005). Ascertaining the support 
of the Public Service Commission and the Ministry of Finance and Planning in the 
case of Fiji was necessary, however due to reasons discussed in the above chapter the 
institutions imposed constraints on the policy process, which impacted on the 
functioning of policy system. By withdrawing support of the policy process the 
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institutions signalled to the wider public sector a different pathway was been 
developed for the reforms. They applied “brakes” to the process and subsequently 
forced actors to follow the same patterns.  
 
This response by institutions, according to Considine (1994), creates potential 
problems for policy makers. The regulatory role of a political institution is mandated 
through the parliamentary processes and via its legislation lays downs the codes for 
which the policy proposals are structured. The long histories of both these 
institutions gave them their own sense of power and independence to define their 
own action pathways. The policy system with which they operated gave them many 
advantages and they used the power in their organisational history as well as their 
legislative authority to enable them to judge the reforms as a threat. The regulatory 
mechanism and the cultural mandate carried by the institution offered them an 
opportunity to carry past practices into the reform discussion.  As Considine (1994) 
suggests, an institutions’ ‘accumulated intelligence’ allows it to express itself as it 
feels appropriate. 
 
Trader-Leigh (2002) discusses the idea of a ‘pathology of resistance’ to 
implementation strategies in the public sector.  She describes the importance of 
developing the case for change and that public sector managers unlike the private 
sector managers are much more likely to resist change.  She notes that public sector 
managers and bureaucrats are much more difficult to convince and that strong cases 
for change need to be developed as part of a change strategy (Trader -Leigh, 2002 
p142). In the case of Fiji the lack of analysis on purpose and clarity of reform 
intensions must be strong so that institutions can see the benefits of change. When 
this type of analysis is not available, organisation designs for major changes often 
result in failure or a struggle between forces supporting change and those institutions 
resisting change, followed by long and bitter implementation battles, change she 
suggests is a bit like warfare. Lindblom agrees and suggests initiating change 
introduces hostile activity.   
 
An examination of Fiji institutions and their resistance to the reforms is better 





the new legislation.  As in most reforms, the majority of policy initiatives involve 
new or revised legislation and it is typical that the MoH as the central policy makers 
push and cajoled together with their counterparts to bring the policies into action. 
According to several theorists (Theodoulou and Cahn, 1995, Sabatier, 2007, Peter, 
2012), four important stages are required to implement legislation: initiation, 
clearance, consideration and decision. 
 
1. Initiation 
The first stage of this process is referred to as the initiation of new legislation or 
amendment of legislation which was first proposed and completed under the broader 
public sector reforms program in 1999. At this stage of policy initiation in Fiji, it is 
important according to Stone (1998) that a detailed analysis should be completed on 
the level of opposition that the proposal might attract by other agencies. The reason 
is to gauge an evaluation of alternative means could be identified should the existing 
proposal not meet all the requirements (Stone 1998), and identify if interested 
players have any concerns. Importantly also to gauge commitment to the policy if at 
any stage an election or budget occurs and political priorities change (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2003, Considine, 2005). The reason being is that it is necessary at this early 
stage to assess whether interested players have any concerns and to enable a 
significant and lasting commitment to the policy if at any time an election or budget 
occurs and the commitment could evaporate. 
  
As noted in Section 5.2, the MOH did not have the capacity to carry out this kind of 
analysis nor was it considered. There was no formal strategic analysis on the impact 
of the policy and the views of key policy stakeholders. A feasibility undertaken prior 
to the reforms identified that the reforms would be welcomed if they resulted in 
system improvements and improve access for consumers (PW Associates Pty Ltd, 
1998). Resources to implement the policy were not required at this stage from 
Government of Fiji as the donor through its bilateral arrangements with Fiji, had 
committed to funding ninety per cent of the costs of the reform program, 
subsequently at this stage of the initiation no financial assessment of the reforms was 








The second stage of consideration concerns the vetting of proposals in order to 
obtain permission or clearance to proceed further (Colebatch, 2002). No matter what 
agency or authority initiates a proposal for new legislation there is always a demand 
that other authority holders to be given an opportunity to check modify or veto new 
policy. In the case of Fiji it was at this stage of the vetting that the PSC and MOFP 
did not clear the policy process. Also important at this stage is the identification of 
policy resources and involvement of the MOFP (or treasury).  It was at this juncture 
that the MOFP in particular became concerned at the capacity of the MOH to 
manage the resources that would come with devolved authority. 
 
Reviewing the policy at a broader governmental level to ensure that that government 
philosophy and strategy are consistent, and to check that the policy initiative is still 
seen as a Government priority is critical (Stone, 1998, Considine, 2005). It is 
standard at this stage that policy committees of Government might also assess the 
policy’s validity (Considine, 2005). In the case of Fiji, these processes were not 
adhered to. At no time did the policy proposal developed by the consultants with the 
MOH go to Parliament or to cabinet for review and checking. As such the policy was 
not protected by the broad government processes but rather kept within the confines 
of the PSC and MOFP policy process, who used their own internal institutional 
processes and powers to review the policy.  
 
3. Consideration 
The third stage involves consideration of the new legislation and sees Ministers 
deciding whether or not to grant permission for the proponents of the new initiative 
to proceed with the policy.  It is at this stage that the proposal is checked to see if the 
initiative will actually work in practice and to make sure that there is no major 
opposition from inside the government. Media reaction to the initiative is likely to be 
at this stage.  This stage also involves elaborate policy consultation and wide 
community consultation. Further it is likely at this stage of the process that attempts 
at forecasting the impact of the proposal takes place. In the case of Fiji this process 
took place after the completion period of the reforms in 2004.  It was also at this 





were forced to offer some form of cooperation. The data shows that at no point 




This point is reached when the proposal is framed as a Bill or an Act. It is at this 
stage the Minister responsible for the proposal is able to call upon his or her party 
colleagues to vote the measures through. For Fiji the decision point was reached in 
2004 when the transfer of authorities moved from the PSC and MoFP to the MoH. 
The analysis highlights that the FHMRP policy proposal sat at clearance stage (stage 
2) of the process for the entire five years of the reform program. 
 
5.13 Authority Transfer 
In September 2002, three years after the commencement of the formal reform period 
and after a period of various delays caused by the institutional resistance the 1999 
election and the 2000 coup, and the reinstatement of the public sector reform 
program, the MOF finally approved partial devolution of financial powers to the 
MoH (Aus Health International, 2004b). Three months later in December 2002, the 
PSC devolved partial human resources power to the MoH. The PSC retained the 
power to approve job descriptions as well as authority to appoint senior health 
officials, but devolved to the MoH power to recruit their own medical staff. 
 
Following the delegation by the PSC of HR powers to the PSH, the MoH prepared a 
detailed listing of proposed HR sub-delegations to the health services and finalised it 
in February 2003. The proposed sub-delegations were then submitted to the PSC for 
approval in March 2003. The achievement of this output was dependent on the 
support of the MoF. 
 
These two central policy decisions enabled the MoH to formally establish the new 
divisional structures and commence advertising the new divisional positions 
(AusHealth International 2004a). The MoH completed its necessary documentation 
for the devolvement and recruitment process in March 2003. Approval by the PSC to 






reform timelines (Aus Health International, 2004b).32 The PSC reported that director 
positions would be processed and completed by the end of July, and general manager 
positions by the end of August. In December 2003, four years after the 
commencement of the reforms, the PSC approved the appointments of three directors 
of health for the newly formed divisions (see Figure 13). 
 
The development of policy and divisional guidelines, new job descriptions and roles 
was a significant part of this work. Central to this was the legal framework, in which 
the delegation of powers could be transferred to the newly established divisions, 
from the PSH to the new divisional structures. The process of consultation and 
negotiation to get to this point took more than 12 months. Detailed organisational 
designs for the divisional health services were completed in 2001, however, the 
legislative amendments to support the establishment of the divisional health services 
were not passed in parliament until August 2002 and the PSC did not delegate 
powers to the PSH until November 2004, nearly five years after the commencement 
of the project. 
 
At the end of the reform period in 2004, the final report on the reform outcomes 
notes that the delegations from the MoF to the MoH ‘remain inadequate’ to 
successfully complete the reform implementation successfully (Aus Health 
International, 2004b). A senior health official describes the following: 
The FHMRP finished in December 2003. The major areas started but not 
completed are wide and varying in size. Some of the key changes are still 
only in the planning stages, whilst others are a little bit further along.  I don't 
think people will view this process as successful. As a follow on we are 
pleased that the Australian Government will continue to fund phase two 
(Rabukawaqa, 2006) 
Figure 13  Completed health system restructure, 2006 
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5.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter highlighted the challenges of the three main political institutions 
involved in the reform activities. The analysis showed that the two key and central 
political institutions, the PSC and the MoF, actively derailed the reform process by 
delaying the devolvement of authority to the MoH. The analysis further highlighted 
that the legislative processes related to the approvals were not adhered to and 
subsequently the MoH proposals “got stuck” in bureaucratic processes rather than 
Government and legislative processes. Reasons such as paramountcy and protection, 
lack of confidence in the MoH and relationship failure were the key determinants 
that contributed to the delays in this health reform process. 
 
The MoH also had both technical and human resource issues, which affected the 
ability of the MoH to reorient itself as a serious policy institution. I further argued 
that a key challenge for the MoH was the limited political support it received from 
central government and the various ministers of health during the same period. The 








Chapter 6: Actors, Issues and Strategies 
 
 
6. 0 Introduction 
The study of a country’s political context, the culture of policymaking and its 
institutions do not account for all that occurs within a policy system. Subsequently, 
an analysis of policy actors and their relationships with each other and their 
behaviour is necessary (Considine, 2005). The concept that Considine advances is 
that policy is the result that emerges from the interplay of individuals and groups 
who seek to alter and confirm the rules and the programmes organised by 
government or a bureaucracy (Considine, 1994; pg 37). There is no policy system 
without participants, so policy must be viewed as the accomplishment of real people 
and actual groups. Policy is primarily a joint action among a complex range of actors 
(Considine, 2005, Gilson et al., 2008). 
 
This chapter considers the role of actors and stakeholders using evidence and 
information gathered through interviews and documentary data. It examines several 
key issues that emerged in the analysis related to actor behaviour. Actors acting on 
these issues affected the implementation of the reforms. An analysis of the strategies 
of actors and the issues that mobilised them has been identified from careful analysis 
of interview data outlined in the methods section. The research identifies various 
categories of actors who engaged in the reform process. Two themes are examined: 
the role of the medical authority (between doctors and nurses) and the role and effect 
of the external technical authority on the implementation of the reform process.  
 
 An actor is an individual or organization that has an interest in the reform and has 
some power to affect the policy’s progress (Walt and Gilson, 1994).  Although 
numerous actors were involved in the reforms, the following discusses the key 
themes in relation to four groupings of internal MOH stakeholders: doctors, nurses, 
health bureaucrats and HMAs. 
 
Doctors and Nurses 





servants. There were two groupings of doctors in the system: medical managers and 
mostly located in the centralised arm of the MOH and clinicians who worked in the 
hospitals and in the sub-divisional health service.  Doctors were not grouped together 
in a formalised network in the system, but came together over common concerns 
related to the reform structure and processes. Nurses in the Fiji health system make 
up the largest part of the health sector workforce.33 Nurses did not hold senior health 
management posts. The Director of Nursing position was the only senior nurse 
position at the time of the commencement of the reforms.   
 
Health Management Agents (HMAs) 
HMAs were technical advisors employed by the managing agents to lead, design and 
support the implementation of the reform processes. The recruitment of HMAs to act 
as technical advisors was part of the identified reform implementation model (Aus 
Health International, 2000).  Advisors were selected from a pool of Australian 
development consultants, based on their knowledge, skills and expertise and worked 
in Fiji either for the duration of the project, or short term 3-6 months. Over the period 
of five years, 20 different HMAs were involved in the reform project.  Their 
technical skills included, health financing, health information, IT, nursing, policy and 
management and workforce training. 
 
Health Bureaucrats 
Health bureaucrats in this discussion include all health workers in the MoH that were 
not part of the clinical workforce. These included planners, service directors and 
non-medical divisional directors, office clerks, corporate service employees. 
 
6.1  Power and the Influence of Actors 
Various commentators agree that actors bring varying degrees of power and 
influence to the policy making and implementation process (Lewis, 2005, Walt, 
2006). The power and influence of the different actors (nurses, doctors, health 
bureaucrats, public sector officials and community leaders, politicians) in Fiji during 
the reforms highlights the importance of this critical element in the policy making 
process and underlines why actor behaviour is important to analyse. The data 
                                               






identified that several categories of actors wielded significant influence during the 
reforms. The study has been guided by Lewis’s definition of influence below: 
 
Influence is defined as a demonstrated capacity to do one or more of the 
following: shape ideas about policy, initiate policy proposals or veto others 
proposal, or substantially affect the implementation of policy in relation to 
health. Influential people are those who make a significant difference at one 
or more stages of the policy process (Lewis 2005; pg 61). 
 
While those in the top political and bureaucratic positions are highly visible and 
central, there are other actors in the policy process who had extensive influence.  
Linking actors with issues helps examine how the health policy agenda can be 
shaped by the confluence of influential actors and their concerns (Considine, 2005). 
An emphasis on analysing connections, combined with the notion that actors cannot 
be divorced from their preferred issues, produces a way of understanding the impact 
of actors on policy process. 
 
6.1.1  Medical Power 
The role of the medical profession in any reform activity holds special interest and 
the medical profession is important as it plays a number of different key roles 
(Lewis, 2005, Walt, 2006). Health and policy formulation requires medical 
knowledge and expertise, doctors and physicians as well as nurses are the frontline 
workers and their practices often determine how well a policy would perform. If the 
medical profession holds a common view on a health policy, it can have a direct 
channel to policy makers, which can be used to further the profession’s interests. 
Consideration of the role of doctors in the reform process and how they acted to 
protect what they valued forms part of the following discussion (Lewis, 2005). 
 
Fiji’s health policy system has evolved from a colonial base where the power and 
influence of the medical sector has been at the centre of its system. This is not an 
unusual scenario given that most developing nations’ health systems have 
historically developed on the availability of medical professionals and their 





past acted as health managers, health service directors, hospital managers, corporate 
managers and practitioners. The analysis shows that during the reforms the doctors 
responded over several key issues, discussed in the following section below. 
 
6.2 Creation of a New Cadre of Health Managers in the MoH 
A key feature of the reforms was the establishment of a centralised and strengthened 
policy and health management capacity in the MoH. It was recognised that the 
creation of this capacity in the MoH required the establishment and training of a new 
cadre of health and policy managers into the system.34 The removal of doctors from 
management roles therefore was a key aspect of the establishment of the new policy 
and management culture to make way for the new cadre of health managers (Aus 
Health International, 1998a). Further exploration of this issue with actors and 
stakeholders highlights that MoH stakeholders recognised and were concerned at the 
overt influence of doctors in the management of the health system. A senior member 
of the planning team shares the following: 
 
The majority of the management decisions made in our system were made by 
doctors. Our senior management team was mostly doctors. I can see the 
reform needs a different kind of skill and our doctors don’t have it (Planning 
officer MoH). 
 
Equally concerning for many stakeholders was not just the need or desire to remove 
doctors from senior management roles but the urgent need to put doctors back into 
clinical practice. As one health official describes, 
 
We need our doctors to be working with patients, that’s what they are trained 
for, not running the health system….. they are hopeless at management. They 
are wasting their skills here when we need them in the hospital 
 
 It was a common perception that doctors were in administrative roles so they could 
influence decision making and resources allocation. Comments typically heard 
include the following by a nurse: 
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Many of our doctors they know where the real power is, they seem to have 
forgotten what they were trained for (Senior nurse in the MoH). 
 
Comments such as this suggest that doctors should be actively working in the 
hospital and managing patients and not meddling with health management politics, 
nor should they be associated with political and management roles. 
 
The reform’s intentions to remove doctors from senior level positions and described 
in the reform proposals as part of the management restructure,35 were firmly rejected 
by the medical doctors. The analysis showed that doctors were, first, concerned with 
the proposed structure and the planned reduction of their power and influence at the 
senior health management level and, second, concerned with the lack of capacity of 
the MoH to replace them with the ‘new management capacity’. A senior doctor on 
the MoH management team shared the following: 
 
We understood that the reforms wanted to remove us (doctors) from the 
administration of the system but we did not view this as a reality as there 
were no real health managers in the MoH. We are still the most important and 
knowledgeable in the health system and it would be impractical and risky to 
try move us out at the top of administration … what and who would you 
replace us with? … These folks don’t know how to run a health system 
(Doctor on senior management team in the MoH). 
 
Comments such as these demonstrated that doctors in senior levels of the health 
system believed they were well suited for the management of systems and their 
reactions revealed the tension between doctors and non-medical managers and 
bureaucrats. 
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6.3 New Paradigm of Health Care 
The devolvement of authority and decision making to the newly established sub-
divisions and part of the new decentralised reform structure, was a move to take 
health decision making closer to communities, and an important and critical part of 
the reform strategy and a key aspect of the reform design (Aus Health International, 
1998a). The devolvement was based on the release of authority by the central arm of 
the MOH to the new sub-divisional directors (Aus Health International, 2001a). 
Implementation of this model meant that many of the responsibilities held by the 
senior management team and medical staff at the centre of system would be removed 
or reduced. Decisions related to service delivery and outreach and community 
services would, in the new structure, be within the jurisdiction of the newly formed 
sub-divisions and not retained at the central level.  
 
Doctors at the centre of the health system who held control and authority of 
resources did not support the approach. The contention for doctors was that the new 
structures would give medical and administrative divisional staff more power than 
their counterparts. Further exploration of this issue with doctors highlighted that 
underlying the tensions was a resistance by medical doctors at the centre of the 
system towards policies (such as the reforms) that were moving away from a 
medically centred approach of care towards a community centred model. A doctor 
from the centralised arm of the MoH shared the following: 
 
I’m not sure our medically trained staff in the sub-divisions realize the full 
impact of this policy … they will have to think about how they deliver their 
services differently. It seems they will have to talk to their communities more 
… I don’t think this is their role here.  
 
The doctors reaction to the intended reforms is understood better in the context of 
understanding how Fiji’s health system was established and has evolved within a 
bio-medical model of health care. In the bio-medical framework as discussed by 
Starr (1982) in his work, The social transformation of American medicine, he states 






1982).36  The medical profession has significant control over health care through its 
autonomy and authority and by shaping societies beliefs about health problems and 
how they should be managed.  Lewis (2005) notes that the structure of health 
systems is indicated not only by bio medicine and the associated authority of the 
medical profession, but also by the range of other interests that rely on a continuation 
of disease focused and curative service policies, such as medical equipment 
manufacturers, pharmaceuticals companies and providers of care to people with 
acute and chronic illnesses (Lewis, 2005). 
 
The Fiji health reform policies were based on a shift towards socially based models 
of health care with stronger community and public health principles and a move 
away from the bio medical approach to health service development.  Socially based 
models of health care which locate disease within the wider environment, challenge 
the models of bio medicine by emphasising the importance of societal factors in 
determining health and illness and, subsequently, challenge and at times reduce the 
authority of the medical profession (Lewis, 2005).  
 
Policy initiatives that have a strong shift away from the bio medical focus have often 
caused negative responses by doctors as they can be perceived as directly 
undermining the medical profession’s credibility in health care. Lewis (2005) further 
explains that this type of approach is also likely to threaten the authority of medical 
influence and reduces the perception of the autonomy of medicine, threatening the 
profession. A doctor concerned about the proposed policy shift shared the following: 
 
I don’t have confidence that my medical counterparts at the sub-divisional 
level will know how to handle the new environment … we are doctors, not 
community workers (Senior medical superintendent in the CWM). 
 
I understand that there is belief that communities should be more involved in 
community health decisions, but at the end of the day it is the doctor who 
treats the patients that makes the decisions about the health of the patient….. 
                                               
36 Although the bio medical view of health has changed over the past twenty years, the idea of medical 






These types of comments suggest that doctors in Fiji feared not only the loss of 
management influence and control in the system but also felt threatened at the 
reduced influence and role of their own profession. 
 
6.4  Strategies by Doctors  
The attitude of senior doctors with regards to the reform intentions of the removal of 
doctors from management roles and their professional demise as part of the reform 
policies orientation resulted in doctors strategising to retain their positions and power 
within the system. The majority of the senior medical staff sat on various committees 
responsible for the oversight, decision making and implementation of the reforms. 
The committees were recognised as being the central decision making mechanism of 
the reforms (Aus Health International, 2004b). 
 
Behaviour such as non-attendance at critical meetings, withholding information from 
committees, withholding approvals for activities related to change management 
processes and the use of delay tactics such as purposefully losing information 
resulted in slowing processes needed for the smooth implementation of the reforms. 
A senior planning officer shared: 
 
We would wait for Dr … and Dr … to attend these meetings, which were 
critical to the reform roll out. They always sent their apologies to the most 
important meetings, knowing full well we couldn’t proceed without them. 
 
A common strategy by doctors is described by one of the sub-divisional medical 
superintendents. 
 
Sometimes we found out that doctors in the central office would make 
decisions that would be to their advantage and push through decisions … then 
these decisions would come to the meetings and we were required to sign 









A senior divisional manager shared the following: 
 
Many times we were called to meetings to just rubber stamp whatever the 
central medical divisional officers had already agreed behind closed doors … 
I found this very frustrating. 
 
These actions contributed to the delay of the reforms and resulted in anger and 
confusion at all levels of the system. A sub-divisional planning manager shared the 
following: 
 
I could see what was happening at the central level of the system, the doctors 
were behaving badly, it was frustrating for us in the sub-divisions, we 
couldn’t get a decision on time for anything. 
 
Confusion regarding responsibilities and delays for decisions were also a direct result 
of the behaviour of strategic play by the medical doctors at the centre of the system. 
As the senior medical officer in charge of a sub-divisional hospital noted: 
 
I was always left unsure what responsibilities and authority I had during the 
five-year reform. I did recognise that for some of our senior medical staff in 
Suva … it was hard to let go of some of the their responsibilities and I felt it 
made it hard for us in the divisions … Some days I knew what I had authority 
to do but most days I didn’t … even when I thought I had the power to make 
decisions, I know I really didn’t have it. 
 
Comments such as these were a telling example of the confusion and power struggle 
between MOH officials and medical counterparts and resulted in a tension that 
existed throughout the five year period. Further the delays imposed by the PSC and 
MoFP on the reform roll out impacted on the delay of the recruitment of the new 





medical managers. These delays played to the advance of the medical strategy to 
resist change in the MoH.37 
The FHMRP challenged the medical profession because it was viewed by doctors 
that their privileged status might be eroded, they also viewed the reforms as 
introducing more control and monitoring in the system and these would impact on 
patient practices. 
 
The reforms are supposed to free up doctors to do more medical work but all 
I see is more monitoring and less resources. 
 
I see the reforms as increasing more managers in the system… this means 
more reporting and more paper work…and more time spent writing reports 
than on looking after patients…. How does this help? 
 
Comments such as above highlight that doctors were concerned that the reforms was 
would reduce their medical authority in the system but viewed the reforms as 
increasing control over their profession and clinical freedom.  
 
6.4.1 Increasing medical authority in the MoH 
Overriding concerns by nurses and other internal MoH stakeholders was the push by 
medical doctors to retain their medical and management influence in the MoH. The 
interview data suggested that the strategies by doctors to keep the reforms from 
succeeding were successful.  The overt push by doctors was not only about retaining 
their level of influence at the management level but it was also about increasing their 
influence. As many stakeholders described the doctors’ strategies were to increase 
the medicalisation in the MoH; that is, increase the power of medical power in the 
system, rather than reduce it as part of the reform’s intentions. Doctors within the 
MoH who had senior roles were very vocal and strategic about retaining their level 
of control of the administrative power and were able to keep safe and protect their 
positions at the senior level of the MoH during the reform process. By the end of the 
reforms, there was an increase of six medical doctors at the senior management team 
level of the health system. Their ability to increase their hold at the highest level of 
                                               






the system was viewed negatively by the MoH non-medical staff. A senior nurse 
shared the following: 
 
I felt … doctors in the management team actively sabotaged the reform ideals 
… They sat around the decision making table and were able to advocate their 
issues and keep safe their positions better than anyone else in the system  
 
I felt the doctors were very smart…. They used the reforms to gain an 
advantage and yet we thought the reforms were about removing the doctor’s 
(Senior nurse in the MoH) 
 
6.4.2 Relegation of Nurses 
An examination of the position of nursing in the Fiji health reforms provided useful 
insights into not only the power of the medical profession but also the position of 
nurses in the health system. The central concern of nurses during the reform period 
related to the behaviour of doctors to entrench their medical position in the MoH. 
Nurses were further concerned at the lobbying of doctors and others to reduce the 
nurses’ leadership position and capacity in the MoH system. Nurses were also 
concerned that their credibility to actively have a voice in the reform processes was 
marginalised. 
 
Tension between doctors and nurses emerged in the early days of the reform during 
the planning process and over the reform structure. The new reform model proposed 
the removal of the Director of Nursing position and the nursing division from the top 
level infrastructure of the MoH.38 In the pre-reform structure, the Director of Nursing 
was located at the most senior level of the MoH management system (equal role to 
the senior doctors in the management team). The position gave nurses not only health 
system leadership profile but also enabled nurses to have a voice in the management 
of the overall system.  
 
                                               
38 The Director of Nursing was a member of the senior management and executive team that worked 






The Director of Nursing had sole responsibility for the recruitment, retention, 
training, promotion, supervision and career development of all nurses in the MoH 
(Aus Health International, 2000). The proposed relegation of the Director of Nursing 
position from the senior management team39 was supported by doctors who made it 
clear that the Director of Nursing role was ‘ill fitted’ to sitting around the senior 
management team table, as one senior doctor described it.  
The Director of Nursing position should be concerned with the work of 
nurses, their role and their support of the medical teams, it makes no sense 
that the Director of nursing is at the senior level of the health system … 
nursing issues are a human resources issue not a management issue.   
 
The position of doctors towards nurses during the reform process can be explained 
further by their fear of loss of authority, but also by what Lewis (2005) calls the need 
for doctors to control the definitions around health. The above comment reflects the 
attitude that doctors had regarding the role of nurses and their contribution to the 
health care model.  Nurses should be concerned about only supporting doctors and 
their roles not about management issues. Nurses became concerned at the push by 
doctors to relegate the nursing director’s position outside of the senior management 
team structure.  
 
A nurse in the hospital shared the following: 
We were not sure what the real intentions of the reforms were. We were 
shocked at the suggestion to remove the nursing director’s role.  We felt the 
doctors in the system were supporting this.  I know many of my medical 
colleagues believed that nurses should stay under the medical director’s 
position.  I know many of them thought we should not even have an 
independent nursing director. 
 
One nurse recounted: 
You know, we are the largest workforce in this sector, the nurses make this 
system work … yet we were not regarded well in this reform (Nurse CWM 
Hospital). 
                                               
39 The senior management team consisted of five doctors, one non-medical manager, a female 







Another nurse described the reforms were a ‘slap in the face’ for the nursing 
profession.  An unpublished report written by an external consultant on the role of 
nurses during the reform period notes that ‘nurses were on a slippery downward 
slope’ (Shields, 2003). The unpublished report suggests that the Fijian nursing 
profession was at risk of losing its ‘true vocational identity’. The report further 
suggests that reforms had intentionally ignored the role of nurses in the restructuring 
process signalling their disregard as serious policy contributors.  
 
Nursing was viewed as on a lower hierarchy within the system because the doctors 
within medical profession placed themselves at the top of the hierarchy. An extract 
from a report completed by a nursing consultant during the reform period that 
highlighted the tensions between doctors and nurses noted the following: 
 
The focus of health management change has been on the medical 
superintendents. Their issues, their needs and driven by them. As part of this 
push there has been some strategic oversights along the way the most obvious 
of which is nursing. The reforms have paid little or no attention to nursing, a 
function in our Ministry that employs 75% of our total professional of staff 
(Shields, 2003; pg 17). 
 
Nurses viewed the position of doctors towards them as a direct attack on nurses and 
the nursing profession, further enforcing the perception that nurses were not an 
important factor in the policy discussions. The PSC of Health at the time described in 
his interview that the nurses were central to the reform discussion but unfortunately 
the influence of the doctors made it difficult for them to assert their positions 
(Rokovada, 2006). According to Lewis (2005), this is a common perception that 
although nurses can wield significant power through the sheer numbers of their 
workforce, the power is not the same as that required to be able to contribute to 
health policy agenda setting. Their major contention was their lack of visibility in the 






Nurses in the MoH did not vocally or publicly agitate their concerns regarding the 
proposed reform changes in nursing leadership.  A senior nurse noted the following: 
We didn’t make a public fuss internally; it wasn’t our way (Senior nurse in 
CWM). 
 
In exploring this position of non-confrontation and silence with the nurses further, 
they conveyed that they were aware that moves by doctors to strengthen their role in 
the MOH and to reduce the power of nurses was related to power and gender. A 
senior nurse suggested that their silent response could be explained by the traditional 
and cultural position that women normally take when confronted by men in change 
processes, suggesting that women in a strong cultural male environment needed to be 
careful about how they managed their relationships so as not to upset the balance of 
social hierarchy. 
 
Varani-Norton (2002) in her study on Fijian culture and women, affirms this idea of 
social balance: 
 
Fijian women will be inhibited by two concerns: a desire not to lose their 
time-honoured role as conservators of the status quo, and a fear of disrupting 
social harmony by challenging what they still see as men’s proper role as 
initiators of change (Varani-Norton, 2002; pg 22). 
 
The policy process, Lewis (2005) explains, is a result of nursing still being seen as 
female and therefore subordinate to medicine and the male profession.  Furthermore, 
Lewis and others suggest that women nurses particularly struggle to find a voice in 
the health policy debate because of the highly gendered nature of the professions 
(Lewis, 2005, Sperling, 2001) and policy is often oriented to male concerns 
(Sperling, 2001). Power issues between nurses and doctors within the MOH were not 
explicitly referred to as nurses were sensitive about being seen as griping about the 
professional tension. However, their responses to the removal of nursing within the 
leadership structure brought forth an underlying tension regarding doctors in the 
senior management levels who were perceived to have supported the decentralisation 







Quietly and strategically, nurses conveyed their concerns through the Fiji Council of 
Nurses.40 They communicated their concerns also to the Prime Minister’s Office 
(interview with the Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office). Political lobbying was 
a key political and legitimate strategy by the nurses who used this approach to gain 
support. Nurses viewed themselves as holding very little power and were in a weak 
position during the reform years, and remained concerned at the reforms throughout 
the five-year period. 
   
Both the nursing and medical professions are an integral part of the architecture of 
Fiji’s health policy system both as part of the institutional arrangements of health and 
as interest groups.  They were also a focal point in understanding the politics of 
health. The medical professional has always had significant control over health care 
through its autonomy and authority of other health occupations. The primary concern 
of medical managers and doctors in the Fiji health system was whether medicine’s 
position in the system was losing power and if so what impact this would have on 
them. Nurses on the other hand were on journey in this process to have their 
expertise respected and their voice and opinions incorporated into the institutions 
policy frameworks, as one senior nurse shared: 
 
We need to be heard and taken seriously, we are tired of just been the 
workers, when it comes to policy and serious health discussions, they… seem 
to forget we exist. 
 
Fiji Nurses were perceived by doctors to be pushing the boundaries and this was 
viewed as challenging medical authority in the system.  Nursing provides a contrast 
to the medical authority when analysing the various ways in which culturally 
gendered professions relate to reform policy programmes. Non-medical groups tend 
to remain peripheral to health policy debates. Their ability to promote their own 
ideas on health and policy has been constrained by the dominance of medicine (Starr, 
1982).   
 
                                               





Ultimately both nursing and the medical profession had very important roles in the 
policy process and were key institutional players. Although the data highlights that 
the nursing voice was hard to decipher in the debate they did demonstrate they had a 
strong ability and influence to negotiate. The power of medicine wielded significant 
influence.   
 
6.5 Bureaucratic Power and the Role of the Public Servant 
Walt (2006) notes that the role of MOH bureaucrats is recognised as having the most 
extensive influence in policy processes and they need to be visibly active. An 
examination of the behaviour of health bureaucrats is important as it helps to explain 
the reality of translating policy into practice (Considine 2005). The seminal study of 
Michael Lipsky’s (1980)  ‘street level bureaucrats’ highlights that policy 
implementation in the end comes down to people who actually implement it, the 
bureaucrats, in particular, how they shape their responses to their understanding of 
the reform issues (Lipsky, 1980, Hill and Hupe, 2002, Considine et al., 2009). 
 
6.5.1 Role of the Public Servant 
In Fiji, MOH bureaucrats consisted mostly of Indigenous Fijians who were career 
public servants (Ravuvu, 1992). 41Civil servants in Fiji have always been held in 
high regard and high-ranking traditional chiefs have often held the majority of 
bureaucratic positions in Fiji’s public service. In the Fijian context, senior civil 
servants have led the way in the public discussion of controversial policy issues of 
the day.  The engagement and support of health bureaucrats in the FHMRP was seen 
as a central and essential aspect of the safe implementation of the reforms. The data 
suggest that the relationships between health bureaucrats and the technical health 
management advisors needs examination in order to understand the various issues 
that affected the implementation of the reforms. 
 
6.5.2 Role of the Health Management Advisor 
The role of HMAs in the reform programme was seen as a critical and important 
aspect of the reform model. Their role was to provide the technical and strategic 
                                               
41 Although most senior civil servants were Indigenous Fijians , the reforms were proposed a merit 







leadership and guidance under which the reforms would progress. An analysis of the 
role of the behaviour of bureaucrats in this study cannot be explained without a focus 
on the role of the HMAs. HMAs were located across the various divisions in the 
MOH,42 depending on the role they were performing. It was intended that the 
international consultants would bridge the gap and fill the missing and necessary 
capacity that the MOH needed to support the reform planning and implementation. 
 
6.5.3 Control of the Technical Dialogue 
Throughout the analysis a reoccurring theme by internal MOH stakeholders was the 
lack of confidence of the bureaucracy in the HMAs’ abilities to carry out the 
technical and strategic leadership of the reforms. Concerns related to the HMAs’ on-
going inability to get clarity on technical aspects of the reform model, 
implementation plans and sequencing of technical inputs, timelines and processes 
was seen by the bureaucrats as a key failure and left the MoH with little confidence 
that HMAs were technically capable for completing the tasks allocated. 
 
A health official offered the following: 
 
We never knew where we were up to with the reforms, sometimes I felt the 
plans changed daily … and the HMAs kept changing their minds on 
everything. They did a lot of their thinking on their feet, the reform model 
was never agreed with any certainty … and it kept changing each week. I 
remember being very frustrated with the HMAs we had as we couldn't 
understand their processes… 
 
The analysis further highlighted that bureaucrats felt that arguments developed by 
the HMAs were technically poor, highlighting their lack of understanding of the 
contextual issues in Fiji. The example highlighted by many in the analysis referred to 
the collapse of relationships with their public sector colleagues in the PSC and 
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MoFP.43  I felt that the HMAs did not know how to frame the policy issues properly 
so that we could convey the issues well to stakeholders. 
 
A senior health bureaucrat noted: 
 
I didn’t expect the HMAs to understand everything about how our system 
works, but I did expect that they would know about politics and policy. 
 
Interview data confirmed that external stakeholders were concerned that the MoH 
bureaucrats seemed detached and not fluent with the reform processes nor fully 
conversant with reform issues. A MoH official shared the following: 
 
The reform model kept changing so much, I was too afraid to go to any 
outside meetings in case I was questioned about what was going on … I 
didn’t know anything. 
 
Some years later a review of reforms by the Australian government acknowledged 
the problems of technical errors and problems of interpreting the political landscape 
and the effect of those on the reform programme (Australian Agency for 
International Development, 2006). 
 
A central issue in the data and an area of concern was the problem of what one health 
official called undeserved power and position allocated to the HMAs in the reform 
process to control the technical and the policy dialogue. Health bureaucrats felt they 
were forced to rely on the expertise of HMAs because of their appointed roles in the 
reform programme. As one divisional director noted: 
 
The reform efforts depended entirely on the consultants … the team was 
perceived as the experts… but they should have facilitated the process, not 
led it.  
 
                                               
43 The MoH failure to convince the PSC and MoFP to support the reforms was detrimental and a 






The data suggest that bureaucrats felt that the authority and leadership granted to 
HMAs during the reform period was not justifiable, not only from a technical 
perspective but because MoH counterparts felt that they were purposefully 
disempowered and isolated from the decision making and had no real technical voice 
in the reform process. The concern was that the HMAs used their technical expertise 
to gain autonomy in the technical debate and to isolate bureaucrats from being much 
too involved in technical discussions. Their expertise enabled them to endorse their 
own plans and they used their technical knowledge to justify their processes. 
Interview data suggested that HMAs assumed a special role in the reforms which 
gave them position to exclude health bureaucrats. 
 
The control of the policy dialogue further gave the impression that the reforms were 
driven and owned by the consultants and not by the MOH. As one bureaucrat shared: 
 
The reforms are all about the HMAs, they are the real beneficiaries of this 
exercise … not us. 
 
A senior health official described the relationship in the following way: 
 
The reforms belong to the consultants, this is their thing, we have nothing to 
do with it. They think all the work in reforms is at the top level, and we at the 
bottom are not qualified enough or important enough to understand what was 
going on. This reform is about them not us. 
 
These comments suggest the underlying and tense feelings that the bureaucrats 
carried towards the HMAs. Further, bureaucrats were concerned for their own 
reputations in this process within the broader public sector and among their 
colleagues. Their isolation from technical processes and lack of control of the 
processes made them look inept among their colleagues in the other sectors. As one 






I felt embarrassed at times because I was so far removed from the technical 
discussions in the MoH, my colleagues seemed to question the integrity of 
my position … I felt awkward. 
 
The effect of these delays affected the credibility of the MoH to engage confidently 
and publicly with external stakeholders and agencies who were outside of the MOH; 
subsequently, external colleagues developed the impression that the MoH 
bureaucrats had little technical knowledge of the reforms. 
 
6.5.4 Technical Capacity of HMAs 
At the heart of the many concerns of the MoH was the issue of the technical capacity 
of the HMAs. Interview data suggested that this caused the most concern for the 
MoH officials. An observation by a MoH manager noted: 
 
Our consultant didn’t know what he was doing, he didn’t know the technical 
detail needed to help us … We needed skills to help us understand our new 
legislative and regulation roles, how to deal with our stakeholders and how to 
communicate to our colleagues, our consultant was not able to help us with 
this (MoH manager). 
 
A member of the independent Technical Advisory Group (TAG) reported that 
consultants recruited for the project were not well matched to their specific roles as 
the recruitment process was based on availability of consultants (mutual friends and 
associates) rather than technical fit . As one member of the project review team noted 
at the completion of the reforms: 
 
A number of the consultants were a complete mismatch between the tasks 
that were needed and the skills that were necessary for the reform process 
(Member of TAG).  
 
The project leader at the commencement of the reforms revealed that the consultants 






and subsequently were not selected under rigorous scrutiny but rather recruited on 
availability. 
 
6.5.5 Capacity Building 
A central outcome of the reforms and a key role of the HMAs was the importance of 
transferring technical knowledge to the local counterparts in the MoH (Aus Health 
International, 2001b). The concept of skills transfer was a new “championed idea” by 
the donor (Soakai, 2006) and strongly supported by the MoH of Fiji. Given the views 
of the bureaucrats towards the Health Management Advisors (HMAs), the outcomes 
of these intended arrangements were not achieved. Internal stakeholders shared that 
the HMAs did not ‘reach out’ to work with them; rather, their approach was to carry 
out the majority of the technical tasks on their own without the support of local 
counterparts. Further exploration into this issue highlights that HMAs felt under 
duress to manage timelines and reporting and compliance activities, which often did 
not leave them time for working in a collaborative style with the local counterparts. 
 
As one HMA noted: 
 
We had 105 milestones to deliver on over five years, I never felt I had 
adequate time to really do the job well … I felt all I did was write reports. 
 
HMAs revealed that compliance reporting and managing up was a burdensome task 
that often took them away from the day-to-day work of the reform programme. 
Preoccupation with over-reporting was perceived by health bureaucrats as not only 
distracting, but gave them the perception that the HMAs role and the reforms were a 
desk exercise rather than a real exercise in system change. Counterpart interviews 
further reaffirmed this frustration: 
 
They were always busy managing their reporting milestones … rather than 
supporting the MoH to deliver the reform outcomes.44 
 
                                               





The final report by the Australian government notes that the ‘burden of delivering on 
a 105 milestones’ and the over compliance in reporting on the project was 
challenging as well as distracting to the initiative (AusHealth International 2004b). 
 
Interview data revealed that very few counterparts felt that they learnt anything from 
HMAs over the five-year period. Bureaucrats suggested that this was not a priority 
for HMAs; rather their focus was on rapid results versus long term capacity 
development. A sub-divisional director in the MoH noted: 
 
Our HMA was focused on quick wins and I needed to stay focused on the 
longer goals … I was going to be here longer than him … I needed to make 
sure we had good processes…. So we didn't agree on many things. 
 
The concerns were that the HMAs did not feel a strong sense of accountability to Fiji 
nor to the MoH, and were focused on managing their internal compliance 
obligations, and therefore focused more on their own responsibilities. This particular 
issue also suggests that the HMAs operated in a mode of “box ticking” outcomes 
rather than being focused on building longer term capacity and systems development 
needed for the reform program.  The combination of these issues impacted on 
relations between HMAs and the MoH officials. 
 
6.6  Relationship Failure 
The collapse of relationships between HMAs and internal health bureaucrats created 
a significant barrier to the implementation of the internal reform changes in the 
MoH. Bureaucrats were unsupportive of the reforms and did little to avail themselves 
of the processes. Lack of support by bureaucrats is captured in a comment by a 
HMA: 
 
Throughout the entire five-year period we had a disconnect between us and 
the internal health bureaucrats. We couldn’t communicate and our 
relationships were tense. We couldn’t win the hearts and minds of those 







HMAs did not share the same perspective of the internal health bureaucrats; rather, 
they suggested that the reasons that internal reform processes struggled was the lack 
of technical capacity by the counterparts. The end of year report written by a 
consultant and HMA noted:  
 
Our counterparts couldn’t internalise the technical information, they didn’t 
want to read the information, they didn't appreciate the technical detail of the 
reforms (Aus Health International, 2004b). 
 
A HMA shared the following: 
 
Communicating with internal staff was a problem … we just couldn’t get it 
down to people and more often than not … people wouldn’t read the stuff 
anyway. 
 
A HMA reform planner noted: 
 
Changing people’s mind-set and creating a new environment of change 
proved difficult because not everyone felt part of the process. 
 
HMAs described feelings of isolation and distancing by internal MoH staff, not only 
technically in the work but also as colleagues in the same working environment.  
Interview data with HMAs confirmed the tension between themselves and the local 
counterparts but they struggled to understand and interpret it. A comment made by 
one HMA reflects the confusion of the behaviour of counterpart colleagues. As one 
HMA noted: 
 
The entire three-year period I was there, not once was I invited to a local 
home or to a colleague’s residence; it was like we were the untouchables. Our 
work didn’t make it easier. They had this kind of respect for us because of 






The attitude of the bureaucrats in this regard is better understood by examining 
cultural and social values in the Fijian context. HMAs experienced the discontent of 
officials but were not able to understand nor interpret why health bureaucrats 
remained distant or aloof during the processes. Fijian societal concepts of respect and 
keeping face are related to this. Concepts of Vulagi (the visitor) and iTaukei (the 
host) are cultural concepts of respect. The treatment of visitors in Fiji is held in high 
regard. HMAs were viewed as Vulagi and therefore they were not to be disrespected. 
Maintaining respect for the Vulagi and ensuring their dignity is maintained is 
essential (Ravuvu, 1987, Ravuvu, 1992). This cultural concept requires a Fijian to 
not offend and ensure that the visitor maintains dignity. The cultural positioning of 
Fijians in the system was not an overriding value but does explain some of the 
behaviours of some counterparts who disengaged in processes for fear of been rude 
and breaking the rules of Vulagi. 
 
A low level manager expressed that culturally he didn’t feel it was appropriate to 
openly criticise a white consultant: 
 
I didn’t really understand or care what the consultants did, I knew when they 
left we would do what we wanted. It wasn’t our place to tell them or to advise 
them … I didn’t feel I could tell them much because they are not Fijians and 
probably would not understand some of our Fijian ways. 
 
Fijian bureaucrats were careful not to offend but they also did not encourage or foster 
collegial relationships or friendships outside of the MoH with external consultants as 
this went against their understanding of traditional etiquette.  
 
Ravuvu (1992) explains the problem of culture and misinterpretation. Fijians are well 
known for being courteous, respectful and self-effacing. Their world is imbued with 
concepts such as vakaturaga (chiefly values). This explains why health bureaucrats 
did not openly challenge the HMAs regarding the process, but rather kept silent 
about their disenchantment in order to maintain cordial respectful working 
relationships. In face to face contacts, such principles of social engagement 






contact, care not to cause offence and indirect, subtle, nuanced or elliptical ways of 
addressing sensitive issues (Ravuvu, 1992). For those not schooled in these ways 
especially foreigners, the scope for misinterpretation and misunderstanding are 
considerable. 
 
These norms of social behaviour are especially not open to critical inquiry or debate; 
subsequently HMAs were never given the opportunity to discuss these key issues.  
These socially sanctioned modes and conventions are widely understood only by 
Fijians. Disagreement therefore is resolved in private, rather than in public, 
consensus and quiet diplomacy is preferred over an adversarial style, and criticism is 
muted.  The impact of social behaviour and norms according to Ravuvu (1992) does 
not allow for critical thinking and expression of independent thought and the 
development of skills of argumentation, and therefore helps explain why health 
bureaucrats during the reform process, were perceived to be supporting the reforms 
by the HMAs because of their muted and silent responses. 
 
The combination of all these issues left MoH counterparts and stakeholders feeling 
isolated from the various processes and resulted in MoH staff disengaging from 
reform activities. The consultants’ inability to recognise the importance of cultural 
context of management change in the MoH and their lack of appreciation of the 
cultural values that existed in the system hindered their inability to work alongside 
many of the internal MoH stakeholders, subsequently creating a ‘them and us 
culture’. These issues resulted in resistance towards not only the HMAs and a lack of 
confidence in their ability but also a resistance towards the reform programme by 
internal MoH staff. 
 
Disengagement from the reform processes caused difficulty for HMAs. 
Subsequently, the MoH failed to bring about a whole of organisation ‘buy in’ to the 
reforms. The introduction of the reforms, planning, conceptual and strategic 
discussions and ideas were not internalised throughout the MoH. The diminished 
technical role of the bureaucrats affected their public service credibility. They felt 
unable to discuss the reforms publicly and therefore unable to maintain what they 





6.6.1 Strategies of the Bureaucrats 
In examining the interview data and reports that described the activities of internal 
bureaucrats, a number of strategies were used to derail communication activities and 
implementation processes. The most common practice of health bureaucrats during 
the reforms was their purposeful disengagement from discussions with HMAs and 
internal processes. Disengagement with external stakeholders was also a strategy 
used by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats felt unable to hold technical discussions with 
external counterparts, due to their limited technical knowledge of the processes. 
Interview data showed that internal stakeholders removed themselves. 
 
6.7 Actor Resistance to Change 
The intensity of policy resistance to the reform initiative for some actors in Fiji was 
reinforced by their desire to ensure that other actors were not empowered by 
changes. Doctors did not want to lose power and neither did the bureaucrats. Doctors 
did not want nurses representation advanced in the system and bureaucrats wanted to 
retain the status quo within the system. Many of the tactics used by the actors had 
traditionally been used in the system and it was not necessarily a case of developing 
new strategies by actors but rather escalating their behaviour at various time and 
intensity.  The nature of policy resistance was partly driven by a legacy of the history 
of bio medical culture and many of tactics used by doctors used to resist the reforms 
had been practiced throughout the systems at various times. The resistors exploited 
all their options available to them.  
 
Lindblom (1994) notes that while it is possible to is to find policies or changes that 
benefit everyone in policy reform, changes ordinarily benefit some actors or 
institutions by injuring others, particularly where change is feared and members of 
the organisation are not made to see its possibilities.  In the Fiji case doctors resisted 
the change but also stopped the flow of communication in committee meetings 
(Section 6.4). Lindblom et al (1994) suggests that halting communication by 
stakeholders who resist change is the best way to block change because it renders 
people unaware of change possibilities. He suggests that those who are most affected 
by policy change often will use communication less for exposing others to the 







Where the reforms were able to advance and actors reduced their resistance, was 
through processes of negotiation for example the removal of the nursing directors’ 
position was reinstated after political lobbying and discussions.  The reinstated role 
however did not have the full powers of its previous position. The various actors in 
the Fiji system had different resources at their disposal, the nurses used political non- 
confrontational lobbying and had access to high level political leaders, whilst doctors 
were much more explicit in their responses and involved the Fiji medical Association 
to support their position.  Health bureaucrats on the other hand used the strategy 
disengagement from processes had an immediate and compelling impact on the 
reform process. Disengagement was also an expression of power by the MOH 
officials, it symbolised authority. 
 
Actor resistance to change was an obstacle to the smooth implementation of the Fiji 
health reforms (Table 10).  Recognizing the determining influence of actors over 
policy development and implementation, much attention has been given to 
stakeholder analysis (Reich and Cooper, 1996, Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000) and 
actor management (Thomas and Gilson, 2004).  Public policy literature sheds light 
on the complexity of the implementation of change and the role of actors and their 
resistance to change (Grindle, 2000, Sabatier, 2000, Thomas and Gilson, 2004). 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the deliberate management of actors is a key 
factor in driving reforms (Glassman et al., 1999). Governments need to become 
better managers of sector change and therefore develop an ability to negotiate with 
stakeholders (Reich, 1995b). In the case of the Fiji study it was difficult to identify 
where the Governments took on this role, rather it was a case of where Government 
actor management was mostly absent.   
 
Change management literature focuses on the skills managers require in order to deal 
with the unpredictability, resistance, practical difficulties and disruption to personnel 
arrangements that change can bring about (Argyris, 1994, Trader -Leigh, 2002).  In 
the case of Fiji there was none or very little of the management of actors as a strategy 





2002) suggests that people react against change for a wide range of reasons, 
including fear of the unknown, lack of information, threat to status, there being no 
perceived benefits, fear of failure, low trust in the organisation, strong peer groups 
norms and being bound by custom (Table 11).   
 
Table 10 Actor strategies and the impact on the reform process 
Actors Positions within 
the reform 








Forced delays on the 
process 
Doctors in hospitals Supportive Disengaged as reforms 
didn’t seem relevant to 
them 
Neutral 





Supportive   
Technical advisors 
(HMAs) 
Leadership Technical isolation Could not engage support 
of bureaucrats and 
stakeholders 
Health bureaucrats Non-supportive Disengagement  Caused delays 





Not supportive Sabotage 
Attempts to remove 
nursing from management 
structure 
Separate conversation 






As Glassman and colleagues note, actors in health reforms are often more satisfied 
with the status quo rather than with change (Glassman et al., 1999).  Furthermore, 
Mauer et al. (1996) suggest that in order for actors to move in any direction they 






purposefulness of the changes and see the benefits of the change primarily for 
themselves. Many of the actors in the Fiji system did not perceive that these changes 
would result in advancements. Rather actors (doctors, nurses and health bureaucrats) 
felt that the results of the reforms would result in the redistribution of benefits away 
from them. Doctors further were concerned that the redistribution of power and 
authority throughout the reforms impacted on their role and their social and expert 
standing in the system. 
 
  
Table 11 Factors associated with actor resistance and actor issues in the Fiji Reforms (adapted from Trader 
Leigh 2002) 
 






only buy into 
change if to a 
degree their 
interests are met 
Opposed the reforms 
as they couldn’t see 
how the reforms 
would benefit them 
and could not see how 







Retain status quo Retain status quo 
Psychological 
impact:  

















Felt at risk around 
job security and 
changing roles 
Threat to 
historical ways  
of working 
Doctors felt 
threatened with new 
ways of doing things.  
Loss of power 
Nurses wanted to 
retain traditional 
power in the old 
system 
 
Escalate profile Resisted new 







Loss of control of 
power, funding , 
policies 
Doctors did not want 
to lose power nor 
redistribute power to 
sub division 
Felt threatened at 
loss of leadership 
power at the senior 
level of the system 
 
 Resisted push by 
consultants to 









Doctors didn't like 




power of doctors 
Loss of power to 
sub division 
resisted 
Didn't like new 









6.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has brought together information and analyses of issues related to four 
categories of actors involved in the implementation of the reforms. There was an 
analysis of issues that were of concern to them, how they reacted to the issues and 
the strategies they used to influence the reform outcomes. The perceived loss of 
medical influence and power for doctors was a significant barrier to the reform 
implementation as well as a range of other factors culminated in a wall of resistance 
for change.  Further, capacity issues within the MOH made it an ineffective 
implementation agency for the reforms (Niedeggen et al., 2012).  The data analysis 
has suggested that the reform implementation model used by Fiji did not enable 
strong stakeholder involvement from the start of the reforms through to 
implementation further impacting on lack of actor engagement and support 












7.0  Introduction 
The study analyzes the implementation process of the Fiji health reforms between 
1999 and 2004. Fiji is recognized as a developing country and the largest Pacific 
Island nation in the region besides Papua New Guinea.  This chapter brings together 
research findings, observations and theory from previous chapters in order to 
synthesize a coherent description of the reform implementation challenges in Fiji. 
This study has suggested that when health policy analysis precedes or accompanies 
policy development, the chance of effective implementation is greater. Data 
collection for the study was guided by Considine’s (1994) public policy framework. 
The study showed that the execution of policy is an integral part of the policy 
process. 
 
7.1 Synthesis and Discussion 
In the collection and analysis of all the interview data, reports and documentation, 
one key issue was considered as central to this investigation.  That is: what were 
the challenges of implementing the FHMRP?  The analysis examined 
implementation challenges from several perspectives, institutions, actors, political 
context and culture and values.  This was achieved through the discussion of the 
analysis of the data, interviews and documentation. 
 
The research study examined the following key issues, the role of:  
x Key stakeholders in shaping the development and implementation of health 
reform in Fiji. 
 Institutions. 
 Political economy. 
 Culture and values. 
 
Initiating policy change requires thorough understanding of the context and careful 





context, historical, political and social cultural aspects of a system need 
consideration when initiating policy change. For Fiji the greatest lesson has been the 
influences of the past as the most dominant force affecting health policy change. 
 
7. 1.1 The role of Stakeholders and Actors 
The research identified that the role of stakeholders in the reform implementation 
was critical to shaping the end result of the policy. Key actors included not only 
health bureaucrats, ministers and politicians, nurses and doctors, but also public 
servants who sat outside of the health bureaucracy. The research highlighted that a 
range of issues mobilized the various actors (Section 6.1).  The research showed that 
actors reacted and responded to the reforms in various ways (Sections 6.3, 6.4). The 
influence of doctors who resisted the reforms for various reasons described in 
Section 6.2 highlights the continued role and power of the medical elite in 
developing country settings and their ability to shape the end result of a policy 
process.  
 
The important role of bureaucrats particularly those who worked in agencies with 
traditional and strong legislation, was highlighted and showed that the influence of 
their behavior had significant implications on the reform process. The study 
highlighted that the role of the donor as an influential actor through the management 
of their consultants impacted on the design and implementation of the reform to a 
large extent, creating a negative “quick win” atmosphere within the reform project, 
rather than a strategic longer term capacity building environment. 
 
The Fijian traditional cultural and societal system played an important aspect in 
understanding the behavior and actions of the actors and stakeholders. The role of 
chiefs, leaders and the unique cultural principles related to respect to visitors and 
outsiders highlighted that the management of relationships with outsiders within the 
policy system had implications for the process. 
 
7. 1.2 The role of Institutions 
Institutional restructuring presented significant changes for Fiji (Section 5.1.4). The 






during the reform process, it became difficult to observe the tangible outcomes 
causing a sense anxiety within the health sector.  For the bureaucracy the 
restructuring was feared because it was centrally about the redistribution of power 
and resources, and threats to job security (Section 6.10).  A key issue highlighted in 
the data was the over arching impression that the structural institutional changes 
were perceived to be about change for change sake rather than the reforms been a 
necessary change for  improving the real health outcomes of the population.  The fact 
that many of the actors suggested that the structural changes, job descriptions and 
roles change, were merely facets of the process, but in reality it was mostly “business 
as usual”. 
 
In analysing the role of institutions in the reform process the study highlighted that 
three central institutions played different roles in the reform process and each one of 
them was central to the other and their progress was implicit on support from each of 
the institution. The PSC and MoFP, Fiji’s two most important political institutions 
outside of the health sector, controlled the legislative authority to enable the reforms 
to progress. The study documented that for various reasons the institutions resisted 
approvals (Section 5.11).  The study highlighted that no political analysis took place 
prior to the reforms hence the reaction and level of resistance by the institutions were 
unanticipated. 
 
Resistance by institutions impacted the timelines and the final shape of the policy 
whilst internal stakeholders in the MoH purposefully delayed the policy progression 
(Section 5.11).  The study further emphasized that the Ministry of Health as the 
central political institution responsible for leading the reforms struggled to develop 
the necessary political and technical capacity to ensure the safe formulation and 
development of the reforms (Section 5.8.1).  The lack of political advocacy and 
leadership by Ministers impacted on the ability of the MoH to protect and safeguard 
its pathway. 
 
7. 1.3 The role of Culture and Values 
In analysing the role of culture and values in the reform process, the study indicates 





influencing the behavior of actors on the policy process. The interpretation of 
institutional and cultural and traditional values by actors impacted on their behavior 
and engagement with the policy process. Furthermore institutions such as the PSC 
interpreted their cultural and historical mandate in promoting and protecting 
paramountcy values within the public sector as central to the institutions functions 
(Section 5.1). The loss and threat of these traditional values and responsibilities 
mobilized institutions to protect and keep safe those values. 
 
The importance of Fijian societal values were further highlighted in the study as a 
key factor in the management of relationships between indigenous health bureaucrats 
and external health management consultants (Section 6.7). The study showed that the 
clash of interpersonal relationships between these actors was due to cultural 
misinterpretation of actions and cultural norms which operate at the heart of Fijian 
society (Section 6.1). 
 
The study revealed that the MoH failed to understand the importance of developing 
clear objectives for the reform not only for the purposes of guiding the reform 
process and communicating to stakeholders the reform goals, but the MoH missed 
the opportunity in this processes to advocate explicit institutional values and describe 
what was important to them and what it wanted to achieve with the reform program 
(Sections 3.1, 5.1). The study noted that a major distraction for the MoH was the 
internal “authority wars” between the MoH and the other key public sector agencies.  
These distractions and delays impacted on the ability of the MoH to define the 
reform goals it was trying to advance. 
 
A clash of values was highlighted in the study through the analysis of the behavior of 
medical managers, non-medical managers, doctors and nurses and bureaucrats. 
Doctors felt the need to protect the medical value base of the health system whilst 
also protecting their expertise.  Nurses felt that their position in the health system and 
their contribution to the reform process was compromised, whilst bureaucrats fought 







The reform model as discussed earlier was recognized to be in policy terms a “big 
bang” reform strategy rather than a strategy with “small incremental” steps. The 
choice of the reform design is strongly associated by the sway of the donor who were 
influenced at the time by ideas around global reforms advocated in the 1990s 
including the 1993 World Bank Report (such as decentralization and increased roles 
of the private sector in health) (Section 2.1). Furthermore Fiji was heavily influenced 
by ideas generated in the Fiji public sector at the time related to the New Public 
Management (NPM) ideas (Appana, 2007).  
 
The study has also noted that development aid values and emerging ideas related to 
the health sectors functioning played a significant part in influencing the reform 
design and implementation.  The study showed that prior to the 1999 reforms, that 
the Government of Australia and Fiji enjoyed a strong donor relationship, with 
Australia enjoying a priority position as a central funder of the health sector. 
Australia’s interests therefore were well entrenched in many of the already existing 
donor initiatives in the country. Australia’s role was further strengthened by the 
control of the initiative through the management contractor and the health 
management advisors. 
 
In the case of Fiji, policy makers did not consider the assumptions of the values that 
lay behind the chosen policy options nor did they anticipate the reaction of 
stakeholders who championed the retention of the old system. According to Walt 
(1994) value systems are seldom explicit or take into account when policy 
implementation is considered (Walt, 1994).  There was considerable conflict in 
values between policy makers, the professional and other stakeholders in 
Fiji.   Where values clashed with reform objectives there was resistance to executing 
policies such as the doctors’ resistances to release decision making power to the sub 
divisions and institutional resistance to release human resource authorities to the 
Ministry of Health. Assuming that the entire Fiji Health Sector was committed to 






7. 1.4 The role of political Context 
In analysing the political policy context of Fiji during the reforms, it was shown that 
the unstable political environment which preceded the reforms and during the reform 
period impacted on the reform implementation. Political unrest coupled with rising 
ethnic tensions, changing roles of traditional leadership and power, removal of Fiji 
from the world commonwealth community in 1990 and the subsequent review of 
Fijis constitution all made for a difficult context and environment for public policy 
making (Section 4.2) 
 
The frequency of the change of governments during the same period resulted in lack 
of sustainable political support by health ministers for the reforms. The distractions 
of ethnic tensions, constitutional issues related to paramountcy and protection of 
indigenous Fijians did not allow for a political focus on public sector reforms.  There 
were four changes of government and one coup during the reform period.  Strong 
and stable governments are not only a necessary determinant for successful 
implementation but important for implementation and sustainability (Walt, 1994). 
 
The 1999 elections were the first political test of the reconfigured 1990 Constitution 
known as the 1997 Constitution Amendment. The Act signaled a move towards a 
broader equitable political balance between indigenous Fijians and Fijian Indians. 
The results of that election gave Fiji its first Indian Prime Minister and a year later a 
military coup overthrew the Indian leadership.  From 2000 to 2001, Fiji was led by 
an interim Government and the public sector reforms were halted. These vital events 
created a de-stabilising environment for the implementation of the reforms (Section 
4.3.1).  Fiji was also recovering from substantial economic setbacks and a growing 
large and inefficient public sector (Section 4.3). Furthermore and most importantly 
there was evidence that the Fiji health system was struggling to respond to the 
growing burden of disease on its growing urban population, impacting on the ability 
of the system to function well (Section 4.4). 
 
The study highlighted that the MOH was shown to be a “low lying” agency with 
little political power and legislative authority to undertake the reforms. It was viewed 






struggled to develop the necessary respected and credible leadership and failed to 
convince the wider public sector of its capacity to sustain the reform momentum.  
Strong bio medical focus of the health system (Section 6.1.1) and a nursing sector 
that was discontent with its professional status within the system (Section 6.5.1) was 
also an influencing feature of the reforms. An environment of discontented health 
workers and a high volume of migrating doctors and nursing during the same period 
was also a key element of the reforming health system (Section 4.5.4). 
 
7. 1.5 The role of Policy process and implementation 
In analysing the health policy process the study showed that the important stages of 
the health policy process (such feasibility, agenda building, advocacy, diagnosis, 
agreement on objectives, planning, and implementation) were not well understood 
and therefore affected the formulation and the implementation process. The study 
suggests that limited data and evidence was used to diagnose the health sector 
problems were not clearly identified or articulated and therefore the problem 
identification stage of the policy processes floundered. 
 
Analysis also highlighted that the process in which the health reforms then made it 
onto the policy agenda was without formal political support. At the policy 
formulation stage the study suggests that very few stakeholders, community and 
actors were involved in the consultation of reform objectives nor contributed to the 
reform design. Critical to this stage of the reform model development is the 
importance of communication with stakeholders and as the study showed, poor 
communication across the entire five year period on the reforms was problematic and 
directly destabilized the implementation process.  Arguably implementation is the 
most important phase of policy making. The study documented that at the various 
stages necessary, for policy formulation and implementation were not well defined. 
Subsequently, implementation of the reforms were diverted and often changed, 
impacting on overall success of the reform process.  
 
7. 1.6 The role of the Policy Context 
An analysis of the data suggests that the reforms proposed for Fiji were technically 





technical a policy design according to Walt the easier it is to implement (Walt, 
1994). In the case of Fiji the conditions for analysing the reform model and the 
changes it necessitated both legislatively were not available.  Three agencies were 
involved in the key changes, and technical features of the reforms required 
substantial legislative changes as well as the orientation of the Ministry of Health 
from a service provision organisation to a policy, planning and monitoring 
organization (Section5.6.1). These were not marginal changes but whole of sector 
and system changes.  The complexities of the reform model placed the importance of 
technical information at the centre of the decision making process, causing 
distractions and an over emphasis of its role in the process. 
 
This according to Bossert (1998) is problematic and is a rejected concept in policy 
making decisions (Berman and Bossert, 2000). The study further highlighted the 
importance and emphasis that policy makers put on the role of technical information 
to try to gain legitimacy and to persuade actors to support the reform model. The 
over-reliance on legislation and technical activities in the reform program 
highlighted the belief of the policy makers that the legislation changes would be 
sufficient catalyst for reform success.  The study showed that whilst central to the 
reform implementation, numerous other factors (such as actors and the political 
context) were equally as important and critical to the success of the program.  The 
study further showed that there was no technical consensus to the reform model 
during the reform period (Section 5.6.2). 
 
Implementation has been defined as, “what happens between policy expectations and 
(perceived) policy results”.  As discussed in the methodology chapter early 
theoretical models perceived policy making as linear with a clear division between 
policy formulation and policy execution (Buse et al., 2007). Most of these models 
suggest that policy formulation is political and concerned with what governments 
should do and implementation is concerned with management and administrative 
(Walt, 1994). In the case of Fiji, the reform initiative is described as a 
decentralisation reform (Aus Health International, 1998c). This study does not cover 






documentation and interview data suggests that the reform model and the significant 
restructuring of the system was not what the MOH expected or anticipated. 
 
The study suggests that the overly technical approach of formulating the reform 
model used by the consultants was a purposeful strategy because it was easier, and 
appeared to be more efficient to define decisions as technical rather than political.  In 
other words it was easier for them to advocate technical designs and defend policy 
decisions rather than to engage in the political discussions of reform development.  
As the study highlights: reform and health systems change require both political and 
technical leadership. 
 
The reform leaders were as much as possible technically qualified but were not 
aware of the political implications of the reform option chosen. Furthermore, the 
MoH was not prepared for analysing and managing the highly political dimensions 
of the reform process nor prepared for identifying strategies to manage the various 
stakeholders. Policy analysis capacity within the MoH would have assisted in 
organising political data in the system that would have assisted in risk management. 
 
7. 1.7 The role of Leadership and Ownership of the Reforms 
The leadership vacuum during the reforms made the overall reform process difficult.  
Four changes of Government and four different health ministers, two elections and 
one coup, did not allow political stability or consistency of progression of the reform 
program, even with stable bureaucracy leadership.45  Health sector change requires 
the full commitment of Governments and political leadership, the credibility of the 
Government, political timing and recognition of the political effects of the reforms 
(Glassman et al., 1999).  Given the political vacuum, much of the leadership fell to 
the bureaucracy and to the technical teams located across the MoH, of which neither 
groupings had the knowledge or capacity for political strategic assessment to manage 
the political costs and benefits of reform especially in relation to the stakeholders in 
the MoH and the PSC and the MoFP (Section 5.9). 
 
                                               






The challenges of adopting the reforms were due to lack of ownership of the changes 
by the MoH and by the Government. The dilemma identified was that the various 
Governments that came to power during the reform period were not committed nor 
engaged in the health sector reform debate and therefore did not take political 
ownership of the reforms to a large extent. There were no efforts to raise ownership 
with the various governments in power (through for example multi partisan 
ownership) because of the political turmoil within the country at the time. Rather 
minister driven ownership was the only approach and the only political strategy 
available to the MOH and as the analysis showed this was not a successful strategy.  
 
7. 1.8 Political Timing of the Reforms 
The feasibility of reforms is affected by political timing (Glassman et al., 1999).  The 
Government who initiated the FHMRP remained in power for five months after the 
commencing of the reforms. Although policy reformists were concerned at the 
impending elections, very little political strategizing could have prevented the 
temporary halt by the new Government of the legislation process. Subsequent 
Governments such as military and interim governments 2000-2001 did not have the 
political will or mindset for continued public policy development. In 2001 after a 
democratic election the reforms progressed more slowly (Chapter 4, Appendix 1). 
 
7.2 Recommendations from the Study 
Analysis of data gathered and a review of literature in this thesis point to a series of 
efforts that could be made towards a greater understanding of health policy 
implementation in Fiji and for Pacific countries in the region.  This section proposes 
specific recommendations in this regard for a range of relevant stakeholders who 
have an interest in this regard. 
 
7.2.1 Recommendations for the Government of Fiji  
That the Government of Fiji ensures coverage of a comprehensive approach to 
building knowledge and capacity in health policy development, analysis and practice 







1. Establishing a central health policy unit that builds and harnesses the 
historical context and intelligence in the Ministry on health policy 
development and analysis. 
 
This recommendation was shared discussed with the Minister of Health in Fiji in 
2011.  In 2012 the MoH established a health policy unit. The learning form this 
thesis has contributed to a number of discussions held in the MoH as part of the 
scoping of the new policy unit. 
 
2. Developing a comprehensive and resourced workforce strategy which 
identifies the recruitment of and growth of health policy analysis and 
strategic planning of human resources. 
 
The study argues that much of the implementation challenges for Fiji are due to the 
lack of capacity in the health system to understand health policy formulation 
processes and its impact on implementation.  The project highlighted the lack of 
technical knowledge by MoH staff in this area has  resulted in poor policy judgments 
and lack of proficiency to anticipate and plan for successful implementation 
activities.  Recognition of the importance of policy analysis has been part of this 
recognition.  The need for Fiji to articulate and describe a comprehensive workforce 
plan that includes, health policy analysis training and the investment of health policy 
research would be a major step in advancing Fiji’s capacity. 
 
In particular, it is observed that Fiji MoH failed to recognize and develop political 
and strategic responses that would have enabled wider public sector issues and issues 
of key stakeholders to be better understood in the implementing stages of the health 
policy reform.  Furthermore, the development of MoH own policy analysis unit 
would strengthen its ability to counter inappropriate external advice and pressure 
from donors and other development partners who don't have full knowledge of 
contextual and political challenges in health policy processes.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, responsibility for implementing health policy is not 





health sector NGOs and workforce unions have extensive responsibilities to ensure 
the smooth flow of health policy decisions in Fiji.  Furthermore, the establishment of 
a focal point of health policy in the MoH will enhance a greater profile of policy 
expertise for the public sector within the MoH and for the health sector providing 
provide a greater confidence in health policy matters for both external and internal 
stakeholders. Specifically it will escalate the importance and credibility and practice 
of the culture of health policy making (Chapters 4, 5). 
 
3. That the Government of Fiji promotes a shared responsibility for health 
policy formulation and implementation through both the public sector 
and the health sector. 
 
Chapter 3 highlights that the MoH struggled to convince stakeholders to share the 
responsibility in health policy formulation and implementation. The MoH struggled 
to advocate the importance of health policy within the broad policy dialogue. 
Understanding how the health sector can broaden and advocate the importance of 
health systems strengthening as much more than a health sector issue is key to 
advancing this important responsibility. A central role for the MoH should include a 
key advocacy role but also opportunities need to be explored with the broader public 
sector on engagement in public policy advocacy and processes.   
 
4. That the Government of Fiji ensures a consultative approach with all 
those associated with the development of new health policy: includes 
cabinet, political ministers, senior politicians NGOS, academics and 
broad public sector agencies and the community more broadly. 
 
Discussion of the need to account for advocating a culture of policy for evidence is 
identified throughout Chapters 3 and 4.  Policy culture refers to a habit of using 
evidence for policy making, fostering processes and creating an enviornment of 
information for decision making.  Specific consultative processes require a  broader 
understanding and buy in of change in a health reform environment. The thesis has 
identified that a poor culture of information and information sharing existed within 






improve communication and therefore engagement and empowerment in the policy 
process by policy implementers.  More importantly consultation is likely to also 
identify potential barriers to policy implementation and more importantly assist the 
MoH to agree reform objectives but also provide clarity on the impact of the reforms 
on stakeholdres and the broader community. 
 
5. That the Government of Fiji specifically gather commissions information 
and research in public health policy in Fiji in regard to implementation 
success factors.  
 
The study highlighted that there is poor understanding of implementation success 
factors. It would be important to ensure that the findings of this commission are 
documented in order to provide guidance to other developing nations in the Pacific.  
This thesis has observed that the body of research in this area is relatively small for 
developing countries in particular Pacific countries that have similar colonial 
histories and public sector structures. 
 
6. That the Government of Fiji requests the technical assistance of the 
WHO, and/or bilateral donors such as the Australian Government and 
the World Bank to build stronger and more sustainable health policy 
capacity in the Fiji Health System. 
 
International assistance in the area of health reforms and health policy needs to take 
greater account of capacity building as part of the broader health systems 
strengthening approach for countries.  That donor ideology needs and donor driven 
outcomes should not be at the centre of health reforms objectives and outcomes, but 
rather focused on what the country is trying to achieve and assisting the country to 
build that capacity to ensure long term sustainability.  WHO has a central role in 
supporting this approach as they are the countries key technical advisors in health 
systems strengthening and capacity building and they should play a role in assisting 






7. That technical assistance is provided in a capacity-building manner 
through training and mentoring. 
 
The study highlighted that the role of the donor and Technical Assistance played an 
important role in the formulation, planning and implemenation of the reforms.  
 
Key questions that development partners should consider when funding 
initiatives similar to this should include assessment of the following issues: 
 
x Assurance that key personnel are culturally and technically competent 
x Human resources available in the country to support the assessment, 
formulation, and planning and implementation adequate and sustainable 
x Is the donor formulating the plan or is the country? 
x Is there an agreed understanding between all stakeholders of what the plan 
will do with the country? 
x Is there already a process in place for planning within the country system? 
x How does a country analyse its context? 
x How does the planning process recognize and take account of in-country 
policy processes, institutional and legislative arrangements (i.e. complexity 
of the country’s system)? 
 
Based on a synthesis of this combined information, a range of factors have been 
argued to be key requirements for success in the development and implementation of 
health policy in developing nation settings.  Furthermore what this study has also 
attempted to support is Gilson and colleagues assertion that health policy analysis is 
not only of practical importance in public health, but also a legitimate area of 
academic inquiry (Gilson et al., 2008). In short, despite ten years of calls for more 
health policy analysis which elucidates the determinants of policy change, the field 








7. 3 Limitations of the study 
This study has provided a background to the process of health policy implementation 
in Fiji, and has focused on the key areas of resistance to implementing the Fiji Health 
Management reforms. The study was not able to cover all the issues that emerged in 
the data analysis, further a number of limitations were also identified in the medthods 
and scope of the study. 
 
Literature review: The area of health policy analysis is not well documented except 
for a handful of specialists and experts in the developed world. No literature was 
available on studies on health policy experiences in the Pacific and with Pacific 
island nations. 
 
Methodology: Besides the document analysis, open ended interviews with numerous 
stakeholders including international and donor agencies of which were central to the 
research study. The approach of conducting interviews with actors involved in the 
policy process, sharing personal knowledge was a culturally sensitive and new 
experience for many of the interviewees.  Convincing stakeholders that they can 
make a meaningful contribution to improving health systems was challenging. 
During the data collection phase Fiji’s MOH was once again restructuring. 
Furthermore, the fragility of  the political environment made it difficult for 
interviewees to speak freely about their feelings for fear of repercussion.  
 
Health information and data in Fiji is poor (Aumua and Hodge, 2012); accessing 
information from within the MoH system of reports was challenging. When data was 
not available but necessary to validate themes that were emerging in the interviews,  
I would not use the information.  Information that I could only verify was used and 
resulted in me not using a large proportion of information. I was questioned several 
times as to why the study was necessary given it was the first time a study of this 
kind had been carried out in Fiji and that the information I needed was not available.  
A large part of the study was focussed specifically on understanding reform  
implementation challenges.  Interviewees were often uncomfortable judging and 
commenting negatively on their experiences because of the cultural constraints in 





 Scope:  Initially, the scope of the study seemed to capture the critical areas of focus. 
However, during the data analysis phase it became clear that the area of the study 
was just a small step into a large research area and it was not possible to 
investigation every emerging issue and theme that was generated in the data. 
Choosing which themes to continue to investigate was difficult as there was so much 
important questions that needed to be answered. 
 
7.4 Suggestions for Future Research and Implementation of 
Health Reform Policy in Developing Countries 
 
7.4.1 Potential Key Areas of Future Research 
The role of health policy analysis theory in developing countries 
The existing body of knowledge of health policy analysis in LMIC is weak (Walt et 
al., 2008). Health policy theory and its usefulness has been evolved and developed 
from the basis of developed country settings experiences and knowledge. The 
interface between policy making and research in low income countries is complex 
(Hyder et al., 2007).  The Literature highlights that there is very little research or 
learning on how health policy analysis models have been used or understood within 
development country settings (Walt et al., 2008). To advance health policy analysis, 
more research is needed in the use of existing frameworks and theories.  As Gilson 
and others have highlighted what is needed are many more studies that test a theory’s 
application. 
 
Deepening and extending this body of work requires a much more focused approach 
to understanding politics, process, and power and needs to be integrated into the 
study of health policies. In particular the concept of power remains under researched 
in health policy analysis (Gilson et al., 2008) Further attention on Pacific Island 
countries and experiences is needed as the reality is that policy analysis is only 
emerging and has yet to establish its legitimacy as a field within developing 







Understanding the centrality of actors in health reforms (developing country 
experience) 
Actors are essential to consider when analyzing health policy and each grouping of 
actors have a critical role to play. There is a growing realization between researchers 
and decision makers that research can improve the management decisions of actors 
in national health systems. However there is a lack of scientific knowledge on the 
mechanisms to promote such engagement and their level of success, especially in 
low-income countries. There is a need to better understand why actors and policy 
decisions makers behave as they do. Understanding their values and interests and 
identifying who have the potential to block or subvert policy development and 
implementation.  
 
An added dimension of this important discussion relates also to what Gilson and 
colleagues (2008) describe as the importance of enhancing reflexivity in relation to 
both the relationships between researchers and policy actors and the manner in which 
the findings from policy analysis are used to engage with policy actors. It is in this 
vein and in the context of LMIC that the role of actors in limited resource settings 
needs further exploration.  A significant learning in the study has been specifically 
my role as an indigenous Fijian woman and the use of reflexivity principles 
throughout the research and how this concept enabled me to be central to the 
research knowledge process.  
 
Building health policy capacity in developing countries 
Health policy capacity refers to both institutional and individual capacity but also 
individual capacity and competencies necessary for reforming developing countries.  
Much is already known about training and development of health policy analysts, 
however more research is needed to understand further the development of strategies 
to enhance and strengthen institutional policy capacity. How can countries strengthen 
and prioritize decisions that relate to building and investing in institutional health 
policy analysis. How can countries learn about program sustainability? This single 
and most important issue is responsible for the limited success of health systems 






Implementation Theory and its role in development countries 
Policy implementation studies have found that while there has been a trend in the 
growth of academic literature about implementation of public policy, there has been 
no theory that has commanded general agreement and researchers continue to work 
from diverse theoretical perspectives, do not agree on the outlines of a theory of 
implementation, or on the key determinants to success (Trader-Leigh, 2002).  Adding 
further to theoretical challenges is the complexity is the limited knowledge of 
implementation theory in developing countries. A critical aspect of these 
investigations should focus on institutional resistance to policy change. 
 
7. 5 Significance of the Study 
An understanding of the broad range of factors that affect implementation of health 
reform, change and policy is growing; however, much of the learning has been 
accrued from developed country experiences.  Absent from the published literature is 
research and knowledge on health policy on the region of the Pacific, and in 
particular small island nations with poor public policy development infrastructure. 
 
x This study is the first to provide an in-depth detailed such a discussion of health 
policy implementation in Fiji and one of a few on health policy in the Pacific 
region.   
 
x This study also collected data related to the health policy implementation 
experience from a variety of stakeholders. There has been no other data 
available in Fiji to date to explain health policy process. 
 
x While data has highlighted that health policy formulation and implementation 
are difficult processes, it has also identified other issues related barriers of 
implementation. These findings require further investigation, although the 
current research has identified, political institutions, actors, values and context 
much more research is required to better understand them. This project therefore 








x The research has identified that in a country that has limited formal policy 
formulation and implementation experience, a history of colonial influence on 
its political institutions, a health sector that is weak with human resources and 
limited technical knowledge, and an unstable political environment, the likely 
hood of successful policy implementation is difficult. 
 
x The thesis has discussed the importance of health policy analysis to assist in 
strengthening policy implementation and it has identified the challenges of 
implementation. 
 
x The study highlights that implementation studies need to examine the 
relationships between the authority responsible for policymaking, the policy 
objectives and policy implementation. 
 
x The recommendations proposed in this thesis provide practical suggestions for 
overcoming these challenges.  Most importantly it proposes a call for research to 
test health policy analysis theory in development country settings. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Health Policy in Fiji has traditionally focused on responding to supply side issues 
such as supply of hospitals, services, and human resources. During the 1990s and 
prior to the reforms Fiji had also developed a policy focus on disease prevention and 
health promotion (Negin et al., 2010).  Health Systems strengthening or health 
management strengthening prior to the 1999 reforms had not been a policy focus. 
The reforms as discussed elsewhere challenged the centralized and bio medical focus 
of the system. The reforms shifted power from centralized health decision making 
structure to various devolved health structures. The reforms also instigated a shift in 
power form a centralized control center of Government to the Ministry of Health. 
 
Health policy analysis is important for Fiji as it helps identify what has been the 
experience of implementation of the Fiji reforms and for developing countries. 
Policy analysis means different things to different people, for some policy analysis 





context and process (Walt and Gilson, 1994b).  
 
In developed countries, policy structures and process are much more sophisticated 
with formal procedures and actors and stakeholders are much more organized. 
Democratic procedures hold these processes in place. In developing countries the 
policy process is different, and the interaction between institutions and actors can 
influence the implementation process much more than in developed country settings.  
Policy structures are not often well organized and policy processes and stakeholders 
groupings are not well formed.    
 
In developing countries such as Fiji the political environment, unstable governments, 
poor institutional capacity in reforming organisations, the cultural values of society 
and its history are often much more  influencing factors (Bossert, 2000, Gilson et al., 
2008, Gilson and Raphaely, 2008).  In analysing the implementation of the reforms 
the study highlights that the lack of understanding of the important stages of the 
policy process, such as agenda building, policymaking, planning and implementation 
was evident. The involvement of all stakeholders in the development of reform 
objectives and broad engagement of stakeholders in the implementation was low.  
The challenges which affected the implementation, was the control and influence of 
the centre of the system, medical power, reluctance to move towards community 
health models of care, shortage of key trained staff, and difficult and unstable 
political environment. Implementation was further influenced of the social cultural 
context of Fijian society such as paramountcy and protection. 
 
Traditionally, there are two approaches to policy analysis, the “rationalist approach” 
and the “behaviorist” approach.  The rationalist approach assumes that the policy 
process can be designed and implemented in a straight line and that policy can be 
implemented in a series of rational steps  (Sabatier, 2007). The behaviourist approach 
on the other hand suggests that policy implementation is much more interactive and 
not linear but rather a process that is “bottom up” and not “top down”. 
What has been learnt in this study is the understanding that the theory that 
undermines policy choices and processes is critical to the success of a reform 






with which its policy is been developed the more likely the success of the policy 
been formulated and the greater identification of the appropriate reform model. 
Additionally, the more a country undertakes policy analysis activities the more 
effective its policy implementation. 
 
Considines (1994) public policy model used in this study to guide the collection of 
data and analysis is s associated with the behaviorist approach of policy development 
and implementation.  Its usefulness to this study of Fiji was that it called for a 
broader description of the role of culture and values in policy making 
 
The model utilised by Fiji to formulate and implement the reforms is closely aligned 
to the linear or top down approach (Figure 2) (Sabatier, 2000), which implies that 
once a policy decision is made, implementation of the decision happens 
automatically.  This model assumes that the role of actors is not central to the success 
of the reform implementation; rather it is fixated on processes rather than actors. A 
major drawback of the linear model is its failure to consider the complexities of the 
implementation process, and what eventuates is a situation in which the practical 
working out of the policy may be very different from the policy originally planned 
(Chapter 3). Policy leaders in the Fiji context did not recognize that Policy 
implementation is an ongoing, non-linear process that must be managed (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991) and required consensus building, participation of key stakeholders, 
conflict resolution, compromise, contingency planning, resource mobilisation and 
adaptation.  
 
The interactive model of implementation would have been a far more effective 
model for Fiji to use, as its focus would have been to generate the policy from within 
the policy community with which it would have been implemented (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1992). This approach argues for an ‘actor-perspective’, emphasizing the 
need to take into account the opinions of individuals, agencies and social groups that 
have a stake in how a system evolves. The approach promotes an interaction and 
sharing of ideas between those who make policy and those who are influenced most 
directly by the outcome.  As seen in the case of Fiji one of the most important effects 





policy makers to avoid responsibility. ‘The dichotomy between policy-making and 
implementation is dangerous. That is because it separates the ‘decision’ from the 
‘implementation’ and thus opens up ‘escape hatches’ through which policy makers 
can avoid responsibility (Sutton, 1999).  
 
The approach taken by Fiji fell short of achieving its intended results. This study has 
intended to show the importance of policy analysis in prospective policy making. Its 
focus has been on understanding the importance of process for policy formulation 
and implementation and not on the content of the policy.  Policy analysis has been 
used in this study to retrospectively understand Fijis past experience.  The study has 
intended to highlight why health policy analysis is important  to understanding  
health reforms success  (Walt et al., 2008). The study has helped explain why certain 
health issues received political attention and others did not. It assisted in the 
identification of stakeholders who supported as well as resisted policy reforms and 
helped identify The study identified both  potential and unintended consequences of 
policy decisions, as well as the barriers that undermined policy implementation and 
jeopardise the overall national objectives for the overall reform goals (Gilson et al., 
2008, Gilson and Raphaely, 2008, Buse et al., 2007). 
 
However it should also be used prospectively in the future for policy development as 
Fiji continues to move towards further reform and policy changes to strengthen its 
system and enhancing health services for its population.  
 
A model for health policy development and implementation with the following 
stages can be considered by Fiji and possibly developing countries:  
 
1. Defining the context- an assessment of the politics, economics and the 
culture of their health system, social pressures including their national culture 
and values, and priorities. This will enable Fiji to put its health system in 
context and therefore form the basis for health policy analysis. 
 
2. Stating the problem- an assessment or clear definitions on the health 






health policy analysis is that problem definition becomes clearer the more we 
review our empirical and conceptual understanding of the problem.  The 
process of policy analysis helps to make sure that the problem will be 
successfully targeted. 
 
3. Evidence of the problem- Assembling the evidence of the problem. 
Collecting data that can help identify the features of the policy. Health policy 
analysis will assist at this stage in identifying significant features of the 
policy problems under study and how it might be solved or mitigated. 
 
4. Identifying policy options- once the evidence has been compiled, and policy 
options have been constructed for solving the problem, it is at this stage that 
the importance of health policy analysis becomes critical and where linkages 
to the contextual factors, (identified in stage 1) become important. Once 
policy options have been considered, health policy analysis instruments for 
implementation should be considered such as: 
-  analyzing conditions for facilitating change process,  
- identification of technical features of the policy change and assessment  
ease of policy change, 
-  reviewing the underlying values within the chosen policy options 
- undertaking stakeholder analysis, reviewing interest groups who are likely 
to resist or support the policy- options for mobilizing support 
- analysis of the financial and technical and managerial support to facilitate 
the policy change, training issues, salary levels, information systems , 
workforce capacity 
- consideration of how strategic implementation process might work, such as 
how to involve planners, managers, research , and the analysis needed 
to execute the policy, promoting public awareness, advocacy etc.  It is 
at this stage that policy makers might review their own analysis of the 
policy problem and the policy options. 
5. Impact Analysis or projecting the policy outcomes – Policy makers will at 
this stage should be concerned with the outcome of the proposed 





over option B) The answers to these questions should emerge from health 
policy analysis undertaken at stage 4. The role of health policy analysis at 
stage 5 should be on implementation analysis and utilizing the information 
collected at stage 4. 
 
6. Making the decision to implement – At this stage the decisions regarding 
which policy option to pursue that will give the maximized outcome and have 
the greater success of implementation should be clear. 
 
Fiji, like many other developing countries around the world is intent on improving 
the health of its population whilst challenged with limited financial and human 
resources and with an increasing burden of disease. These challenges place 
significant stress on its health system.  However, Fiji is a country of great optimism 
and its dedicated health workforce are admired for their tenacity and commitment.  
Ensuing population health and enhancing the Government’s capacity to improve 
health is now a priority for Fiji. Health policy analysis offers Fiji an important 
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Appendix 1: Key Dates and Reform Timeline 
 
1970 Fiji becomes Independent from United Kingdom under a new 
Constitution 
1979 Report of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Health Services in 
Fiji 
1982 David Coombes Report on the Administration of Fiji’s Heath System 
1985 Public Sector reforms introduced with Public Sector Wage Freeze 
1987 May Fiji’s First Military Coup by Rabuka 
1987 September Fiji’s second Coup ( Fiji is evicted from the Commonwealth) 
1987-1992 Fiji Ruled by a military Interim Government Rabuka 
1992 Fiji General Elections/won by SVT 
1990 New Constitution developed 
1994 General Elections won by SVT 
1994 Start of Civil Service Reform Programme under Rabuka 
1996 Economy and Efficiency Review of the Colonial War Memorial 
Hospital 
1997 Constitutional Amendment Act 
1997 Report of the Select Committee on the Fiji Health Service 
1997 WHO Mission Report on Divisional Hospital Management  
1998 February Pre-Feasibility Study completed on Reforms 
1998 April AusAid Issues and Proposals Paper for Management Reform of Sub 
Divisional Health Services 
1998 October Final Project Design completed 
1998 December MOU signed between GOA and GOF 
1999 February Appointment of AMC 
1999 February FHMRP commences Project Implementation ( Minister of Health 
Navuca) 
1999 January Public Service Act Reviews – its purpose to improve public sector 





1999 January Public Finance Management Act passed but not implemented due to 
elections and new incoming political party 
1999 June Finance Management Act suspended 
1999 November Cabinet endorses the proposed changes to MOH HQ and the 
establishment of Divisional Hospitals. (FHMRP) 
Duration of project Six-monthly TAG reviews 
1999 April  Eve of elections , Nursing strike by Fiji Nurses Association over salary 
disputes 
1999 May Elections of government in Fiji/ Rabuka Government lost the elections 
to Mahendra Chaudhry ( Fijis first Indian Prime Minister) 
Labour Coalition Government 
New Minister of Health, Mr Isimeli Cokanasiga 
1999 July All public sector reforms halted including legislation development 
necessary for the FHMRP 
2000 March MOH submits to Cabinet  the devolution structure, the creation of the 
divisional health boards and the creation of Chief Executives as 
administrative heads of each division.  
2000 April First  Annual Plan of the FHMRP 
2000 May Speights Coup/Labour Coalition Government overthrown and new 
Minister of Health, Mr Pita Nacuva 
 Fiji Constitution Suspended 
2000 June Finance Management Act suspended 
2000 November Constitution Restored 
2001 April 2 additional HMA positions (from the original HMA position at 
CEHS), added to the project – by the creation of HMA positions in 
Lautoka (WHS) and Labasa (NHS) 
2001 July Tavenui Community Health Project Opened 
PATIS introduced into the Northern Division 
2001 August Installation of an elected government for the first time since the May 
2000 Coup 
2001 September Democratic Elections  Prime Minister Qarase elected 
2001 September New structure  organisation submitted to PSC and approved 
2001 December PSC approval of the proposed decentralised structure for the MOH 






2002 July Establishment of Divisional Health Offices in the 3 Divisions 
2002 September  Dr Lepani appointed Temporary Director of Health. PSC approved  
temporary position in new environment 
2002 October Decentralisation Task Force disbanded 
2002 November  First Meeting of the National Executive Committee (supreme decision 
making for MOH). 
2002 FHMRP introduced as a KRA 
2002 December Government announced a freeze on recruitment to all vacant public 
service posts. Medical and nursing positions were exempt. 
2003 February Division of Health system standards renamed to include Nursing.  
2003 March Draft instrument of delegation (transferring responsibility and 
accountability to the proposed Divisional Directors’ positions of the 3 
Health Services) submitted to the PSC for approval 
March 2003 PSC published the formal transfer of staffing establishment from PWD 
to the MOH 
2003 May Financial Information System launched 
2003 September Government lifted freeze on recruitment of public service posts 
2003 October PSC approval of the delegation, with the exception of those powers 
considered to be granted to the PSC by the Constitution 
2003 The strengthening of the Decentralised system noted Annual Report as 
KRA 
2003 December Permanent appointments made to positions of Director, for each of the 
3 Health Divisions 
2004 January  Project Completion –  
2006 Full devolution of powers completed 









Appendix 2: Key individuals and organizations who participated in 
the case study research 
Total of 92 participants, 55 individual interviews and three focus groups. 
 
Individual Institution Title  Why was this person chosen  




Involved in Medical education and 
health policy education 
1  Senior 
researcher 
Involved as a member of the 
HMA team  
6   Senior 
researcher 
Involved in Reform evaluation  
1  Senior 
Researcher 
Employed at the MOH during the 
period of the reforms 
1  Senior 
researcher 
Policy and planning manager 
during the reforms 
3 Ministry of 
Health 
Ex Ministers 
of Health  
  
10 Central Division Senior MOH  
Clinical 
Officials  
Involved in the reforms both 
planning and implementation   
4  Senior 
Nursing 
Leaders  
Involved in planning, 
development and implementation 




Part of planning team in the MOH  




Ex Director Planning 
1 MOH Senior 
Clinician 






Individual Institution Title  Why was this person chosen  
1  Senior 
Clinician 
Divisional leader 
1  Senior 
Clinician 
Epidemiologist 
1  Senior Health 
Planner 
Health reform manager 
1  Health 
Researcher 
Researcher in the MOH 
5 Eastern Division Nurses Active nurses in the reform period 
5 Western Div Senior health 
officials 
Involved in reform 
implementation 
3 Central Division Senior health 
managers 
Involved in reform 
implementation 






Nurses Effected by reform  





Involved in lobbying MOH and 
nursing strike 




Involved in legislation and reform 
planning and discussions 




Oversight of reforms 
Monitored progress 




Key stakeholder, control of 
legislation 
1 Dept of Public 
Works 
Senior official Responsibility for asset 





Individual Institution Title  Why was this person chosen  
1 Parliamentarian Senator Member of Parliament during the 
reforms 
1 Fiji Womens 
Rights 
Movemen 




Senior official NGO for Fijian women  
1 WHO Country Head Technical Advisor to MOH 
 
2 Aus Aid Country Head High level oversight of reforms 
  ex first 
secretary 
Key advisor involved in reforms 
1 JIKA Country Head Observer 
1 Fiji Med Assoc. Member of 




1 Suva Private 
Hosp/NGO 
Director Stakeholder/actor 
1 Aus Health Senior official Lead implementing agency 
1 Aus Health Health 
Management 
Advisor 
Team Leader for Project 
 
1 Aus Health Health 
Management 
Advisor 
Manager Health reform team 
1 Aus Health Health 
Management 
Advisor 







Individual Institution Title  Why was this person chosen  
1 Aus Health Health 
Management 
Advisor 
Hops technical advisor 
1 Aus Health Health 
Management 
Advisor 
Institution reform technical 
advisor 
















Appendix 3: Themes that guided discussion with stakeholders 
Interviews structured around a framework of themes and questions which varied 
depending on the position of the individual been interviewed. 
 
Theme 1  Reform model and personal understanding 
 Background knowledge of Fiji’s health sector 
 Knowledge of key problems 
 Knowledge of purpose and goals of reforms 
 Understanding of reform design and reform content 
 Process on which reforms were communicated to the recipient/ how did they 
come to know about the reforms. 
 Involvement in actor networks/groups etc. 
 
Theme 2   Institutional Focus 
 Individual role in the institution 
 How long in institution 
 How did they as individuals engage in the reform process 
 How did the reforms become internalized in their respective institution 
 Institutional legislation issues 
 Public service issues/ role and environment 
 Capacity and technical issues in their institution that related to the reforms 
 Explore other issues related to institution and other public sector agency 
relationships 
 
Theme 3  Implementation 
 Individual role in implementation 
 How active individual in implementation process 
 Role in governance policy process 
 Individual observations regarding infrastructure and processes 
 Key observations regarding barriers and challenges 








Theme 4    Context 
 Individual views regarding political landscape,  
 Explore tensions/leadership /cultural and other broader socio political issues 
 Explore key issues in the environment that impacted on reforms 


































Appendix 7: Fiji Ethics Approval form 
    MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
88 AMY STREET, SUVA. 
              BOX 2223 GOVT. BLDGS.  
              SUVA. FIJI ISLANDS 
              PHONE: 3221424    FAX: 3318227 
15th March 2007 





I am pleased to advise that the National Health Research Committee has endorsed the 
following proposal submitted to the committee in February 2007.  
 
Fiji Health Reforms 
Researcher: Mrs. Audrey Aumua 
It is your responsibility to ensure that all people associated with this particular project are 
made aware of what has actually been approved.  
You must submit an annual report on this project at the end of the study or, at the conclusion 
of the project if it continues for less than a year.  
 
If you have any further queries on these matters, or require additional information, please do 
not hesitate to contact me on telephone number (+679) 3221424 or 
email: ravi.reddy@health.gov.fj.  On behalf of the National Health Research Committee 





Secretary – NHRC 
for 












Appendix 9: Pacific in crisis: the urgent need for reliable 
information to address non-communicable diseases 
Available to view online at http://www.uq.edu.au/hishub/pacific-health-dialog (full 









Appendix 10: An accessible method for teaching doctors about death 
certification 
Available to view online at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22408110 (full 









Appendix 11: Fiji's health management reforms (1999-2004). A case 
study 
Available to view online 
at http://www.pacifichealthdialog.org.fj/Volume%2015/v15no2/Original%20Papers/
Fijis%20Health%20Management%20Reforms.pdf (full copy is provided with the 
PDF version of this document). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
